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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is the first in-depth study of the early 1930s Bloomsbury-based New Europe 
Group (NEG) and New Britain Movement (NBM), which constituted a politicised 
social movement led by Dimitrije Mitrinović.  The Introduction situates the NEG/NBM 
as the British manifestation of the nouvelles relèves, the northwest European cluster of 
extra-parliamentary political groups that were neither plainly left-wing nor right-wing, 
but rather were infused with a spiritually based ideology influenced by the Personalist 
philosopher Emmanuel Mounier.  Chapter 1 scrutinises the NEG/NBM as an antisystem 
challenger to the National Government, and analyses the movement’s ‘political 
perfectionist’ antisystemness in the context of the syncretic turn in British extra-
parliamentary politics.  Chapter 2 discusses the dynamics of the NEG/NBM, including 
its ‘prefigurative politics’ and Mitrinović’s use of ‘strategic ambiguity.’  Chapter 3 
contextualises the European federalist thought of Mitrinović and other prominent 
figures in the NEG/NBM, and examines their understanding of the ‘European civil war’ 
and perception of the European and world ‘crisis.’  Chapter 4 begins with a comparative 
analysis of the proposals for European unity advanced by Richard Nikolaus von 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Aristide Briand, and Mitrinović and the NEG/NBM.  The chapter 
then details the lines of reasoning the NEG/NBM used to make a case for 
Eurofederalism, and explains the movement’s proposals for European governance and 
federal institutions.  The first complete list of the NEG/NBM’s periodicals is provided 
in an Appendix.  The main finding presented is that the NEG/NBM (rather than Federal 
Union) was the first genuine Eurofederalist group in Britain.  Another finding is that 
during the early years of the National Government, the NEG/NBM turned many readers 
of its periodicals into a ‘networked audience’ in order to maximise the movement’s 
delegitimising impact on the MacDonald–Baldwin axis.  This thesis redresses the 
neglect of the NEG/NBM in the historiography on significant fringe movements in 
interwar Britain. 
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Introduction 
 
The Subject, Significance and Sources of this Thesis 
 
The Subject 
 
The subject of this thesis is the concentric couple of Bloomsbury-based political 
groups called the New Europe Group (NEG) and the New Britain Movement (NBM), 
active in the first half of the 1930s.  Sharing a set of organisers, the NEG (founded in 
1931) and the outgrowth NBM (which had a public profile in 1933–4, and published its 
last surviving periodical until mid-1935) had no substantive ideological differences.  
For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the NEG and the NBM together as ‘the 
NEG/NBM’ or ‘the movement.’  I will make an exception every time a distinction need 
be made between the NEG (which, for the most part, organised lectures and discussion 
groups, while conducting and publicising research) and the NBM, a politicised social 
movement that grew to operate in all four corners of the kingdom.  The NEG/NBM was 
the brainchild of the London-based self-exile Dimitrije Mitrinović, a charismatic 
Herzegovinian Serb who was the movement’s undisputed leader.1 
The NBM’s objective was to ‘create a New Britain organised in Social Unity 
and for the economic freedom of every individual’ through the use of methods 
including the ‘equitable distribution of wealth’; the ‘national control of the issue of 
money’; the ‘constitutional reorganisation of national politics upon a regional basis’; 
the ‘functional organisation of industry in the service of the community as a whole’; 
and the creation of a ‘European Federation … as the basis of a new world order and a 
                                                
1 Mitrinović was born on 21 October 1887 in a village near the town of Stolac, and died on 28 August 
1953 in Richmond-upon-Thames; see Andrew Rigby, Initiation and Initiative: An Exploration of the Life 
and Ideas of Dimitrije Mitrinović (Boulder, 1984), p. 7 and p. 185. 
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means towards active peace.’2  The NEG/NBM captured the imagination of thousands: 
New Britain: A Weekly Organ of National Renaissance (hereafter New Britain weekly), 
the movement’s main periodical, had a peak readership of half a million.3  In its day, 
commentators recognised the NEG/NBM as a significant voice in the political sphere: 
for example, John Middleton Murry told readers of The Adelphi that the movement 
gave ‘definite focus’ to the ‘aspirations of [a middle-class] mass of opinion,’ 
‘“radically” inclined as no body of opinion in its class has been before,’ on the ‘defects’ 
of ‘national and international organisation.’4 
 
The Significance 
 
Peter Clarke has identified the British Union of Fascists (BUF) and the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) as the main beneficiaries of the ‘bankruptcy 
of bourgeois politics’ that many Britons began to perceive in 1931, when a politico-
economic crisis caused Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to effectively suspend party 
politics.5  MacDonald was expelled from the Labour Party a week after forming the 
National Government (whose benches were dominated by MPs from the Conservative 
Party, led by Stanley Baldwin), which he headed until mid-1935.  Many Britons 
disapproved of what Robert Boothby would later call the ‘get-together on the part of the 
Boys of the Old Brigade.’6  Some Britons who cared just as little for the rump Labour 
                                                
2 University of Bradford Special Collections: New Atlantis Foundation Dimitrije Mitrinović Archive 
[hereafter NAFDMA], 6/1/1, ‘The New Britain Alliance’ [‘The Constitution of the New Britain 
Alliance’], 15 December 1933 (published January 1934), p. 2. 
3 David Davies put New Britain weekly’s peak circulation at 70,000; see D. R. Davies, In Search of 
Myself: The Autobiography of D. R. Davies (London, 1961), p. 131.  I calculated the peak readership 
using the ‘serious weeklies’ readership-to-circulation ratio given on p. 183 of Benny Morris, The Roots of 
Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s (London, 1991). 
4 John Middleton Murry, ‘A Word to Spiritual Aristocrats’, The Adelphi, November 1933, p. 89.  
Mitrinović privately referred to Middleton Murry as ‘Muddleton Mirray’; the two men were not close.  
Adelphi contributor Jack Common also wrote for NBM periodicals.  See NAFDMA, 1/9/13, R. G. Wrugh 
(Rex Campbell became R. G. Wrugh in 1936), ‘Notes on Mitrinovic’, MS, October 1961, p. 12. 
5 Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900–1990 (London, 1997), p. 171. 
6 Robert Boothby, I Fight to Live (London, 1947), p. 93. 
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Party joined the CPGB, whose members saw Soviet Russia as the exemplar of progress; 
others among the discontented joined the BUF, in quite a few cases because they 
wanted their country to mirror, with a British tint, the image projected by fascist Italy.7  
But for discontented Britons wishing to invest their hopes in a more indigenous and 
‘respectable’ movement, the alternatives to the CPGB and BUF included one that suited 
their sensibilities: the NBM was the congenial ‘political home’ they sought.  The NBM 
– active in communities as poor as Lemington and as rich as Royal Leamington Spa – 
was not a distant-third beneficiary of the perceived bankruptcy of bourgeois politics, for 
it outstripped the CPGB in size and importance in 1933–4.8 
The NEG/NBM, though, is very rarely mentioned in surveys of Britain in the 
1930s, and is little known even among specialists.  Unlike the shirt movements of 
roughly equal size (each of which has a comparatively voluminous literature), the 
NEG/NBM did not stage spectacles that attracted national press coverage; this low 
profile augured low visibility in the historical record.  To more fully account for 
scholars’ neglect of the NEG/NBM, we must consider several other factors that, taken 
together, go a long way to explaining the almost complete absence of the movement 
from the historiography. 
One factor that partially accounts for the dearth of literature on the NEG/NBM 
is that some historians may have dismissed it out of hand as nothing but a failure – yet 
this impression turns out to be quite mistaken.  Invoking E. P. Thompson’s phrase, 
Linda Merricks has complained that Mitrinović’s group has been included among those 
unfairly ‘dismissed by the “enormous condescension of posterity” as cranks and 
failures.’9  Even historians are not immune to survivorship bias, so it is perhaps 
unsurprising that few have paid attention to a movement that neither prompted 
                                                
7 Clarke, Hope and Glory, p. 171. 
8 NAFDMA, 6/5/4, ‘Index of New Britain Groups’, no date. 
9 Linda Merricks, The World Made New: Frederick Soddy, Science, Politics, and Environment (Oxford, 
1996), pp. 108–9. 
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government policy changes nor took a more enduring institutional form (such as by 
evolving into a political party).10  Yet the NEG/NBM matters: and it matters most of all 
because it was the first British movement to advocate genuine European federalism 
(hereafter Eurofederalism) – and because it managed to continue publicising that cause 
until the mid-1930s, unlike most likeminded groups on the Continent.  After the fascists 
had come to power in Italy, the leaders of political groups most likely to further develop 
Eurofederalist thought were murdered, exiled or driven underground.11  The same fate 
befell likeminded Germans from 1933, when the National Socialists outlawed 
Europeanist associations as ‘pacifist.’12  In France, the cause of European integration 
had been tarnished in 1930 by the failure of the proposal for a united Europe made by 
French statesman Aristide Briand.  The Eurofederalist flame – stamped out by 
jackboots in Italy and Germany, and smothered in France – was kept burning in Britain 
by the NEG/NBM. 
Another factor, a side effect of the ‘Bloomsbury boom,’ partially accounts for 
the scholarly neglect of the NEG/NBM: among intellectual historians, the voices of the 
Bloomsbury Group have tended to drown out those of its neighbours – witness how 
‘Bloomsbury’ is taken as a metonym for the Bloomsbury Group, effectively 
homogenising the district’s fissiparous intellectual scene.13  In deference to that 
dominance, Mitrinović’s group has been called ‘the other Bloomsbury Group.’14  The 
groups were based only hundreds of yards apart; each met at the Valerie Cooper School 
of Rhythmic Movement and Dance in Fitzrovia, and Mitrinović was a client of the 
                                                
10 It must be borne in mind that the NEG/NBM sought influence rather than power (about which more 
later) – and it is usually harder to detect the exertion of influence than it is to see the exercise of power. 
11 John Pinder, ‘Federalism in Britain and Italy: Radicals and the English Liberal Tradition’, in Peter 
M. R. Stirk (ed.), European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period (London, 1989), pp. 201–3. 
12 Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration, vol. 1, The Formation of the European Unity 
Movement: 1945–1947, trans. P. S. Falla and A. J. Ryder (Oxford, 1982), p. 42. 
13 Regina Marler has documented the ‘Bloomsbury boom’ in Bloomsbury Pie: The Making of the 
Bloomsbury Boom (New York, 1997). 
14 Philip Conford, ‘“Saturated with Biological Metaphors”: Professor John Macmurray (1891–1976) and 
the Politics of the Organic Movement’, Contemporary British History 22.3 (2008), p. 320. 
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Hogarth Press.15  Merricks has contended that no contemporary could have foreseen 
that ‘the Bloomsbury circle around the Woolfs and Bells, not that around Mitrinović’ 
would be ‘regarded as successful by historians.’16 
A practical issue, too, partially accounts for the lack of research on the 
NEG/NBM: Mitrinović’s acolytes restricted access to the movement’s archive until 
2003–4, when 31 metres of material was deposited at the University of Bradford as the 
New Atlantis Foundation Dimitrije Mitrinović Archive (NAFDMA).17  In the mid-
1970s, the acolytes had granted archival access to Serbian scholar Predrag Palavestra, 
who was writing the first biography of Mitrinović.18  A few years after the book was 
published, they read a private translation and were dismayed by the shoddy chapter on 
Mitrinović’s activities in London.19  For decades after their experience with Palavestra, 
the acolytes – who felt ‘a responsibility to him [Mitrinović] not to cloud the picture of 
his personality and work but to carve it out more clearly’ – closely guarded their 
                                                
15 Luisa Passerini, Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and Politics in Britain between the Wars 
(London, 1999), p. 129.  Roger Fry, a Bloomsburian, was the brother-in-law of New Britain weekly 
contributor Janko Lavrin, who had introduced Mitrinović to certain London circles (Rigby, Initiation, 
p. 61).  Another connection between the two groups was that Virginia Woolf and Mitrinović were among 
the patrons of the Guernica exhibition (NAFDMA, 5/1/8 File, ‘Exhibition of Picasso’s Guernica’, 1938). 
16 Merricks, World Made New, pp. 108–9. 
17 Two decades prior to the accession, the acolytes granted access to Rigby, whose biography of 
Mitrinović (the aforementioned Initiation and Initiative) was published in 1984.  In it Rigby 
acknowledged the assistance of David Shillan, Harry and Gracie Rutherford, Ellen Mayne and Violet 
MacDermot, ‘all of whom knew Mitrinović personally’ (Initiation, p. v).  None of these acolytes were 
prominent figures in the NBM, whose public profile was fading by the time Harry Rutherford first 
contributed to Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin on 10 October 1934 (from that issue on, he and some 
of Mitrinović’s other younger followers produced the periodical, restyling it The Eleventh Hour New 
Series [hereafter Eleventh Hour] on 21 November 1934). 
18 Predrag Palavestra, Dogma i Utopija Dimitrija Mitinovića: Počeci srpske književne avangarde 
(Belgrade, 1977). 
19 The biography has all manner of shortcomings, and the chapter on the NEG/NBM is replete with 
factual errors; see NAFDMA, 1/9/2/ Volume, ‘Critique of the last chapter of Dr. Predrag Palavestra’s 
book Dogma i Utopija Dimitrija Mitinovića by the Trustees of the New Atlantis Foundation’, TS, 1980, 
pp. 71–2.  For the private translation, see NAFDMA, 1/9/1, ‘The Dogma and Utopia of Dimitrije 
Mitrinović’, TS, trans. D. Shillan and E. D. Goy, ca. 1980.  At best, Palavestra’s impressionistic account 
of the NEG/NBM offers a rough sketch of a finely grained subject.  Alert to the biography’s 
methodological problems, one reviewer stated that it could be ‘read like first-class novelistic writings’; 
see NAFDMA, 1/9/1, ‘Review by Predrag Protić in “Književne Novine” (Literary News) Belgrade 
1.12.77. of Predrag Palavestra: “The Dogma and Utopia of Dimitrije Mitrinović”, Slovo ljubve, Belgrade 
1977’, TS, trans. D. Shillan, 1978, p. 1. 
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archive, lest another scholar misconstrue sources and put more misinterpretations on the 
historical record.20 
Another reason for the neglect of the NEG/NBM is what might be referred to as 
the ‘incomprehensibility’ of a movement that was anomalous in interwar Britain.  Many 
scholars who have touched on the NEG/NBM (usually while discussing affiliated 
figures or associated bodies) have mischaracterised it, and their superficial treatments 
obscure more than they illuminate.  In order to make the past intelligible, we turn to 
taxonomy; but being so accustomed to labelling as a way to make things legible, it can 
be perplexing to encounter a movement that was determined to ‘throw off labels.’21  
Today, Britons take it for granted that a political party or movement vying for their 
support will stand for a reasonably coherent body of ideas, enabling them to broadly 
discern its ideological make-up.  But British politics had a ‘misty climate’ in the late 
1920s and early 1930s, when ‘talk of “Left” and “Right”’ had only very recently gained 
currency.22  Dan Stone has argued that historians are so used to ‘pigeonholing thinkers 
into “schools,” “movements” and “trends” that we overlook those … who do not easily 
fit’ – but it is important to avoid the temptation to ‘make the past more manageable, less 
complicated.’23  This study of the NEG/NBM is an attempt to widen the sense of ‘the 
play of ideas,’ to borrow Stone’s phrase, ‘in a setting that is too easily slotted into a 
story of political continuity that was not felt with such confidence during the period 
itself.’24  The NEG/NBM sought to sever that continuity, and its ‘political 
perfectionism’ made it an aberrant actor on the edge of the interwar stage, as will be 
explained in chapter one. 
                                                
20 NAFDMA, 3/17/1, Ellen Mayne to Watson Thomson, Richmond, 29 November 1960, TS. 
21 ‘“New Britain”: Colonel Delahaye Explains the Movement’, Golders Green Gazette, 18 April 1934. 
22 David Thomson, England in the Twentieth Century, 1914–63 (Harmondsworth, 1963), pp. 116–7. 
23 Dan Stone, Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain 
(Liverpool, 2002), p. 10. 
24 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Yet another reason why the NEG/NBM has been neglected is that it ‘fits the 
conventional remit of neither the political nor the cultural movement,’ as Mathew 
Thomson has noted.25  The NEG/NBM operated in what Luisa Passerini has called ‘the 
no-man’s-land between culture and politics,’ and the movement’s political, cultural and 
social activities were tightly entwined.26  In a time of sub-discipline specialisation 
among academic historians, it is not too hazardous to venture that for some practitioners 
of political history and cultural history alike, the NEG/NBM has appeared just too 
awkward a subject to be worth the bother.  To that we can add that the movement’s 
‘enigmatic’ leader, whose ‘many-sided interests and activities greatly transcend the 
scope’ of straightforward description, is a ‘difficult subject,’ as one scholar has 
described Mitrinović.27 
The near absence of the NEG/NBM in the historiography on fringe movements 
in 1930s Britain means that the literature has not quite covered the full array of 
opposition to the National Government, and that our knowledge of British ‘politics’ 
(widely conceived) in the first half of the decade is less complete than is warranted.  As 
Stone has argued, restoring obscure figures to their proper place in history is a task well 
worth the effort if it contributes to making ‘complexity and density the norm.’28  
Acknowledging the importance of the long-overlooked NEG/NBM is to recognise that 
the political landscape in 1930s Britain was more complex and even denser than we 
previously supposed.  There being a clear need to redress scholars’ neglect, what 
follows is the first proper assessment of the movement. 
                                                
25 Mathew Thomson, Psychological Subjects: Identity, Culture and Health in Twentieth-Century Britain 
(Oxford, 2006), p. 92. 
26 Passerini, Europe in Love, p. 64. 
27 Nicholas Moravcevich [review], ‘Predrag Palavestra, Dogma i Utopija Dimitrija Mitinovića (Belgrade, 
1977)’, World Literature Today 52.3 (1978), p. 492.  Watson  Thomson, one of Mitrinović’s closest 
followers, wrote of the ‘life-long task of trying to see D.M. [Mitrinović] clearly and as nearly whole as 
possible’ (NAFDMA, 3/17/1, Thomson to Winifred Gordon Fraser, Vancouver, 20 October 1955, TS).  
In the view of acolyte Harry Rutherford, it was ‘very hard for any one person to do him [Mitrinović] 
justice,’ given how ‘rich in mind, character and powers of expression’ he was (NAFDMA, 3/17/1, 
Rutherford to Thomson, Richmond, November 1965, TS). 
28 Stone, Breeding Superman, p. 11. 
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The Sources 
 
This thesis is the first in-depth study of the NEG/NBM, drawing extensively on 
a wide range of primary sources accessed in Britain, Canada, the United States and 
Switzerland.  These sources include extremely candid unpublished drafts of the memoir 
of Glasgow-born intellectual Watson Thomson (b. 1899), one of the prominent figures 
in the movement.  His papers comprise the Watson Thomson Fonds (hereafter Thomson 
Fonds), archived at the University of British Columbia. 
When working with the NAFDMA, I was cognisant of the ways in which the 
acolytes’ concerns about personal privacy, and other matters, might have been reflected 
in the contents (or lack thereof) and organisation of the archive.  There is no way of 
knowing what, or how much, material the acolytes never stored in the first place.  But it 
seems that few documents handwritten by Mitrinović (except for private 
correspondence) went uncollected by his followers, as the acolytes’ ‘reverence’ for 
‘even the smallest scraps’ of his scribblings was akin to ‘the treatment given to a saint’s 
relics,’ according to archivist Emma Burgham, who catalogued the NAFDMA in 2014–
5.29 
 
 
The NEG/NBM in Its European (and Wider) Context: the Movement as the British 
Manifestation of the nouvelles relèves 
 
In the 1930s, the political landscape in several European states featured an extra-
parliamentary group/movement whose spiritually infused ideology could not fairly be 
                                                
29 Emma Burgham, ‘A Mind at Work: Notes and Notebooks’ (11 June 2014), The Eleventh Hour blog, 
https://eleventhhourarchive.wordpress.com/page/3 [accessed 12 June 2014].  Burgham has also stated 
that Mitrinović ‘was a librarian’s worst nightmare in terms of mangling publications’ (Ibid.). 
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characterised as either left-wing or right-wing.  Among the small community of 
historians who work on these phenomena, Olivier Dard’s term ‘nouvelles relèves’ has 
come to replace ‘non-conformistes’ as the collective descriptor of these 
groups/movements, most of which were based in northwest European capitals.30  These 
nouvelles relèves groups/movements had many affinities, each having been founded in 
opposition to what the Personalist philosopher Emmanuel Mounier referred to as ‘le 
désordre établi’ (‘the established disorder’), at a time when their leading figures 
perceived Europe to be undergoing a crisis of civilisation.31  Likeminded in their 
opposition to communism and collectivism, materialism and ‘individualism’ (as they 
understood it), and parliamentary democracy and capitalism in their existing forms, 
each group/movement sought to create the conditions for a communitarian ‘New Order’ 
to arise in their respective states and at the European level.  They envisioned a spiritual 
‘revolution’ that would inspire ‘reconciliation,’ through which social conflicts would be 
resolved and international anarchy replaced by pan-European governance. 
Though usually sui generis in their respective national contexts, each nouvelles 
relèves group/movement was a star in a European constellation that relatively few 
interwar historians have charted.  The Paris-centred l’Ordre nouveau – led by 
Alexandre Marc, Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu – was the polestar.  The London-
centred NEG/NBM and the Brussels-centred Esprit nouveau group (known by the name 
of its periodical) were among the kindred groups, each of which recognised that they 
                                                
30 In 2005, some of these historians took part in a conference on nouvelles relèves, the proceedings of 
which were published as: Olivier Dard and Etienne Deschamps (eds), Les relèves en Europe d’un après-
guerre à l’autre: racines, réseaux, projets et postérités (Brussels, 2005).  This volume remains the most 
comprehensive survey of nouvelles relèves groups/movements.  The main reason why Dard’s term 
nouvelles relèves has replaced ‘non-conformistes’ is that the latter, on translation into English, could 
result in the referents being confused with a different set of ‘Non-conformists’ (i.e. Protestants who do 
not ‘conform’ to the governance of the established Church); see Christophe Le Dréau, ‘L’Europe des 
non-conformistes des années trente: les idées européistes de New Britain et New Europe’, in Dard and 
Deschamps (eds), Les relèves en Europe, p. 312.  Although other scholars have proposed English 
translations of nouvelles relèves, none have gained currency – for this reason I use the French term. 
31 R. William Rauch, Politics and Belief in Contemporary France: Emmanuel Mounier and Christian 
Democracy, 1932–1950 (The Hague, 1972), p. 83.  See also John Hellman’s works Emmanuel Mounier 
and the New Catholic Left 1930–1950 (Toronto, 1981) and The Communitarian Third Way: Alexandre 
Marc’s Ordre Nouveau, 1930–2000 (Montreal, 2002). 
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shared values with the others.  Each group/movement had some left-wing and some 
right-wing characteristics, so their critiques were often predicated on a blend of left- 
and right-wing ideas.  For example, leading figures in each of the groups/movements 
expressed anti-American sentiment based on the notions that Americans were in thrall 
to Mammon (materialism) and Moloch (mechanisation), and bent on cultural 
imperialism.  In Fig. 1, these three attributes of the American imaginary are the set in 
the central intersection where the critique (‘negative’) of the Left overlaps with that of 
the Right. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  ‘America as a concept’ in Max Paul Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism: 
The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
2012), p. 10. 
 
Yet many of these leading figures also levelled criticisms that were 
conventionally the remit of either the Left or the Right – simultaneously, in some cases.  
One example from an NEG/NBM periodical was a short critique of finance capitalism 
11 
 
and Jewish influence that began: ‘When will Jews release their hold over the Money 
power …’32 
Given their unique combinations of left- and right-wing characteristics, 
nouvelles relèves groups/movements are awkward subjects of study; indeed, Mathew 
Thomson has argued that one of the reasons for the ‘surprising’ absence of the 
NEG/NBM from the historiography of fringe movements in interwar Britain ‘is that its 
ideas appear so odd set against the conventional political landscape of left and right.’33  
In a way, he echoes S. G. Hobson (b. 1870), the father of guild socialism and a major 
influence on the NEG/NBM, who in 1938 lamented that the movement’s 
unconventionality meant that – judged by ‘conventional political canons’ – ‘it would 
not as yet appear to be on the map; but how futile are the canons!’34 
In 1992 David Cannadine noted that ‘“Fog in Channel: Continent cut off”’ was 
‘the prevailing weather condition’ under which most academic historians had until 
recently been doing British history.35  The fog has cleared by now, but British historians 
have not yet navigated the route between l’Ordre nouveau and the NEG/NBM as 
adroitly as their French counterparts.  Researched in great depth, l’Ordre nouveau is far 
better and more widely understood in France than the NEG/NBM is in Britain, for 
reasons including comparatively wide practice of intellectual history in France, and the 
fact that l’Ordre nouveau had greater and more enduring influence in France than the 
NEG/NBM had in Britain. 
L’Ordre nouveau’s key principle, ‘Ni droite, ni gauche’ (‘Neither right, nor 
left’), had an NEG/NBM equivalent: what Mitrinović called ‘Above and Between.’36  
                                                
32 ‘Where is Meaning?  What is the Goal and Purpose?’, Eleventh Hour, 10 July 1935, p. 169.  I have 
cited this source because it is the most succinct example of a critique that melded left- and right-wing 
elements published in any of the NEG/NBM periodicals (in each of them, anti-Semitic sentiment was 
either entirely absent or extremely rare, it is important to note). 
33 Thomson, Psychological Subjects, p. 92. 
34 S. G. Hobson, Pilgrim to the Left: Memoirs of a Modern Revolutionist (New York, 1938), p. 266. 
35 David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (London, 1992), p. 6. 
36 Le Dréau, ‘L’Europe’, p. 315. 
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By this he meant the reconciliation, on a higher plane, of ideologies that were typically 
understood to be irreconcilable.  Reflecting on his time in the NEG/NBM, Watson 
Thomson wrote that Mitrinović ‘elaborate[d] passionately on the falseness of this 
[communism and fascism] dichotomy’ and said there was ‘an element of validity in 
both creeds, but that these valid elements had to be transposed and incorporated in a 
new social pattern, different from those proposed whether by the communists or the 
fascists, before their rightness could be fully realized.’  Thomson elaborated: 
 
What was the valid element in communism?  Basically, [the] economic 
proposal: public control of industry, and planning of the whole economy, 
in the interest of … personal welfare…  Where communism went wrong 
was in its monolithic and totalitarian outlook … 
And what did he [Mitrinović] find valid about fascism?  Simply, 
its insistence on … a hierarchic principle, though he would add at once 
that the fascist application of this principle was utterly and profoundly 
wrong.  Inequality did not properly belong to the economic sphere, nor 
to the political, but rather to the cultural … sphere, where one man is not 
as good as another and where the recognition of superior quality is a 
necessity for social health and human advancement.37 
 
This approach to political philosophies led J. B. Boothroyd to remark that Mitrinović 
had a neurosis the size of Nelson’s Column, called ‘synthesis.’38  Mitrinović deemed it 
important to radicalise and mobilise as broad a range of supporters as possible to build a 
New Britain – not least because by so doing, talented individuals and persons of means 
might escape the gravitational field of less salubrious political groups that could 
potentially have secured their backing. 
Christophe Le Dréau has outlined some of the affinities between the NEG/NBM 
and l’Ordre nouveau, and has wondered how close the movements came to organising 
‘une sorte d’Internationale non-conformiste’ (‘a sort of Nonconformist International’).39  
But Le Dréau’s contribution to the debate covers so much ground that his efforts to drill 
                                                
37 University of British Columbia University Archives: Watson Thomson Fonds [hereafter Thomson 
Fonds], Box 2, File 4, Thomson, TS of autobiographical writings, no date (but 1960s), pp. 112–13. 
38 Davies, In Search, p. 140. 
39 Le Dréau, ‘L’Europe’, p. 312 and pp. 322–3. 
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down on this rich seam make only boreholes.  British historians, for their part, have 
almost completely ignored these links – but in the 1930s the links were well known to 
security services on the Continent as well as in Britain, where Scotland Yard 
investigated Mitrinović on at least one occasion.40  It has recently come to light that 
other organisations were gathering intelligence on the NEG/NBM, in part because of its 
ties to l’Ordre nouveau.  Richard B. Spence’s archival research revealed that an 
informant codenamed ‘M’ – most likely MI5 Section B5(b) chief Maxwell Knight – 
passed on information about this ‘very remarkable English group’ to Rome-based Jesuit 
priest Father Joseph Ledit, who was probably part of the Vatican’s clandestine service.  
Ledit shared this information with the Italian secret service.41  ‘M’ stated that 
Mitrinović’s group had ‘startling European connections which might be of grave import 
politically.’  ‘M’ had been conducting a ‘special urgent investigation’ with the support 
of John Baker White, who headed the Economic League’s spy outfit.42  In Nazi 
Germany, the authorities may not have developed an interest in the NEG/NBM as a 
movement, but they did ban the circulation of New Britain weekly from February 1934 
onward.43 
European scholars of the nouvelles relèves have not looked for similar 
phenomena outside Europe, except for in Quebec.  The New Zealand Legion, though, 
can also be considered a kindred movement; its journal, National Opinion, reprinted 
                                                
40 Thomson Fonds, Box 2, File 5, Thomson, early untitled draft of autobiographical section of Turning 
into Tomorrow, TS, 1953, p. 111. 
41 New Britain weekly published writings by the exiled anti-fascist priest Luigi Sturzo (one of the fathers 
of Christian democracy), including a piece on ‘bloody repression, the rule of revolver, bludgeon, and 
castor oil, and the absorption of the person by the dominant group’ (‘Britain and Austria’, New Britain 
weekly, 28 February 1934, p. 439).  The fact that New Britain weekly had opened its pages to such an 
outspoken critic of Mussolini would likely have been sufficient reason for the Italian secret service to 
deem Mitrinović a person of interest. 
42 Richard B. Spence, Secret Agent 666: Aleister Crowley, British Intelligence and the Occult (Port 
Townsend, 2008), pp. 227–9. 
43 ‘The World We Live In’, New Britain weekly, 21 February 1934, p. 404.  Under the sub-heading 
‘Banned in Germany,’ the editorial struck a defiant note: ‘We have criticized the régime, and shall 
continue to do so, for its policy of violence and intolerance.’ 
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several articles from New Britain weekly.44  The New America Movement, too, was 
kindred; indeed, the two movements were ‘in many respects similar,’ as one NBM 
periodical told readers.45 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
The literature on the NEG/NBM is modest: fewer than a hundred pages of scholarship 
have been published in English or French.  In 1973 Alan Watts, a sometime follower of 
Mitrinović, rued that the NEG/NBM had not been ‘properly chronicled’; he was 
adamant, though, that the movement ‘should most certainly “go down in history.”’46  
Writing more than 30 years later, Le Dréau had cause to note that the movement ‘attend 
encore son historien’ (‘is still awaiting its historian’).47 
At the invitation of Mitrinović’s acolytes in the early 1980s, Andrew Rigby 
wrote what remains the sole English-language biography of Mitrinović.48  Reviewing 
the 1984 monograph, Thomas A. Emmert concluded that Mitrinović was a ‘fascinating’ 
thinker, and that Rigby’s work would encourage other scholars to explore the subject’s 
life and ideas.49  The biography has served as the standard reference cited by nearly all 
scholars whose research has been connected with the NEG/NBM in any way. 
                                                
44 For the information on the republication of NBM articles by the New Zealand Legion, I am grateful to 
Dr. Matthew Cunningham, an authority on the Wellington-based movement. 
45 ‘New Britain Groups’ [‘Greetings to New America’], Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin, 7 November 
1934, p. 8.  The NEG/NBM is not mentioned in the papers of New America Movement leader Harry F. 
Ward, which are held by Union Theological Seminary, Columbia University.  The New America 
Movement has been discussed in two works: Eugene P. Link, Labor-Religion Prophet: The Times and 
Life of Harry F. Ward (Boulder, 1984), pp. 174–92; and David Nelson Duke, In the Trenches with Jesus 
and Marx: Harry F. Ward and the Struggle for Social Justice (Tuscaloosa, 2003), pp. 162–70. 
46 Alan Watts, In My Own Way: An Autobiography 1915–1965 (New York, 1973), p. 111.  Watts went on 
to popularise Buddhism in the US, becoming the country’s foremost interpreter of Eastern philosophies. 
47 Le Dréau, ‘L’Europe’, p. 330. 
48 Rigby, Initiation; a second edition appeared as Dimitrije Mitrinović: A Biography (York, 2006). 
49 Thomas A. Emmert [review], ‘Andrew Rigby, Initiation and Initiative: An Exploration of the Life and 
Ideas of Dimitrije Mitrinović (Boulder, 1984)’, Canadian-American Slavic Studies 19.2 (1985), p. 236.  
At the start of his review, George Feaver asked: ‘Dimitrije who?’  See George Feaver [review], ‘Andrew 
Rigby, Initiation and Initiative: An Exploration of the Life and Ideas of Dimitrije Mitrinović (Boulder, 
1984)’, American Historical Review 91.1 (1986), p. 117.  By 1990, though, Emmert was lamenting that it 
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Rigby’s assessment of the movement remains the most detailed one published, 
but it would have been impossible for him to do the NEG/NBM full justice in the 30 
pages over which his discussion ranges.  The limitations of the analysis are completely 
understandable given Rigby’s need to traverse a life as multifaceted as Mitrinović’s in a 
single volume.  As is only to be expected, the overview gives rise to far more questions 
than could be satisfactorily addressed in one chapter.50 
In 2008, Rigby wrote the entry on Mitrinović in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography.  This volume, unlike its predecessor, did not exclude non-British 
subjects who influenced national life.  Mitrinović did not naturalise in Britain, so could 
not have been included in the Dictionary of National Biography supplements. 
Passerini has situated the NEG/NBM where it properly belongs: at the centre of 
the Europeanist discourse community in interwar Britain, whose contours she has 
mapped.51  Her study of that discourse shows how emotion was intimate to the 
workings of groups including the NEG/NBM, thereby enriching our understanding of 
the role of emotion in calls for a united Europe made between the wars. 
It might be supposed that the spike in interest in the Great Depression era during 
the years of the Great Recession would have increased awareness of the NEG/NBM 
among scholars.  To a slight degree this did appear to be the case, in an age similarly 
marked by austerity, eddied by the currents of transnational capital, and witness to 
fragmented opposition to rule by a Conservative-dominated government.  Yet too few 
intellectual historians of interwar Britain have come to see the NEG/NBM as a fertile 
patch of the field – one that is mostly untouched.  This thesis is the first attempt to till it. 
                                                                                                                                         
was now ‘unlikely that we will ever experience a renaissance of interest’ in Mitrinović; see Thomas A. 
Emmert [review], ‘H. C. Rutherford, ed., Certainly, Future: Selected Writings by Dimitrije Mitrinović 
(Boulder, 1987)’, Canadian-American Slavic Studies 24.1 (1990), p. 67. 
50 Since Rigby’s work was published, Zoran Milutinović has produced noteworthy research on 
Mitrinović.  Milutinović is an almost surefooted guide through some of the thickets of Mitrinović’s 
tangled philosophies, though he slips with his assertion that Mitrinović had ‘anarchist inclinations’; see 
Getting Over Europe: The Construction of Europe in Serbian Culture (Amsterdam, 2011), pp. 171–3. 
51 Passerini, Europe in Love, pp. 105–48. 
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The Structure and Main Objective of this Thesis 
 
Chapter one begins with an overview of the ‘crisis’ in Britain between the wars, and the 
scholarly treatment of the phenomenon.  Following that is a discussion of the 
‘antisystem’ challenges to the National Government and the parliamentary regime, and 
an analysis of the NEG/NBM’s ‘political perfectionist’ antisystemness.  Next, 
Mitrinović’s activities from 1914 to 1931 are outlined, prior to an account of how his 
body of followers became a ‘court system.’  The chapter ends with an examination of 
the formation of the NEG and its activities in 1931–2. 
Chapter two starts with an account of the rise of the politicised social movement 
that was the NBM.  An analysis of the NBM’s dynamics shows how some members 
experienced the movement, and how Mitrinović – its guiding light – used ‘strategic 
ambiguity’ to galvanise support.  The chapter ends with an examination of the NBM’s 
demise and the factors that lay behind it. 
In chapter three, attention turns to the NEG/NBM as the first genuine European 
federalist group in Britain.  First, the NEG/NBM’s Eurofederalist thought is situated in 
the intellectual tradition.  There follows an explanation of why sovereignty has been the 
key issue to address in plans for European unity, and an overview of the tradition of 
thought on European integration on which the movement’s prominent figures drew.  
The NEG/NBM’s understanding of the ‘European civil war’ and its perception of the 
European and world ‘crisis’ are then elucidated.  The final question addressed in this 
chapter is why the movement considered the federalisation of Europe a priority. 
Chapter four begins with a comparative analysis of the proposals for European 
unity put forward by Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand, and 
Mitrinović and the NEG/NBM.  The four lines of reasoning that informed the 
17 
 
NEG/NBM’s case for Eurofederalism are then detailed.  The chapter closes with a 
detailed discussion of the movement’s proposals for European governance and federal 
institutions. 
Following the conclusion is an appendix, consisting of the first complete list of 
the NEG/NBM’s periodicals: some names were cause for confusion among readers in 
the 1930s, just as they are for scholars today.  Especially given Mitrinović’s continual 
rechristenings of what could be seen as just one large-format periodical, the list will 
serve as a useful reference. 
The main objective of this thesis is to show that the NEG/NBM was the first 
genuine Eurofederalist group in Britain.  What is more, the movement’s Eurofederalism 
was not the whimper of ‘first-wave’ (i.e. interwar) thought on European integration, but 
was, rather, the apotheosis of first-wave reasoning.  By the early 1930s, Mitrinović’s 
desire for European integration had been reignited by the ideas on European unity 
spread around the Continent by periodicals, some of whose staffs were undivided in 
their support for the cause.52  In the British capital, Mitrinović ‘talked European 
Federation when many of the people clamouring for it to-day sneered at the idea and at 
him,’ one follower recalled in 1961.53  As we shall see in chapters three and four, the 
NEG/NBM did not merely keep the Eurofederalist flame burning after it had been 
extinguished in Italy and Germany, and had died to embers in France – it did no less 
than greatly enrich the supply of prescient ideas on European integration. 
  
                                                
52 Lipgens, European Integration, p. 21. 
53 Davies, In Search, p. 119.  Mitrinović had favoured ‘a federation of European nations’ from at least as 
early as 1914 (NAFDMA, 1/4/2/5, Mitrinović to Peter Kropotkin, Brighton, 16 August 1914, TS, trans. 
R. Meuss). 
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Chapter 1 
Countering the ‘Crisis’ with Political Perfectionism: Dimitrije Mitrinović, His 
Followers, and the New Europe Group 
 
 
The ‘Crisis’ 
 
In line with Britain’s tradition of parliamentary governance, ‘politics’ was for a long 
time generally understood to mean the politics of parties and Parliament.  Until recent 
years, political historians’ focus on the workings of representative democracy as the 
aggregate of British political life tended to blur out many extra-parliamentary 
movements. 
One such movement was the NEG/NBM.  By 1933 many Britons considered the 
National Government thoroughly discredited: unemployment neared 20 percent, and 
appalling social conditions were commonplace in Slump-stricken swathes of the 
country.54  To some citizens it seemed that the attempt by the political class to ‘muddle 
through’ had left Britain stranded in the economic blizzard, and that the NEG/NBM had 
opened the only path out.55  New Britain weekly had ‘a meteoric career’ (in the words 
of Malcolm Muggeridge), as did the movement that produced it.56  To understand how 
and why the NEG/NBM burned so brightly, we must first revisit the debate on the 
‘crisis,’ and then consider anew what opportunities antisystem formations (parties and 
movements) had to challenge political arrangements and economic orthodoxies. 
                                                
54 In 1933, British unemployment was 19.9 percent; see Juliet Gardiner, The Thirties: An Intimate History 
(London, 2011), p. 9.  Durham and Tyneside, south Wales, west Cumberland, and a belt of central 
Scotland (the areas that would be aided by the 1934 Special Areas Act) were in economic distress, as was 
Lancashire (with 38 percent unemployment in late 1932); see Noreen Branson and Margot Heinemann, 
Britain in the Nineteen Thirties (London, 1973), p. 108.  The Cornish economy was ‘in paralysis’ 
(Gardiner, Ibid., p. 53).  The Highlands, too, was suffering from economic decline; see Robert Graves 
and Alan Hodge, The Long Weekend: A Social History of Great Britain, 1918–1939 (London, 1995 
[1940]), pp. 310–11. 
55 Passerini, Europe in Love, p. 126. 
56 Malcolm Muggeridge, The Thirties, 1930–1940, in Great Britain (London, 1940), p. 22. 
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Arnold Toynbee called 1931 the annus terribilis that saw ‘Western minds’ 
contemplating the ‘catastrophe’ of ‘a spontaneous disintegration from within.’57  Peter 
M. R. Stirk has argued that for Europeans, the roots of the ‘sense of crisis’ lay in the 
carnage of the Great War; the problematic post-war settlement (particularly the unstable 
system of states); inflamed nationalism; ideological realignment; and the ‘hesitancy’ of 
the United States.  Dashed hopes of international peace and of lands fit for heroes 
emboldened critics of the powers that be.  Liberal democracy was assailed by 
adversaries who claimed its limitations had been transcended either by communism or 
by fascism.  The onset of the Great Depression compounded Europeans’ fears and 
anxieties, and lent credence to the notion that the crisis was permanent.58 
Europeans’ experience of the crisis was laced with confusion.  As Jan Ifversen 
has observed, the titles of many books and articles published after the first volume of 
Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1918) included the words ‘decline,’ 
‘catastrophe,’ ‘sickness’ or ‘helpless,’ suggesting that the crisis ‘touched the very heart 
of European life.’59  Richard Overy has noted that ‘the possibility of cure’ was implicit 
in the medicalised language of the crisis, but ad nauseam discussions of its many 
dimensions, the dizzying array of diagnoses and the vertiginous variety of proffered 
remedies left most serious readers in doubt as to the nature of the sickness, let alone the 
cure.60 
In Britain, ‘the Slump’ was the shorthand term for the concurrent economic 
symptoms of the crisis, enumerated by the NBM thus: ‘falling price levels, industrial 
                                                
57 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1931 (Oxford, 1932), p. 5. 
58 Peter M. R. Stirk, ‘Introduction: Crisis and Continuity in Interwar Europe’, in Stirk (ed.), Unity in 
Context, p. 10, p. 2, p. 8 and pp. 10–11. 
59 Jan Ifversen, ‘The Crisis of European Civilization After 1918’, in Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle 
(eds), Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War (Houndmills, 2002), p. 17 and 
p. 14.  This vocabulary starkly contrasts that which appeared in pre-war public lecture titles, such as ‘A 
Perfect World – Could We Endure It?’ (1913).  For many educated Europeans, the Great War represented 
‘a clear fracture with pre-war expectations of relentless advance,’ as Richard Overy has explained; see 
The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilization, 1919–1939 (London, 2010), p. 16 and p. 10. 
60 Overy, Morbid Age, p. 4. 
20 
 
paralysis, increased burden of debt, and widespread unemployment.’61  For many in the 
economic black-spots – where structural unemployment blighted whole communities – 
even the prospect of work vanished, reducing life to a precarious existence with no 
hope of respite.62  But the longstanding popular view of the 1930s as a period of 
‘poverty, failure and reaction’ is mistaken, as Martin Pugh, for one, has explained.63  
Obviously, not ‘everyone lived in Jarrow or was on the road to Wigan pier,’ in the 
words of Andrew Thorpe.64  As Overy has noted, profound discontinuities were absent 
in Britain, and there was no serious threat: the economy was healthier, overall, than 
most major ones; there was no prospect of revolution; and free expression was 
continuously enjoyed.65  But ‘discourses of doom’ spread to Britain via refugees, 
visitors and British intellectuals who spent time on the Continent (all three of these 
vectors for the transmission of ideas were well represented among the contributors to 
the NEG/NBM’s publications).66  In the first age of mass communication, the notion of 
civilisational crisis was turned into a ‘populist cliché’ through ‘repetitive endorsement’ 
by what Overy has called ‘networks of anxiety.’67  For many Britons, though, the crisis 
was never anything but a secondhand experience.68 
                                                
61 ‘New Order for Great Britain’, Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin, 15 August 1934, p. 1.  Shipbuilding 
and other heavy industries were paralysed in the early 1930s, but light industry fared much better (the 
national grid, completed in 1933, stimulated demand for domestic appliances); see Gardiner, Thirties, 
pp. 26–7.  The grid and improving road networks meant industrialists could situate factories far from 
coalfields, closer to middle-class consumers (half of whom lived in southeast England); of Britain’s 
1932–7 net increase of 644 factories, 532 were in Greater London, whose residents gained almost two-
thirds of new manufacturing jobs (Branson and Heinemann, Nineteen Thirties, p. 56 and p. 81). 
62 L. C. B. Seaman, Life in Britain between the Wars (London, 1985 [1970]), p. 43.  In 1931 Ferndale, 96 
percent of those who had held jobs covered by insurance were out of work (Gardiner, Thirties, p. 26). 
63 Martin Pugh, ‘We Danced All Night’: A Social History of Britain between the Wars (London, 2009), 
p. vii. 
64 Andrew Thorpe, ‘Introduction’, in Andrew Thorpe (ed.), The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-
war Britain (Exeter, 1989), p. 7. 
65 Overy, Morbid Age, p. 7. 
66 Ibid.  The crisis discourse was transmitted to the United States, too.  Pankaj Mishra has noted that from 
1933 ‘a crisis of man’ was ‘widely perceived’ in American intellectual life, and that ‘most’ of the crisis 
literature was written by European-born thinkers whose ‘formative intellectual experience was of the 
economic and political crisis of Europe.’  This ‘fundamentally derivative’ discourse ‘resonated’ in the US 
until the early 1970s; see Pankaj Mishra [review], ‘Mark Greif, The Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought 
and Fiction in America, 1933–73 (Princeton, 2015)’, London Review of Books 37.16 (2015), pp. 13–4. 
67 Overy, Morbid Age, p. 20, p. 7 and p. 3.  Anxieties were heightened still further by the advertising of 
firms – such as peddlers of quack cures – that stood to profit.  In 1933, four issues of New Britain weekly 
included an advert, ‘The Torture of “Nerves” Banished for Ever!,’ aimed at those who ‘suffer from … 
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Overy has suggested that the ‘mythic portrayal of crisis’ was ‘a special 
language’ that the war-survivor generation needed to describe ‘what seemed to them the 
unique nature of their suffering and their profound insecurity.’  Intellectuals, who 
wanted to be ‘at the front of the throng of onlookers if civilization crashed,’ set the 
fashion in ideas and competed to explain the crisis.  When authors addressed such a 
weighty subject, it made their output seem more consequential.  Publishers colluded 
with authors, and the book-buying public indulged them.69  The idea that Britain was in 
crisis was also stoked by some persons of an authoritarian bent, who had to believe it: 
no other state of affairs would have justified their desire for a leader to emerge and 
prove his strength by tackling the crisis.  Left-wing would-be revolutionaries also 
peddled the narrative of crisis, which may have helped convince some that the 
revolution was closer at hand. 
As Overy has made clear, the revolution in mass media, a marked increase in 
literacy and educational achievement, and ‘spreading habits of self-improvement and 
voluntary lobbying’ allowed the concerns of politicians, academics, doctors and 
scientists to ‘become common property’ – but most Britons did not spend their free time 
contemplating the crisis.70  Aside from the intelligentsia and Colonel Blimps, those who 
recognised the country’s relative decline tended to favour the kind of irreverent attitude 
distilled in 1066 and All That, the publishing phenomenon of 1930.71 
The oft-repeated characterisation of the period as a monolithically ‘low 
dishonest decade’ is erroneous, then – but there was nonetheless a pall.  Susan Kingsley 
Kent has argued that when the friends and family of those who lost life or limb in the 
                                                                                                                                         
Morbid Fears, Shyness, Blushing.’  The copywriters were evidently confident that an anxiety-ridden 
readership was primed to believe blushing was a ‘nerve-weakness’ requiring ‘drugless home treatment.’ 
68 Overy, Morbid Age, p. 7. 
69 Ibid., pp. 48–9. 
70 Ibid., pp. 5–6.  Kevin Jefferys has written of the ‘pronounced growth of new forms of social inquiry’ in 
the 1930s; see Jefferys, Politics and the People: A History of British Democracy since 1918 (London, 
2007), p. 35. 
71 Pugh, We Danced, p. 403. 
22 
 
Great War (or were killed by the 1918–20 flu pandemic) are deemed ‘seriously 
traumatized individuals,’ they collectively ‘begin to constitute a “society,” a “polity,” a 
“nation.”’72  Nearly all men and women had to come to terms with the fact that they had 
consented to mass slaughter on their own continent.73  In the late 1920s and early 1930s 
there was an outpouring of war memoirs, a literary abreaction to the brutalities of the 
trenches; these accounts enabled friends and family to get a sense of what servicemen 
had endured and to understand something of the horrors they had witnessed.74  Many 
survivors – steeped in death, apprenticed only in killing, and suspected of having a 
callous attitude to life – had been discharged into labour markets that could not absorb 
them.75  Jon Lawrence has explained how post-war Britain was ‘gripped by intense 
fears’ that the barbarism of war had unleashed dangerous forces that threatened to 
brutalise society, destroy constitutional government, and deface the edifice of 
‘civilisation.’76 
Added to the trauma was awareness among Britons that the 1914–18 slaughter 
was not ‘The Great War for Civilization’ styled on the Victory Medal, but rather a four-
year record of inhumanity that had disgraced the continent and laid bare Britain’s 
reliance on the cooperation of non-Europeans.  At the turn of the century British 
intellectuals, like their Continental counterparts, had taken for granted Europe’s 
civilisation and superiority, but the Great War caused many thinkers to question these 
twin assumptions in the debt- and doubt-laden aftermath.77  Disavowing a Victorian 
article of faith, they could no longer regard European history as ‘an unbroken chain 
                                                
72 Susan Kingsley Kent, Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918–1931 (Basingstoke, 2009), 
p. 15.  The decimation of the officer class (which many believed deprived Britain of a cohort of leaders-
to-be) left the highest in the land as grief-stricken as the humblest families (Pugh, We Danced, p. 4). 
73 Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle, ‘European Identity, Europeanness and the First World War: 
Reflections on the Twentieth Century – an Introduction’, in Spiering and Wintle (eds), Ideas of Europe, 
p. 4. 
74 Aleid Fokkema, ‘“And Down We Went”: Fragments of Interwar Europe Seen from the British 
Metropolis’, in Spiering and Wintle (eds), Ideas of Europe, p. 157; and Seaman, Life in Britain, p. 18. 
75 Blind or maimed beggars were a common sight in the interwar years (Gardiner, Thirties, p. 13). 
76 Jon Lawrence, ‘The Transformation of British Public Politics After the First World War’, Past and 
Present 190 (2006), p. 190 and p. 211. 
77 Spiering and Wintle, ‘European Identity’, in Spiering and Wintle (eds), Ideas of Europe, p. 4. 
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from primitive to modern,’ as Overy has put it.78  Sublimating their disorientation, some 
thinkers set their minds to the task of imagining possibilities for national and 
continental renewal.  As Benjamin Ziemann has noted, historians of Weimar Germany 
have come to see the crisis as 
 
not simply an objective condition, but rather a cultural form which could 
be used to imagine and reflect upon possible scenarios for a renewal of 
society.  The semantics of ‘crisis,’ in other words, should not be 
mistaken as a simple expression for the dysfunctionality of a system in 
terminal disarray.79 
 
 
Ziemann has referred to the ‘openness’ of the ‘crisis.’80  This was sensed by thinkers in 
Britain, too – among them prominent figures in the NEG/NBM.  For Mitrinović and his 
followers, developing a highly sophisticated understanding of the crisis as an objective 
condition was not an end in itself, but rather a means of better informing their 
deliberations over what changes were needed to fully counter the crisis.  Prominent 
figures in the NEG/NBM thus took the ‘openness’ of the ‘crisis’ as a licence to imagine 
how best the renewal of Britain and Europe could be effected; but the wider 
significance of the movement lies, in part, in the fact that these thinkers did not stop 
there.  Rather, they managed to collectively mobilise as standard-bearers for radical 
politico-economic proposals, with the aim of inspiring action to realise their ideas 
(some of which would, decades later, be implemented).  The very purpose of New 
Britain weekly, its editor stated, was ‘to suggest to its readers that the crisis is an 
opportunity for action.’81 
 
 
 
                                                
78 Overy, Morbid Age, p. 28. 
79 Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Weimar was Weimar: Politics, Culture and the Emplotment of the German 
Republic’, German History 28.4 (2010), p. 553.  I am grateful to Prof. Ziemann for this reference. 
80 Ibid., p. 553. 
81 ‘Former “Everyman” Editor Starts “New Britain”’, World’s Press News, 11 May 1933. 
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Antisystem Challengers 
 
Giovanni Capoccia has put the number of democratic regimes in 1920 Europe at 24; by 
1939 only eleven remained, among them Britain.82  Following the Representation of the 
People (Equal Franchise) Act 1928, Britain more or less met the three criteria for 
‘minimal-procedural’ democracy, namely: free and fair elections with full suffrage; 
elected governments with the capacity to govern; and effective guarantees of civil 
liberties.83  The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures, though, argued that the second and 
third of these were not characteristics of the post-1931 parliamentary regime.  Their 
reasoning will be explored below, but at this point we must situate the movement on the 
British political landscape at a time when, on the Continent, democracies were failing.  
This is far from straightforward, however, because the NEG/NBM was a sui generis 
phenomenon in Britain. 
Capoccia has noted that among the European democracies in which struggle 
between ‘democratic incumbents and antisystem outsiders’ was not a primary 
characteristic of the political process, Britain was one of the six in which ‘democrats 
prevailed against weak opponents.’84  Some of the reasons for the absence of a grave 
struggle in interwar Britain are well known.  Early and gradual introduction of 
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democratic institutions meant Britain had a strong foundation for regime continuity.85  
Crucially, Britain’s social structure was such that neither fascism nor communism could 
flourish.86  British society had few politically salient cleavages, and was insulated from 
troubles on the Continent.  Citizens had opportunities to express their views, and learnt 
of little political corruption.87  Conditions were never conducive to a fascist 
parliamentary breakthrough: Britain was ‘not suffering under the psychology of defeat,’ 
and there was neither a ‘ruined middle class’ nor ‘economic suffering extreme enough 
to drive men to desperate measures,’ as the New Statesman and Nation put it.88  The 
vast majority of those in stable employment enjoyed rising disposable income due to 
sticky wages and falling prices, which took the edge off much popular discontent.89  
The Labour Party’s constitutionalism reinforced the liberal-democratic system, and the 
National Government channelled middle-class fears of socialism into tremendous 
electoral support.90  Fascists could not credibly present themselves as a bulwark against 
revolution when the CPGB (with a cadre of only 2,350 in 1930) was ‘neither more 
powerful, numerous nor rich’ than the Geoplanarian (flat Earth) Society, as Graves 
noted.91  Lawrence has stated that the ‘dominant motif’ of interwar political discourse 
turned out not to be brutality, but rather civility, peaceableness and moderation.92  The 
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extreme Left and the extreme Right never assumed proportions that threatened the 
parliamentary regime, and not once did an antisystem party achieve significant electoral 
displacement.93 
Lauri Karvonen’s empirical study found that ‘the interwar crisis did not 
destabilize previously stable regimes to a decisive degree,’ and that each state with low 
fragmentation in its party system was among the democratic ‘survivors.’94  On the face 
of it, fragmentation increased in Britain in the late 1920s and early 1930s, which saw 
splits in the Labour Party; the factionalisation of the Liberal Party; the emergence of the 
New Party; the confection of the pet projects-cum-parties the Empire Free Trade 
Crusade and the United Empire Party; and the birth of nationalist parties in Scotland.  
But whenever fragmentation was the decisive factor in an electoral contest, parties in 
Opposition or the wilderness were almost always the only ones that suffered – which 
meant that fragmentation had the effect of firming up the position of the National 
Government, rather than destabilising the regime.95  In the 1931 general election, the 
partners in the National Government gained a record 554 of the 615 seats in the 
Commons, though they won the support of no more than 14.5 million of the 21.6 
million voters.96  The result was the outright dominance of the MacDonald–Baldwin 
axis, which ensured the stability of democratic rule.97  Many Britons, though, 
considered the National Government’s outsize majority to be unhealthy and a prop for 
complacency. 
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Although the National Government never had to struggle to defend the 
parliamentary regime, several antisystem formations were active in interwar Britain.  In 
spite of their apparent failure, these antisystem formations are not to be dismissed as 
irrelevant.  For example, the New Party (founded by Oswald Mosley in 1931) was, in 
the words of Matthew Worley, ‘an absolute political failure’ – yet despite the fact that 
the party had only ‘minuscule’ support and ‘never remotely threatened the basic pattern 
of British politics,’ Worley has argued that it deserves our attention because it 
encapsulated ‘the concerns and uncertainties’ of the early 1930s.  The Saturday Review, 
for one, recognised that the New Party was ‘a “sign of the times” and a symptom of a 
wider dissatisfaction with the existing parliamentary system.’98 
Worley buttressed his argument by citing Michael Biddiss’ assertion that 
‘prevalent error’ may sometimes be ‘more accurately representative of an age than 
ultimately more profitable ideas.’99  In the case of the NEG/NBM, ‘prevalent error’ was 
present – yet so were many ideas that would later prove profitable.  True, the NBM did 
not see the implementation of the political changes it advocated; nor did it survive as a 
‘carrier’ of a particular set of principles.  Yet many of the ideas it helped to popularise 
would be realised in the decades that followed, making the NEG/NBM a ‘successful’ 
progenitor.  NBM goals realised in the past 70 years include ‘national responsibility’ for 
‘medical assistance’ and ‘full university opportunity for all able to benefit thereby,’ 
which became pillars of the welfare state.100  What is more, the NEG/NBM’s core 
principles of devolution and subsidiarity are, today, taken for granted as part of 
Britain’s domestic political arrangements.  Thus it is not only because the movement 
was peculiarly resonant of its time that it is worthy of attention. 
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To examine the NEG/NBM is to engage in what Worley has referred to as 
‘subterranean history,’ namely ‘delving beneath the surface of mainstream politics to 
seek relevance in the cross-currents of political allegiance and social interaction.’101  
The best place to start is the ideological ground that the NEG/NBM shared with the 
New Party: both formations were rooted in ‘antisystemness.’  This concept has been 
prone to what Giovanni Sartori has called ‘conceptual stretching.’102  Defined broadly, 
an ‘antisystem’ formation is any movement or party whose constituency’s attitudes to 
the democratic system range from alienation to protest.103  For a formation to meet the 
narrower definition of ‘antisystem,’ though, it must intend to change not only the 
government but the very system of government (including its fundamental values).104 
It is difficult to determine whether the New Party was antisystem in the narrow 
sense because, as Capoccia has stated, a formation’s ‘ideological anti-systemness’ can 
‘only be assessed by way of speculation as to its future intentions.’105  The New Party’s 
intentions can be gauged from its periodical, Action.106  On the one hand, the New Party 
stood for ‘the definite revision of the Parliamentary system’ because ‘under the present 
system … any comprehensive scheme of legislation [would be] blocked by 
cumbersome methods of Parliamentary procedure.’107  Mosley favoured the 
introduction of ‘methods of occupational franchise,’ which would lead to the 
‘representation of industrial interests, workers, employer and technician in 
Parliament.’108  The New Party argued that for the duration of the crisis, there was a 
need for a five-minister ‘inner Cabinet’ to govern ‘by Order in Council,’ which 
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Parliament would have the right to reject ‘after a brief general debate.’109  In Mosley’s 
view, these changes were needed to ‘Make Parliament into a workshop, instead of a 
talk-shop.’110 
On the other hand, the New Party had ‘no desire to rob Parliament of its 
function as guardian of the Nation’s Liberties: it must always be open to the House of 
Commons to dismiss any Government which does not command its support.’111  The 
New Party professed its ambition to be ‘a virulent and compact group’ in the Commons 
that would ‘stir’ the ‘energies’ of the National Government, and ‘influence the next 
Parliament towards a policy of vigour and action.’112  The balance of evidence suggests 
that Mosley’s formation sought to be a fully fledged ginger group in Parliament, as 
Worley has stated.  The New Party wanted to modify, rather than transform, the system 
of government: thus it met the broad definition of antisystem formation, but not the 
narrow one (unlike Mosley’s next formation, the BUF).113 
Capoccia has defined ‘relevant’ antisystem formations as those that manage to 
have, at a minimum, a ‘delegitimizing impact on the regime’ through ‘propaganda and 
actions.’114  The NEG/NBM was most certainly a ‘relevant’ antisystem movement at its 
height in 1933–4.115  Faced by such a movement, incumbents can ignore it, pay lip 
service to its concerns (which may or may not be shared more widely), or co-opt any of 
its ideas that they could feasibly accommodate.116  Alternatively, they could engage 
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with the antisystem movement, at the risk of enhancing its status.  A government 
backbencher might even seek advantage by arguing a case in the movement’s main 
periodical; for example, the Tory maverick Harold Macmillan contributed a full-page 
article to New Britain weekly.117  The NBM afforded such opportunities to incumbents 
because ‘reconciliation’ was one of the movement’s main objectives, as we shall see. 
The NEG/NBM periodicals were met with ‘stony silence’ by ‘such “cultural” 
organs as the Spectator and New Statesman,’ the unaffiliated New English Weekly 
complained.118  But this ‘silence’ mattered little so long as the movement could directly 
delegitimise the National Government and parliamentary regime through its own 
propaganda.  New Britain weekly was read by approximately 500,000 persons at its 
peak.119  The ‘sixpenny weekly for twopence’ was affordable to all but the very poorest 
Britons.120  It cost less than a five-pack of budget cigarettes, enabling the unemployed 
to buy copies ‘out of the few coppers they can spend each week.’121 
To increase the delegitimising impact of the NBM, its prominent figures sought 
to turn the readership of the movement’s periodicals into a ‘networked audience.’  With 
the explicit encouragement of New Britain weekly, many readers formed local groups, 
which by autumn 1933 dotted England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  This 
network offered readers the opportunity to become participants in the NBM, rather than 
just passive receivers of its ideas.  Meetings of local groups enabled their members to 
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develop a sense of themselves as part of a broad-based politicised social movement.  
Members of the Rugby group mimeographed a ‘hyperlocal’ magazine called New 
England, and persons associated with the group in Oxford produced Conspiracy.122 
Many local group members attended meetings in halls, and took part in 
discussion groups in drawing-rooms.123  The most eventful gatherings were the first and 
second national conferences, which were followed by summer schools; in contrast to 
the shirt movements’ marches, the NBM organised rambles.124  Any sparring was 
exclusively of the verbal kind.125  The movement’s prominent figures were not 
interested in capturing headlines through political theatre: there was nothing remotely 
like the Blackshirt rally at Olympia or the Greenshirt brick that broke a window at 11 
Downing Street.126  Whereas Greenshirt activities ‘literalised the notion of projection 
and penetration,’ the NBM never even produced a necktie for its supporters (its 
prominent figures spurned the suggestion that a ‘distinctive’ tie would be ‘good 
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publicity’).127  Watts summed up the NBM attitude as: ‘No shirts, badges, flags or 
labels are required – only a firm purpose and a desire for sanity.’128  This total rejection 
of uniformity left the Sheffield Daily Telegraph unsure of what to make of the NBM: it 
recognised that the movement had ‘political aims, though so far as we are aware its 
members do not wear any special colour of shirt, or even tie.’129  New Britain weekly 
cartoons mocked the shirt movements (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3); a ‘New Britain’ could be 
realised only through regeneration and reconciliation, not regimentation.  As a St. 
Albans group member put it: Britons were not ‘mere instruments at the disposal of 
every wind that blows a shirt in our face,’ for the ‘way to the age of plenty is not draped 
with shirts of any colour.’130 
 
 
 Fig. 2.  Stanley Herbert, detail of ‘The British Association Meets 
 Today’, New Britain weekly, 6 September 1933, p. 497. 
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 Fig. 3.  Stanley Herbert, ‘SALESMANSHIP’, 
 New Britain weekly, 23 August 1933, p. 433. 
 
 
The Syncretic Turn in Extra-parliamentary Politics 
 
The understated nature of the NBM’s activities is one reason why the movement has 
been overlooked; another is that it did not ‘play the democratic game,’ as Capoccia has 
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called an antisystem formation’s attempt to enter ‘the citadel of democratic political 
institutions.’131  Yet another reason is that, as Daniel Ritschel has noted, little serious 
attention has been paid to the ‘remarkably complex variety’ of challenges to orthodox 
economics ‘staked out within the radical camp’ rather than in Westminster, the 
NEG/NBM’s ‘highly eclectic’ and ‘curious’ planning philosophy among them.132  
Ritschel has pointed out that the ‘fractured and fragmented nature of economic opinion 
in the 1930s’ has been oversimplified.133  That is also the case, albeit to a lesser degree, 
for political opinion.  The political loyalties of intellectuals were in fact ‘surprisingly 
fluid’ until Hitler’s seizure of power, as Stan Smith and Jennifer Birkett have explained.  
The European intelligentsia was in ‘ferment’ from 1929 to 1933, when ‘political 
commitments could be inflected to Left or Right.’  Many writers ‘vacillated between 
extremes’ in what Smith and Birkett have termed ‘revolving commitment,’ and much of 
the political writing of the early 1930s ‘reveals this deep ambiguity.’134 
In 1930 The Observer declared: ‘No one remembers a time when discontents 
were so rife in all parties together and when movements were so kaleidoscopic.’135  
Worley has stated that New Party members ‘were caught in an ideological flux, drawing 
from and responding to an array of influences and stimuli as they struggled to 
comprehend a shifting socio-political landscape wracked by economic depression.’136  
Indeed, one editorial in Action complained that members of the public asked New Party 
leaders to offer ‘“an easy category into which you can be made to fit.”  In other words, 
they want to tuck the New Party away into some dusty pigeon-hole of their minds.’137  
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In a similar vein, an editorial in New Britain weekly announced: ‘SINCE THE FIRST 
NUMBER OF THIS PAPER APPEARED WE HAVE BEEN CALLED FASCIST, 
Communist, Imperialist, Nationalist, Liberal, and, if I could remember them, half a 
dozen other names as well.  I am not surprised by that.  We expected to be just a little 
annoying and perhaps confusing.’138  Public confusion over the ideological orientation 
of the NBM aided, rather than hindered, its growth.139  Many puzzled but open-minded 
individuals were pulled into the NBM orbit simply because they were curious about 
what the movement stood for, exactly. 
Tom Villis has explained that the syncretic turn in British extra-parliamentary 
politics – whose locus was the rejection of the liberal parliamentary system ‘from a 
direction that fused the ideas of right and left’ – had its origins in the pre-war years, 
when A. R. Orage’s The New Age was at the height of its influence.140  Until its demise 
in 1922, the periodical served as a clearinghouse for novel ideas.  Mitrinović 
contributed in 1920–1, and was the dominant figure in Orage’s world ‘for two or three 
years,’ according to Philip Mairet, a contributor at the time.141  Villis has noted that the 
syncretic ‘political space’ opened by The New Age ‘has been ignored by those who have 
looked for similar ideas primarily in relation to existing parliamentary parties,’ despite 
it being the breeding ground for ‘criticisms of parliamentary democracy’ that would be 
expressed more clamorously between the wars.142  This political space accommodated 
‘elements of ideas that had motivated criticisms of both parliamentary democracy and 
capitalism in the 19th century,’ alongside ideas that had ‘much in common with a 
European tradition of radical right-wing anti-parliamentarianism.’  Villis has seen in the 
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140 Tom Villis, Reaction and the Avant-Garde: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy in Early 
Twentieth-Century Britain (London, 2006), p. 194. 
141 Philip Mairet, Autobiographical and Other Papers (Manchester, 1981), p. 178. 
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36 
 
ideational complexion of The New Age the first blush of the ‘political revolt’ against 
parliamentary democracy in Britain.  In its day, this ‘cultural rebellion’ did not ‘find the 
same circumstances for political manifestation’ present in Continental European states, 
so the ‘ideas remained isolated on the intellectual fringe’ in Britain.  Yet these ideas, 
Villis has concluded, ‘provided an arsenal of arguments from which later disaffected 
intellectuals could draw.’143  That arsenal would be fully deployed by prominent figures 
in the NBM. 
 
 
Political Perfectionism: the NEG/NBM as a ‘Positive’ Antisystem Movement 
 
The National Government faced antisystem formations strong enough, at least for a 
time, to call into question the legitimacy of the incumbents and the parliamentary 
regime, and to articulate plans (feasible or otherwise) for changes to the political 
system.144 
The emergence of a significant politicised movement is a relatively rare 
occurrence in any state.145  But rarer still is the coming to prominence of one that, like 
the NEG/NBM, belongs in the little-known ‘positive’ subset of antisystem formations 
that Michael Keren has termed ‘political perfectionist.’146  Without doubt, the 
NEG/NBM was the only political perfectionist movement active in Britain between the 
wars. 
The main objective of leaders of a political perfectionist movement or party is 
the realisation, in their polity, of ‘a standard of perfection’ derived from ‘commitment 
                                                
143 Ibid., p. 195. 
144 Capoccia, Defending Democracy, p. 6. 
145 Martin Kolinsky and William E. Paterson, Social and Political Movements in Western Europe (New 
York, 1976), p. 345. 
146 Michael Keren, ‘Political Perfectionism and the “Anti-system” Party’, Party Politics 6.1 (2000), 
p. 108.  In the twentieth century there were few prominent political perfectionist movements or parties.  
The literature on this ‘positive’ subset of antisystem formations is proportionally scant. 
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to an imaginary rather than real civil society,’ for the benefit of the polity’s people.  
This contrasts the agenda of leaders of a ‘negative’ antisystem formation, who seek to 
delegitimise the regime primarily for the benefit of their formation, to which their own 
personal fortunes are tied (they are unlikely, of course, to couch their antisystemness in 
such self-interested terms).147  Political perfectionist formations seek to enlarge 
citizens’ sense of theoretically possible outcomes of the political process; in contrast, 
negative antisystem parties make promises designed to maximise their support ‘in the 
knowledge that they will never be called upon to make good on their pledges.’148 
Keren has stated that leaders of political perfectionist movements imagine an 
‘impossible reality,’ and share that vision in an attempt to wither away citizens’ ‘sense 
of the impossible.’149  The NBM’s prominent figures imagined a perfect ‘New’ Britain 
and worked toward its realisation, initially by popularising their vision.  One journalist 
grasped that ‘They of the New Britain movement … would build up the ideal state they 
visualized.’150  As Sartori has stated, political perfectionism differs from utopianism in 
                                                
147 Keren, ‘Political Perfectionism’, pp. 107–8.  Keren has discussed New Force (NF), an Israeli political 
perfectionist movement-turned-party represented in the Knesset from 1965 to 1973.  Like the NBM, NF 
had former soldiers among its prominent figures.  The NF’s leader’s ‘viewpoint’ was that of ‘the soldier 
forced to fight for a state whose leadership … had corrupted it,’ and the formation focused on the 
discrepancy between the pure wishes of young soldiers and the tainted realities of the state (Ibid., 
pp. 111–14).  NF, like the NBM, emerged only after it had become fully apparent that national leaders 
had over-promised in wartime and under-delivered after (in the British case, over-promising had quelled 
the militancy of returning Fighting Forces until they were safely demobilised).  Twenty years to the day 
Britain declared war, the NBM began its second national conference (4–6 August 1934).  Delahaye said 
that the date had been chosen because ‘the ideals men died for’ (‘civilisation, liberty and democracy’) 
‘had not been achieved; indeed, they were in greater peril than ever.’  The NBM ‘was out to fulfil them,’ 
he stated (‘Transformation of Society by National Will’, Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, 6 
August 1934).  If the Fallen ‘could come back they would realise that they had died for nothing.  That put 
the responsibility on the people of the present day to see that … what these men died for should be given 
to mankind,’ Delahaye said (‘“New Britain” Movement’, Central Somerset Gazette, 10 August 1934). 
148 Capoccia, Defending Democracy, p. 31. 
149 Keren, ‘Political Perfectionism’, p. 112 and p. 114.  Today, as Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 
have explained, it is advocacy networks that ‘use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to 
alter the information and value contexts within which states make policies’; see Activists Beyond Borders 
(Ithaca, 1998), p. 16.  Today, few citizens believe a government could bring about ‘perfect’ conditions in 
its polity; rather, the general expectation is that a government manage, as best it can, a wide range of 
highly complex issues.  Specialist advocacy networks have thus proliferated in recent years, and no new 
political perfectionist formations have come to prominence.  It may be the case that a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the emergence of a political perfectionist formation is the grouping of a critical 
mass of activists with faith in government’s ability to broadly determine domestic conditions at will. 
150 ‘New Britain’, Croydon Advertiser, 3 March 1934. 
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that it moves beyond contemplation and becomes ‘perfectionistic activism.’151  Watts 
stressed that the aims of the NBM were ‘positive – not merely the anti-this and anti-that 
of Left Wing politicians,’ and that the movement had ‘evolved a definite and detailed 
plan for national reorganisation.’152  If the political perfectionist formation’s vision 
captures the imagination of followers, faith may follow: after all, it is not unreasonable 
to believe that a plan that seems unrealisable at one moment could be implemented at a 
later juncture.153  Circumstances constantly change, often beyond anyone’s powers of 
anticipation – as was well understood by Mitrinović, who, after devoting his youth to 
Yugoslavism, saw the political unification of the South Slav peoples go from lost cause 
to internationally recognised reality in the span of a few years.154 
Negative antisystem parties distort the electoral market: they try to empty the 
political centre by outbidding incumbents.  In contrast, ‘positive’ antisystem formations 
shine a spotlight on the deficiencies of the status quo in order to stir awareness among 
citizens, shame those responsible, and spur into action the persons or bodies tasked with 
rectifying the problems.155  Clarke has noted that the Slump not only ‘discredited 
capitalism, it also discredited reformist attempts at tinkering with it.’156  By casting the 
National Government’s tinkering in unflattering light, the NBM sought to shame the 
incumbents, and to spur them to legislate with a view to a ‘perfect’ polity.157 
                                                
151 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revised (Chatham, 1987), p. 60. 
152 ‘National Co-operation’, Bromley District Times, 20 July 1934. 
153 Karl Mannheim argued that ‘man would lose his will to shape history’ if he lost faith in utopias; see 
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London, 1936), p. 236. 
154 As will be discussed in chapters three and four, the NEG/NBM had a vision for European integration.  
This was one of the great lost causes of the 1930s, yet many of the European-level changes sought by the 
movement’s prominent figures would come to be realised within their lifetimes. 
155 Of course, political perfectionist movements are not the only antisystem formations that agitate against 
government complacency.  The New Party, for example, aimed to ‘see to it that the seats of office are not 
over-comfortable’ (‘Parliament’, p. 3). 
156 Clarke, Hope and Glory, p. 172. 
157 A political perfectionist formation would struggle to function as such if new limits on free expression 
minimised its potential delegitimising impact.  The NBM feared that the National Government would try 
to stifle criticism using the powers it sought with the Incitement to Disaffection Bill.  The movement 
supported the Merseyside demonstration against the Bill (‘United Front at Liverpool’, Daily Worker, 26 
June 1934).  The NBM’s Alexandra Park group stated that the law would be ‘an unjust weapon in the 
hands of an unscrupulous Government’ (‘Profound Concern’, Wood Green Sentinel, 1 November 1934). 
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Mitrinović understood that to exert influence on a government, an antisystem 
formation need not contest elections: it need only grow strong enough to get 
incumbents to act on ideas in line with those of the movement.  The Cabinet was in an 
unprecedentedly strong position to resist attempts to shape the legislative agenda from 
beyond government ranks.  But some dynamic National Government MPs – whose 
minds were not clogged by old nostrums – put forward activist government proposals, 
which prominent figures in the NBM hoped their ideas would inform.158  Among the 
younger generation of MPs, those exploring innovative economic ideas perceived the 
1860s-born Baldwin and MacDonald to be hidebound and complacent in the face of 
high unemployment; in 1929, for example, Mosley had attacked Baldwin on the 
grounds that he had been ‘content’ as prime minister ‘just to squat in front of problems 
of the day like a hypnotised rabbit in front of a snake.’159  MacDonald was equally 
deserving of criticism: when prime minister, his efforts to address unemployment 
extended little beyond setting up committees and launching inquiries.160  In December 
1932, he resorted to urging the public to give unemployed persons something to do, 
such as by ‘teaching men … to make mats out of bits of old rope.’161  The NBM was 
well aware that ‘some of the strongest criticism of the Government comes actually from 
the young Conservatives,’ and that Macmillan was ‘impatient to get at the roots of the 
                                                
158 The National Government won 90 percent of seats in the 1931 election.  Years of rule by a 
government with an impregnable majority galvanised the NBM, as it later would a German antisystem 
movement that arose in similar circumstances, namely the Außerparlamentarische (extra-parliamentary) 
Opposition that opposed the 1966–9 grand coalition (which had 95 percent of seats in the Bundestag). 
159 ‘Preston By-election’, The Manchester Guardian, 30 July 1929.  Within a year, Mosley became even 
more disillusioned with the ‘old gang’ politicians, having been obliged to work under Jimmy Thomas, a 
corrupt minister who was co-responsible with Chancellor Philip Snowden for tackling unemployment 
(Gardiner, Thirties, p. 433 and p. 389).  Panic-prone Thomas, who preferred drinking to thinking, could 
not even grasp the scope of the problem.  Snowden was beholden to notions of thrift and sobriety, and 
believed the main effect of spending on public works would be the crowding out of private investment.  
See Piers Brendon, The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s (New York, 2000), pp. 179–80. 
160 Brendon, Dark Valley, p. 178.  In 1930, MacDonald confided in his diary that unemployment was 
‘baffling’ him, and that his ‘head would not work’; see David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 
1977), p. 543.  Diary entries such as ‘The simple fact is that our population is too great for our trade’ 
betray MacDonald’s ignorance of economics (Ibid., p. 537).  By 1935, his mental acuity had deteriorated 
so badly that the interpreter at the Stresa Conference had to make up a speech from his ramblings; see 
Brendon, Dark Valley, p. 414. 
161 Branson and Heinemann, Nineteen Thirties, pp. 39–40. 
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trouble.’162  The National Government’s outsize majority resulted in what one 
prominent figure in the NBM called the ‘drift away from a rigid party politics.’163  
Looser party ties allowed Macmillan to argue – via the Next Five Years Group, 
established in February 1933 – in favour of subsidies for distressed areas, state control 
over industry, and the abolition of the Means Test (a system used to assess the amount 
of dole payable to an unemployed person).164  Other conscience-stricken Conservative 
MPs (some of whom represented blighted industrial areas in the North) were disquieted 
by their less idealistic colleagues’ indifference to the suffering of the unemployed, and 
rejected the notion that ‘sound’ finance would see the country through – like 
Macmillan, they were ‘semi-detached’ from their party.165  The NEG/NBM hoped that 
MPs sympathetic to the movement could be induced to advance its causes in the 
knowledge that NBM members ‘from all parties or none’ would rally support for such 
efforts in league with New Britain weekly.166  The NBM would thus influence the 
course of government by ensuring that ‘the best brains of all political parties were 
sinking petty differences,’ as a member of a local group in Devon put it.167 
 
 
 
 
                                                
162 ‘Another Week Goes By’, Eleventh Hour, 5 December 1934, p. 34.  Between the wars, no more than 
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166 Basil Hall, ‘New Britain’, News Chronicle, 20 February 1934. 
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Stir, Shame and Spur 
 
Political perfectionist movements can single-mindedly ‘stir, shame and spur’ in a ‘pure’ 
way – unlike pressure groups, on which the grubbiness of procedural politics rubs off; 
protest parties, which angle for a share of power; ginger groups of MPs, which are 
subject to parliamentary socialisation; and loyal Opposition parties, which jockey for 
power (and, if they ruled recently, may be reluctant to draw too much attention to 
certain deficiencies, lest their own record in government be scrutinised anew).  In 
contrast to pressure groups, which make demands (typically on a single issue) that 
could be accommodated in the system, political perfectionist formations advocate broad 
and deep changes that are barely conceivable in the circumstances – but the evident 
unfeasibility is an integral part of the damning indictment of incumbents.  When 
examining a correctible (albeit difficult) problem, a political perfectionist formation 
highlights the expanse between a far from perfect reality (e.g. the continued existence 
of slum housing) and an optimal solution (e.g. all citizens securely housed in decent 
conditions) so that the shortcomings of office-holders and the system in which they 
operate appear in the sharpest possible relief.168  Political perfectionist formations posit 
that if ‘perfect’ solutions to longstanding problems are still not within reach, it is only 
because incumbents have made so little progress toward them (prior incumbents may 
come in for a share of criticism, too).169 
To give an example, New Britain weekly castigated the National Government 
for the slow pace of the clearance of slums, ‘the most disgraceful social stain of the 
                                                
168 There is, however, a scenario in which a political perfectionist movement would have a net stabilising 
effect on the system: if citizens disenchanted with mainstream parties came to see the movement as a 
suitable outlet for the expression of their discontent, negative antisystem parties would lose much of their 
appeal – and with it, much of their ability to threaten the system. 
169 The News Chronicle, the sole surviving liberal national daily, acknowledged that the NBM’s 
‘criticisms’ were ‘useful’ (‘Liberty’, News Chronicle, 22 February 1934). 
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20th century.’170  It also decried ‘the awful results of widespread speculative building,’ 
‘meaningless ribbon development,’ and the ‘spread of brick monstrosities … 
marshalled monotonously in depressing rows.’171  A few months before the completion 
of Becontree, the world’s largest public housing estate, Jack Common drew attention to 
what he called ‘the planned slum and the cemetery-suburb,’ which lacked amenities for 
communal life.172  New Britain weekly shamed the health minister for declaring slum 
clearance progress to be ‘very good’ when ‘by the lowest possible standard the number 
of houses to be cleared cannot be far short of a million and by any decent standard of 
living not far short of two million.’173  Housing policy was ‘a shocking mockery,’ and 
the National Government’s ‘refusal to accept responsibility’ was a ‘national disgrace’ 
that ‘should cover every member of it with ignominy.’174  New Britain weekly sought to 
spur the health minister to ‘much more drastic’ action.175 
Some citizens might be so dazzled by the spotlight that political perfectionist 
formations shine on problems that they avert their eyes, rather than allow themselves to 
be stirred to greater awareness.  The periodical Patriot, for example, dismissed as 
‘subversive propaganda’ the ‘chief line’ of the ‘Noxious’ NBM, calling it a ‘Fruit Tart’ 
with an ‘attractive crust’ that covered ‘Moscow’s unconscious agents.’176  Many other 
citizens, though, appreciated the efforts of ‘New Atlantis, New Albion and New Britain’ 
to ‘clarify the murkiness,’ as Ronald Blythe has put it.177  Seeing problems illuminated 
in a harsh, unforgiving light could have been just what it took to stir them out of 
                                                
170 ‘The World We Live In’, New Britain weekly, 14 June 1933, p. 99.  Niall MacDermot, the son of the 
NBM’s main benefactor, would later serve as housing minister in Wilson’s first government. 
171 Ibid., p. 98. 
172 Jack Common, ‘Report on Housing’, Eleventh Hour, 9 January 1935, p. 141.  Becontree’s 110,000 
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complacency, apathy or fatalism – all habits of mind to which the NBM objected (Fig. 
4).178  If a ‘perfect’ solution seemed beyond grasp, even the remotest prospect that it 
could come within reach might have been enough to stave off pessimism, a disposition 
that the NBM’s prominent figures scorned as much as they did inertia (Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Stanley Herbert, ‘SHADES OF THE GREAT MARVELLING AT THEIR 
PROGENY’, New Britain weekly, 7 June 1933, p. 81. 
                                                
178 After 1931, ‘general apathy’ was the ‘most remarkable aspect of electoral behaviour,’ according to 
John Stevenson and Chris Cook.  Local election turnout was ‘regularly low’ and sometimes fell to about 
a third of eligible voters; see The Slump: Britain in the Great Depression (3rd edn, Harlow, 2010), p. 140.  
Most middle class voters trusted the National Government to mind the shop, freeing them to pursue their 
lives unencumbered by a duty to be overtly political. 
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Fig. 5.  Stanley Herbert, ‘Derby Day: All the Losers!’, New Britain weekly, 31 May 
1933, p. 49. 
 
 
When weighing criticisms of incumbents made by various formations, some 
citizens would likely judge a political perfectionist movement’s motives to be purer 
than those of a party contesting power.179  Expressing no interest in elected office, 
prominent figures in positive antisystem movements embody disinterestedness, and 
present themselves as starkly different from favour-currying, self-serving operators 
eyeing the spoils of office.  One prominent figure in the NBM did just that at a public 
meeting in Hampstead, as the Golders Green Gazette reported: 
 
                                                
179 One commentator disdained the ‘purity’ of the NBM’s approach, stating that Conspiracy (the 
magazine produced by persons associated with the NBM’s group in Oxford) expressed ‘sympathy and 
feeling for our present industrial and political discontents without contaminating its [the movement’s] 
adherent with anything so worldly or useless as day to day party politics’ (‘Spectator’, ‘Glass Case 
Politicians’, Isis, 5 December 1934). 
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Every country was having its change … and the New Britain movement 
wanted to bring about a change here.  It was a peculiar movement in that 
sense. 
If there was a new Britain, if they were instrumental in bringing 
about a change, they were not so much concerned, like most other 
organisations, whether they had publicity, they were wholeheartedly not 
for themselves, but for Britain.  If they could be instrumental in any way 
they would not mind whether or not their name was ever mentioned.180 
 
 
Other journalists developed an understanding of the NBM’s peculiarity in this respect: 
The Birmingham Post noted that the movement set itself ‘the task of creating an 
atmosphere [emphasis added] in which great reforms could be carried through without 
force and without the reactions of dictatorship, &c.’181 
 
 
‘Aspidistra Antisystemness’ – and Its Limits 
 
The NBM’s task of ‘creating an atmosphere’ for ‘great reforms’ held most appeal for 
members of the middle classes.182  Murry wrote in The Adelphi that a ‘considerable’ 
and ‘growing’ middle-class ‘mass of opinion’ had ‘acquired a distinctive organ of 
expression – the New Britain weekly.’  ‘Through the agency’ of the weekly, he 
continued, ‘a nebulous mass of dissatisfaction and aspiration has advanced a perceptible 
                                                
180 ‘“New Britain”’, Golders Green Gazette, 18 April 1934.  The speaker addressed ‘a large crowd of 
interested people’ (‘Towards a New Britain’, Hendon Times and Borough Guardian, 13 April 1934). 
181 ‘Objects of the New Britain Alliance’, The Birmingham Post, 31 March 1934. 
182 The advertising in New Britain weekly suggests that the bourgeoisie was well represented among its 
readership; each of the first five issues, for example, had full-page adverts aimed at lawn tennis players 
who could (if they had a spacious back garden) use the ‘Kum-Bak Auto-Coach’ for a ‘practice knock-
up.’  Unlike Action, New Britain weekly never had adverts that spoke to fears of reproletarianisation or 
more perilous social relegation (‘your family can be made safe from the peril of poverty’, Action, 8 
October 1931, p. 15), or that addressed concerns about reduced circumstances (‘start a spare-time 
business that quickly brings a full-time income’, Action, 5 November 1931, p. 21).  Corot advertised 4–7-
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1931, p. 23).  Appealing to more socially secure New Britain weekly readers, Corot did not mention 
persons in the ‘selling world’ – rather, its adverts focused on ‘designs for town or country wear, for 
cruising, and for holiday wear,’ and made reference to instalment plans only in code (customers could 
pay ‘in the modern way’) (‘get your frocks from corot’, New Britain weekly, 24 May 1933, p. ii). 
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degree towards becoming a real body of opinion.  To that extent, the New Britain has 
performed a creative function, seldom fulfilled by a new journalistic organ to-day.’183  
Through the NBM, members of the middle classes were able to participate in what we 
might call ‘aspidistra antisystemness,’ namely the genteel expression of discontent with 
the system in a manner that maintained social respectability.184  An unwritten code of 
behaviour restrained active involvement in politics among suburbanites, for whom 
respectability was all-important.185  But members of the middle classes were able to 
attend NBM local group gatherings in homes, or even public meetings at small-scale 
venues, without setting off the twitching of net curtains in their neighbourhoods.  
Compared with ‘Safety First’ conservatism (which was as dull as the road safety 
campaign whose name the Tories borrowed for their 1929 election slogan), the NBM 
seemed inspirational to many in the middle classes.186  They could identify with a 
movement that was inspired by social idealism, to which it gave eloquent voice, rather 
than fuelled by unsavoury grievances.187  One prominent figure in the NBM would later 
write that the fact that the movement ‘grew to the dimensions it did’ was ‘a testimony to 
the spiritual vitality of its vision.’188 
Political perfectionist movements highlight what they regard as the incumbents’ 
poverty of political imagination and failure to make laws that would minimise 
imperfections in a polity.  The imperfections perceived by the NBM’s prominent 
figures included the wretched housing conditions endured by millions of their 
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compatriots, poor public health, mass unemployment, sub-optimal money supply, and 
other clusters of problems that had been inadequately addressed by those with the 
power to rectify them.  L. C. B. Seaman has written that most Britons came to accept 
the existence of long-term unemployment in the older industrial areas ‘in the way they 
accepted the phenomena of overpopulation in India or of recurrent flood and famine in 
China’ – that is, as something ‘natural,’ about which nothing could be done.189  Most 
citizens were resigned to malign socioeconomic conditions in parts of the country, 
meaning incumbents more readily fell into the timidity trap, enacting only half-
measures at best.190  But many other citizens despaired over ‘white flag’ attitudes – and 
it was from among this subset of the citizenry that the NBM drew much of its support. 
Mitrinović had no patience for what he called ‘Business as usual’ politics.191  
Equally impatient were the NBM’s prominent figures who had served in the Great War: 
they had developed disgust for ‘muddle-through’ politicians, and – unwilling to ‘soldier 
on’ in silence – felt free to criticise those who spoke in the name of Britain.  The 
National Government presented itself as ‘the true expression of national consensus,’ as 
Tom Jeffrey has noted.192  But the government was ‘“National” in name only’ 
according to one NBM periodical, which stated that the label was ‘obviously an 
absurdity’ given the preponderance of Conservative MPs.193 
The NBM’s ‘lofty aim’ was commented on by at least one newspaper.194  Tens 
of thousands perusing the movement’s periodicals likely found some of the NBM’s 
ideas hard to metabolise, but even the most casual reader could not have missed the 
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repeated exhortations to expand his or her sense of what was possible, politically.  
Neville Chamberlain’s claim that 1932 was ‘a year wonderful in endeavour’ suggests 
just how little scope for endeavour the National Government was capable of 
imagining.195  By ensuring that tens of thousands of Britons were exposed to a radical 
yet respectable alternative programme, the NEG/NBM showed up the timidity and 
complacency of the National Government.  As a positive antisystem formation, the 
NBM sought to abash, rather than bash, the incumbents and the system.  The Fourth 
Estate, for its part, did little to hold the government to account: the national dailies were 
glutted with human-interest stories and ‘borderland’ ones straddling science and 
mysticism (the great topic of 1933 was the Loch Ness Monster).196  Indeed, the popular 
press discouraged the study of political and economic issues.197  In 1931 the National 
Government had gone to the country with the request that voters ‘register a simple act 
of faith’ in its capacity to restore the nation to health, as Seaman has noted.198  That 
faith had been betrayed and the people’s trust abused, in the view of prominent figures 
in the NBM.  After all, what good was a Doctor’s Mandate if the dithering doctor 
declined to use his instruments when the body politic was so obviously in need of 
corrective surgeries? 
The NBM’s political perfectionism put the movement at odds with Britain’s 
tradition of gradualism.  Walter Bagehot wrote that ‘the most essential mental quality 
for a free people, whose liberty is to be progressive, permanent and on a large scale’ 
was ‘much stupidity’ – in English Constitution (1867) he clarified what he meant by 
‘stupidity,’ positing it as the virtue of ‘the dull traditional habit’ that ‘guides most men’s 
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actions.’199  The ‘stupidity’ of much of the potential audience for the NBM’s ideas 
capped the support for the movement; many Britons would have been wary of the 
political novelty it represented.  One of the NBM’s prominent figures recognised the 
salience of ‘stupidity’ when he spoke of the ‘peculiarly British way of great hesitation 
to move,’ even when the country was heading ‘in the direction of tyranny and the denial 
of individual rights.’200 
In mid-1933, New Britain weekly declared ‘We need a special microscope to 
study the economic improvements of 1933.’201  But by 1934, signs of recovery were 
hard to ignore: economic conditions seemed to be improving in most parts of Britain.  
Indeed, the country looked to be on the mend: the loss of confidence in the British state 
was being stemmed (in England, at least), with Parliament re-establishing its credibility 
through initiatives such as the Special Areas Act 1934.  Chamberlain told the 
Commons: ‘We have now finished the story of Bleak House and are sitting down this 
afternoon to enjoy the first chapter of Great Expectations.’202  There remained much 
bitterness in economically desolate areas, but elsewhere in Britain life tasted sweeter – 
quite literally so, for when Chamberlain reported on economic recovery the following 
year, he was able to cite a massive increase in sugar consumption.203 
But it was developments beyond Britain’s shores, rather than the country’s 
improving fortunes, that gave one of the NBM’s prominent figures cause to re-evaluate 
his attitude to political perfectionism.  David Davies (b. 1889), an ex-collier and 
Congregational minister from Wales, recalled the change in his thinking: 
 
The idealist urge to build a new world had been swamped in my growing 
sense of the danger besetting our civilization…  The fine frenzy arising 
out of an exuberant, positive will to fashion a new order evaporated in 
the realization that the secure, established heritage of previous struggle 
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was in danger of being lost.204  My concern now was not a new Socialist 
order, but the preservation of democracy; ordinary, bourgeois capitalist 
democracy.  It is going to take us all our time, I thought, to keep what 
we’ve got.  I was acutely alive to the menace of Fascism, still more to 
the menace of Hitlerism.  The world is retreating, I felt…  Hitherto I had 
been crying for the moon.  Now I began to cry for the street-lamp, which 
barbarian hands were seeking to destroy.205 
 
In short, was it right for the NBM to continue to undermine a purportedly decayed 
domestic order once it became apparent that Britain’s ‘bourgeois capitalist democracy’ 
was on course for an existential struggle against a brutal order twisted by ‘barbarian 
hands’?  By the mid-1930s Davies, for one, came to realise that it would take all the 
efforts that a society could muster to preserve its ‘established heritage’ from the harm 
that could be inflicted by German military might: ‘How can we get a new world, if we 
cannot summon the will and the energy to safeguard the few good things in the old 
world?  Significant living narrowed down to desperate defence of the status quo.’206  At 
this juncture, Davies came to see political perfectionism as irresponsible, even indecent 
– what Sartori has termed ‘bad idealism.’207  As Keren has noted, ‘uncontrollable 
attendance to the maximization of ideals’ can have a role in ‘jeopardizing the political 
principles’ underlying a parliamentary regime – and the British one, as Davies 
acknowledged, looked rosier when compared with the systems of government on the 
Continent.208  Anyone who persisted with the ‘fine frenzy’ would seem as out of touch 
as a tenant complaining about the foundations of his home while neighbours fretted 
about the tremors of an earthquake that imperilled everything. 
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The ending of the NBM experiment in political perfectionism also had to do 
with the personal circumstances of Mitrinović.  He never became a subject of the 
Crown, which meant he was not in a position to openly lead a politicised social 
movement in Britain (as will be explained in chapter two).  At this point, we must turn 
our attention to Mitrinović: the man who created the NBM; inveigled its funding; 
synthesised its ideology; inspired its other prominent figures; controlled its periodicals; 
guided its development – and assented to its demise. 
 
 
Dimitrije Mitrinović’s Activities, 1914–31 
 
Mitrinović is ‘not exactly a household name’ even among historians of the Balkans, one 
scholar has noted.209  Yet the Herzegovinian Serb accomplished a remarkable feat: born 
in a remote, hardscrabble village on the periphery of one empire, he made himself a 
success in the centre of another by building a movement that ‘mobilized … public 
support, and became of political importance for a brief, critical moment,’ as Mairet put 
it.210 
Born in 1887 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a territory that had fallen under 
Austro-Hungarian control nine years earlier, Mitrinović was brought up in the Serbian 
Orthodox tradition.  His schoolteacher parents raised their firstborn at home (which had 
a library of several hundred books in at least four languages) until 1899, when the gifted 
boy was sent to board at the high school in Mostar.211  All aspects of life in 
Herzegovina’s largest town – with its ‘babel of languages’ and thousands-strong 
garrison – reminded its inhabitants that they were ‘under a military occupation,’ a 
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British traveller recorded.212  Mitrinović and his schoolfellows were bitterly opposed to 
the exploitation of their homeland, and formed a secret society.213  In order to 
circumvent censorship and avoid punishment, Mitrinović had to operate in a 
conspiratorial mode; decades later, facing far fewer restrictions in London, Mitrinović 
would intrigue his followers by toying with pseudo-conspiratorial practices, as if to 
experience some semblance of the excitement he had felt during his formative years.214 
As a young man Mitrinović distinguished himself as the ‘undisputed ideological 
and aesthetic leader’ of his generation: he was the arbiter of cultural taste among the 
territory’s politically conscious youth, many of whom were involved in the Mlada 
Bosna (Young Bosnia) movement, as it later became known.215  He ‘moved in 
mysterious ways, and often met an open door where others could not even knock,’ his 
first biographer stated.216  Crisscrossing the South Slav lands, Mitrinović promoted 
discreet discussion on spiritual and moral regeneration (‘Fighting against attitudes of 
servility, sneaking and contemptibility’), and cultural revival in the face of the ‘spiritual 
and material forces’ of Germanisation, Magyarisation and Italianisation.217  His 
activities made him subject to official harassment, including arrest and searches of his 
lodgings, when on Austro-Hungarian soil.218  Committed to gradualism, Mitrinović 
argued that awakening ‘dormant national energies’ was a prerequisite for a successful 
union of the South Slav peoples in an independent federal state.219  Having put his faith 
in federal governance as the best hope of peacefully resolving differences among 
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peoples, Mitrinović would soon enlarge the focus of his concern from the South Slav 
lands to Europe – but not until the early 1930s would he prove able, in London, to lead 
a movement furthering the cause of European federalism. 
By the early 1910s, Mitrinović was outgrowing what he increasingly saw as 
petty squabbles among South Slav intellectuals; he gave the impression of being a 
‘world-traveller who had stumbled by chance into sad and gloomy provincial 
surroundings,’ a fellow Young Bosnian recalled.220  Unwilling to stagnate in a Bosnian 
backwater, Mitrinović moved to Munich – a wellspring of art – to immerse himself in 
the currents of European intellectual life.  While studying in the Bavarian capital in 
1913, he met Wassily Kandinsky.  In February 1914, Kandinsky wrote to Franz Marc 
that Mitrinović would be ‘very useful to the Blaue Reiter’ group of artists because ‘he 
goes to the heart of things like lightning.’221  At some point in the spring of that year, 
Marc’s editorship of a planned follow-up to Der Blaue Reiter Almanach was usurped 
by Mitrinović, who wanted the volume to propose the creation of ‘a federation of 
European nations.’222 
In Germany, Mitrinović was beyond the reach of the Austro-Hungarian 
authorities – until teenage Young Bosnians assassinated Archduke Ferdinand.  
Mitrinović had always advocated strictly non-violent means of struggle, but his 
influence had waned in his absence.  His teachings had come to be rejected by a band of 
youths who instead embraced the strategy of political violence favoured by Unification 
or Death (also known as the Black Hand), a secret military society in Serbia.  As war 
fever spread, Mitrinović’s position became increasingly awkward: he was an almost 
penniless Austro-Hungarian subject in a neighbouring Central Power preparing to 
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mobilise against his kin-state, Serbia, whose passport he held illegally.  Cut off from 
Belgrade sympathisers, Mitrinović faced either arrest or conscription if he returned to 
the Dual Monarchy.223  After ruling out Russia as a refuge, Mitrinović decided to flee to 
Britain.224  He crossed the Channel in the first week of August 1914 and proceeded to 
London, which would be his home for the last four decades of his life.225 
Taking a position at the Legation of the Kingdom of Serbia (with the personal 
backing of the Serbian prime minister), Mitrinović worked as a propagandist.226  A year 
or so after the Armistice – by which time his heart was no longer in the work – he 
resigned from the service of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.227  Distancing 
himself from émigré groups, Mitrinović began to move in more influential circles.  As a 
contributor to The New Age in 1920–1, he asserted that any peaceful global order would 
have to be built on metaphysical foundations, not mere inter-governmental 
agreements.228  But his light-hearted side was in evidence, too: at that time Edwin and 
Willa Muir were among those who saw Mitrinović as a ‘source of joy’ who, when 
‘Feeling gay,’ would ‘imitate Serbian bagpipes with zest.’229 
Mitrinović concentrated on widening his network and deepening his 
relationships in and around Bloomsbury in the years up to 1926, when he cofounded the 
Chandos Group.230  This society of intellectuals met regularly to discuss ideas including 
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guild socialism and social credit economics, the theory that C. H. Douglas (known as 
Major Douglas) had propagated in The New Age.231 
At this time, Mitrinović felt the need to ‘delve deeply into the psychological 
aims which underlie human motives in general and politics in particular,’ as it was later 
explained to Hobson.232  By November 1926, Mitrinović had established the British 
branch of the International Society for Individual Psychology, also known as the Adler 
Society; its purpose was to advance the study of the school of individual psychology 
founded by Alfred Adler.233  Mitrinović was attracted to Adler’s theories because they 
centred on an individual’s ability not only to better his or her life using the conscious 
mind, but also to cooperate with peers to improve the welfare of society.  Adlerian 
theories were consistent with Mitrinović’s conviction that individuals had to overcome 
passivity and take responsibility for remaking the world.  In Adler, Mitrinović saw 
another thinker who believed that individuals needed to work together for the sake of 
humankind, not struggle among themselves for personal or national aggrandisement.234  
Mitrinović’s ‘eloquence, personal magnetism and tremendous intellectual brilliance,’ 
Mairet recalled, ‘turned Alfred Adler into a sort of “movement” in London,’ where 
lectures were held most evenings on premises on Gower Street.  The Adler Society 
‘was a brilliant show, with an enormous number of brilliant people,’ wrote Mairet.  
There came to be as ‘much “head-knowledge” of Individual Psychology about the 
quarter of Bloomsbury as in half Vienna,’ he added.235 
In late 1928, an influx of members of the Chandos Group began to steer the 
Adler Society programme away from psychology; in mid-1930, members with a 
medical background saw fit to sever their connections.  Mitrinović and the remaining 
members then concentrated on sociological inquiry and possibilities for political 
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change, basing their discussions on Politics: A Discussion of Realities, which the 
Chandos Group had published the previous year.236  Contributors including Lieutenant-
Colonel J. V. Delahaye DSO (b. 1890), who would become a prominent figure in the 
NEG/NBM, had taken as their starting point the notion that society was badly 
organised, given that unfilled needs and unemployment existed simultaneously.237  
Mitrinović, Delahaye and other Adler Society members came to focus on ideas 
including the decentralisation of power through devolution of decision-making; 
workers’ control of their respective industries, along with coordination of the activities 
of producers’ organisations; European federalism; and world federation.238 
Over the next few years, Adler distanced himself from the activities on Gower 
Street, determined as he was to keep his school of psychology free of practical 
politics.239  Eventually Adler would completely disassociate himself from the British 
branch of the Society, but by October 1931 Mitrinović had turned his attention to a new 
initiative, the NEG.240  Unlike the Adler Society, the NEG was not the branch of a 
larger organisation based on the Continent; rather, it was the creation of Mitrinović, 
which meant he no longer had any need to keep a ‘parent’ figure favourably disposed to 
his endeavours.  Mitrinović formed the NEG, Britain’s first genuine Eurofederalist 
group, to publicise his own Eurofederalist views, and those of others who thought along 
similar lines.  As we shall see, the efforts of Mitrinović’s ‘devoted disciples and adoring 
women,’ as Watts called them, helped the NEG flourish by the summer of 1932.241  
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Around September of that year, Willa Muir and her husband paid a visit to Mitrinović 
and found him ‘established in Gower Street as the centre of a cult’: 
 
We were received by an incisive secretary who said the ‘The Master’ 
would appear in a little while; she looked shocked when asked if he 
could still imitate the Serbian bagpipes.  The room was fluttering with 
devotees …  One young man told us happily that he had sold his only 
pair of gold cuff-links for The Master, and two little old ladies had sold a 
country cottage, they said, for The Master.  When Mitrinović came in, 
the whole roomful thrilled and moved reverently toward him…  We 
non-joined his bogus cult.242 
 
 
Prior to scrutinising the NEG, it is important to understand how Mitrinović was able to 
galvanise such dedicated followers – for without them, the activities of the NEG would 
necessarily have been on a far smaller scale, and the NBM could never have been 
launched.  Was Mitrinović’s group a cult, a circle, or something else? 
 
 
‘The Master’ and His Court System 
 
Arthur Peacock, the secretary of the National Trade Union Club, recalled that the 
followers of Mitrinović ‘held him in deep regard and were a faithful bodyguard.  He 
was their “master.”’243  Willa Muir’s characterisation of Mitrinović’s group as a ‘cult’ 
was echoed by John Gould Fletcher, an Arkansan who would later win the Pulitzer 
Prize for Poetry.  In his 1937 memoir, Fletcher reflected on his time in the NEG, which 
had ‘the atmosphere of a mad cult,’ being a ‘collection of neurotic women, sentimental 
vegetarians, charlatans, and self-deceivers.’  They ‘were freakish, to say the least, but 
they seemed to be exercising a queer hold on me,’ he recalled.  Fletcher claimed that 
England ‘was utterly bankrupt of new ideas and energy,’ implying that the NEG was 
not so much as a speck of light in the dark firmament – but one obvious problem with 
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his account is that he had thought highly enough of the ‘windy talk’ to become deeply 
involved.244  In any case, he left the NEG before its members developed very 
sophisticated ideas, so his appraisal was akin to judging a parliamentary career solely 
on the quality of the maiden speech.  Fletcher’s faculties were impaired in 1932: having 
‘overextended’ himself in the NEG, he suffered a ‘psychic melt-down,’ his biographer 
has explained.  After a failed suicide attempt in July 1932, Fletcher returned to Little 
Rock.245 
The ‘cult’ construal of Muir and Fletcher is corroborated by few sources.  
Granted, Mitrinović’s group had some cult-like features, which became more 
pronounced from 1935; but before then, hardly any of the hallmarks of cults were in 
evidence.  With one or two exceptions, Mitrinović did not exert himself to keep in his 
orbit individuals who were drifting away.  Mitrinović did not shun, or tell loyal 
followers to shun, those who parted ways with him.  Rather than fostering intolerance 
of those outside the group, he did the opposite.  Mitrinović did not demand adherence to 
a dogma, nor did he forbid criticism of the ideological direction of the group – in fact, 
he sometimes became frustrated when his authority was not challenged.246 
In the first half of the 1930s the group cannot fairly be characterised as a cult, 
then, but given Mitrinović’s dominance it was clearly not a ‘circle’ of individuals of 
roughly equal standing.247  Thomson recalled that he ‘lived within the splendid orbit’ of 
Mitrinović, who ‘in range and stature … just wasn’t of our kind at all.’248  Furthermore, 
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the most dedicated followers were too intensely involved in the group for ‘circle’ to be 
an appropriate descriptor. 
What Mitrinović was operating on Gower Street is best described as a ‘court 
system,’ a term Maurizio Viroli has used to denote any arrangement of power in which 
‘one man is placed above and at the center of a relatively large number of individuals’ 
who ‘depend on him to gain and preserve wealth, status, and reputation.’249  
Mitrinović’s followers believed he had vast reserves of spiritual and cultural capital, 
portions of which he could choose to share with them or withhold at any given moment.  
His followers could gain wealth of the financial kind, too.  Thomson, for one, had no 
source of income outside the group.250  Davies was paid handsomely for work to further 
the group’s objectives.  He lived in a ‘whirl’ of public and private meetings 
 
from luncheon till early dawn.  I felt how wonderful it was!  I was given 
plenty of money, though I had little occasion to spend it for I was lavishly 
entertained.  The Age of Plenty had dawned.  It did not last, of course.  
As long as it continued I became familiar with expensive restaurants and 
no longer trembled before a head waiter…  Mitrinovic was a man of 
amazing generosity…  For property and money (its symbol) he had utter 
contempt.  I once saw him throw a bundle of pound notes into the air 
before an astonished company of people.  He looked on with sardonic 
amusement at the scramble.251 
 
Davies recalled how Mitrinović could raise or lower the status of his followers at will, 
including by playing them off against each other.  Davies and Thomson ‘were 
Mitrinovic’s “See-saw, Marjorie Daw,” as he said himself.  When I was in favour, 
Thompson [sic] was out of it, and vice-versa.’252  Another attendee of meetings at 
Gower Street wrote of how Mitrinović ‘would get hold of a person, make him feel he 
had a great message or a great mission, get him publicity and opportunities of 
expression, and then pull him down, or perhaps it is fairer to say, subject him to tests 
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that made him feel diminished and superseded.’253  Mitrinović’s control over the 
movement’s periodicals meant he could determine which of his followers would gain 
reputations beyond Bloomsbury: it was he who decided whose articles would be 
published alongside contributions by high-profile individuals.  To promote a certain 
follower, Mitrinović would on occasion affix the favoured one’s byline atop a piece 
written by someone else.254 
Mitrinović’s most devoted followers (some of whom are among those pictured 
in Fig. 6) included three unmarried women of ‘unusual gifts,’ who formed a ‘unique 
trinity of talents,’ according to Hobson.255  The trio comprised Winifred Gordon Fraser 
(b. 1893), a graduate who was Mitrinović’s right-hand woman; Lilian Slade (b. 1881), 
who was of independent means; and Valerie Cooper (b. 1884), who owned a school of 
dance.  Delahaye was among the most dedicated, as were Leslie ‘Sammy’ Lohan (b. 
1910) and Davies (for a time).256  So too was Thomson, a shell-shocked veteran of the 
Western Front who had refused a battlefield promotion.257  In the 1920s he had 
graduated from the University of Glasgow, tutored in Jamaica, and served as a 
superintendent of education in Nigeria, where malaria almost killed him.258  Rex 
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and lots of attention to their every remark’; see Singer, Cults in Our Midst (San Francisco, 1995), p. 114.  
Mitrinović was ‘the complete master’ of ‘oil and honey’ flattery, Davies stated.  He ‘was a marvellous 
talker, but a still more marvellous listener.  That is how he first approached a prospective disciple: he 
encouraged him to talk, and listened with intense concentration.  Suddenly he would break forth excitedly 
and turning to the company present would say: “Did you hear that?  You should have been taking notes.  
Absolutely wonderful!”  It is likely that the man had been talking utter platitudes.  I shall not forget the 
effect upon myself.  I swelled visibly.  I was completely taken in.’  See Davies, In Search, p. 122. 
254 Rigby, Initiation, p. 111. 
255 Hobson, Pilgrim, p. 263. 
256 Lohan would go on to serve in the Army during the Second World War.  Later he became Secretary to 
the Services, Press and Broadcasting Committee, in which capacity he was smeared by Prime Minister 
Wilson in the 1967 ‘D-notice affair.’  Wilson cited Lohan’s ‘character defects’ in the Commons, and took 
an ‘almost obsessive interest’ in him, Alan Travis has written.  The official inquiry cleared Lohan, but by 
then he had resigned (Travis, ‘How Wilson Hounded the Colonel’, The Guardian, 13 April 1999). 
257 Thomson Fonds, Box 10, File 9, Thomson, ‘Confessions of a Convert’, TS, no date (but 1960s), p. 1. 
258 Thomson Fonds, Box 2, File 1, Thomson, ‘Curriculum Vitae’, TS, no date; and Thomson Fonds, Box 
2, File 1, Thomson, untitled draft of autobiographical section of Turning into Tomorrow, TS, no date (but 
1960s), p. 6. 
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Campbell (b. 1900), a businessman who had ‘Tory associations’ and Junior Carlton 
Club membership in the late 1920s, was another devoted follower.259  To collectively 
refer to Mitrinović and this inner core of the NEG/NBM I will use the term ‘prominent 
figures’ rather than ‘leaders’ or ‘the leadership’ – for in a court system there can be only 
one leader. 
 
Fig. 6.  Centre, Dimitrije Mitrinović; above left, Valerie Cooper; above right (out of 
frame), Ivo Gabela, an NEG member who was not involved in the NBM; far left, 
Catherine (Kitty) Sulman (née Fraser), older sister of Winifred Gordon Fraser; left, 
Watson Thomson; right, J. V. Delahaye; far right, Lilian Slade; below right, Gladys 
MacDermot, the NBM’s most generous benefactor.260 
 
 
What did Mitrinović gain from association with his followers?  First of all, he 
gained the following he needed to actualise as a leader in his adopted land.  He drew on 
the energy of his followers, who served as ‘workers’ to pursue the agenda he led them 
                                                
259 Wrugh [Campbell], ‘Notes’, p. 5. 
260 NAFDMA, 11/2/16, detail of a photo taken at High Acre, West Mersea, Essex, no date (but most 
likely 1936). 
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to share.261  Mitrinović benefited financially, too.  He oversaw the distribution of 
largess disbursed by wealthy followers; although there is scant information on the 
particulars of his income, he maintained a relatively high standard of living and 
amassed a large library.262  His means could be deemed ‘spiritual entrepreneurship’ – 
and, later, political entrepreneurship, of sorts.  Mitrinović monetised his spiritual, 
intellectual and cultural capital so effectively that he was ‘always’ able to pay his bills 
‘with crisp white five-pound notes.’263 
What did Mitrinović’s followers gain from their association with him?  Most of 
them were initially attracted by the compelling way Mitrinović introduced individuals 
to new realms of thought, enriching their understanding of other cultures (non-Western 
ones especially) and their intellectual lives in general.  Widely read in several languages 
and profoundly curious, Mitrinović provided an alternative education to his followers, 
some of whom had not attended university.  Edwin Muir recalled that Mitrinović ‘flung 
out the wildest and deepest thoughts pell-mell,’ and sent ‘dynasties and civilizations 
flying.’264  A limerick attests to Mitrinović’s sharing of ‘superb’ thoughts: 
 
A modern mystic from Serbia 
Enlightened the minds of Suburbia 
Under each camisole 
Sighed a synthetic soul 
With thoughts too superb and superbia265 
 
 
                                                
261 Sono Matsumoto wrote of his suspicions that Mitrinović enjoyed ‘the power’ he had ‘over people 
more than anything else’ (University of the Creative Arts, Crafts Study Centre Archives: Additional 
Papers of Bernard Leach, MS 11987, Matsumoto to Bernard Leach, London, 24 November 1932). 
262 According to Stephen Graham, Mitrinović got the ‘practical idea’ that there ‘was money to be made 
from straightening out people’s lives’ from the esotericist P. D. Ouspensky (Graham, Wonderful, p. 251).  
When Graham’s estranged wife died in 1956, he married his longtime companion, Vera Mitrinović (Ibid., 
p. 269).  Hughes has stated that Mitrinović seemed to disapprove, initially at least, of his sister’s 
relationship with a married man almost 20 years her senior; this ‘probably contributed to a later falling-
out between the two men,’ who had been ‘drifting apart’ since 1916 (Holy Russia, p. 241 and p. 244). 
263 Watts, Own Way, p. 109. 
264 Edwin Muir, An Autobiography (London, 1954), p. 174. 
265 NAFDMA, 3/21/18 File, ‘M – VITCH’, a limerick about Mitrinović (most likely written by Barbara 
Johnson), MS, no date (but most likely 1979). 
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Mitrinović was able to hold audiences spellbound.  ‘Certainly the atmosphere of 
Mitrinovic fascinated me – his humor, the power of his eyes and voice, his secretive 
and night owl habits,’ Watts remembered.266  Paul Selver, too, recalled the effect of the 
‘hypnotic eyes’: ‘Hardly had I shaken hands with Mitrinović than I found myself so 
affected by his mere presence that I nearly lost consciousness.’267 
Mosley was widely considered to be distinct from the ‘dun ranks’ of English 
political figures.268  Mitrinović certainly was, too, but the leader with whom ‘The 
Master’ had most in common was neither Greyshirt (and later Blackshirt) leader 
Mosley, nor the Greenshirt leader John Hargrave (two others who operated court 
systems in the antisystem formations they led).  Mitrinović bore more similarities with 
the leader who would get the lion’s share of NEG/NBM criticism: MacDonald.  The 
prime minister and his critic were tall and handsome, brooding and aloof – but they had 
far more in common than physique and temperament.  Both were idealists rather than 
ideologues – but the similarities went still further.269  In the 1920s, many had regarded 
MacDonald as ‘a second Messiah’; later, Selver called Mitrinović a ‘would-be 
messiah,’ and Lavrin stated that he had a ‘messiah complex.’270  Each of the two leaders 
had been viciously abused as a traitor to his nation – MacDonald during the Great War 
he opposed, and Mitrinović immediately before it, when some Serbian ultranationalists 
‘hated’ him so ‘terribly’ that he had asked one contact to warn him if there was 
‘anything at all that materially affects life and wants to destroy me.’271  MacDonald’s 
long suffering had, in the eyes of many, sanctified him, while Mitrinović could seem 
                                                
266 Watts, Own Way, p. 110. 
267 Paul Selver, Orage and the ‘New Age’ Circle: Reminiscences and Reflections (London, 1959), 
pp. 56-7. 
268 James Drennan, B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism (London, 1934), p. 14. 
269 Brendon, Dark Valley, p. 176.  MacDonald’s idealism faded over time: for example, in 1929 he 
allowed black workers to be forced off the job of building the new British Embassy in Washington; see 
Francis L. Broderick, W. E. B. DuBois: Negro Leader in a Time of Crisis (Stanford, 1959), pp. 147–8. 
270 Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. 281; Selver, Orage, p. 58; and Peter H. Butter, Edwin Muir: Man 
and Poet (London, 1966), p. 74. 
271 Brendon, Dark Valley, p. 177; and Rigby, Initiation, p. 25. 
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‘radiant with the supersensible light which the ancient Christian artists used to 
symbolize by putting aureoles round the heads of saints and apostles.’272  Both men 
were interested in spiritualism, and each cultivated a mystique tied to their origins on 
the fringes of Europe: MacDonald added to his ‘charismatic presence and melodious 
eloquence’ a ‘visionary gleam, a distillation of Celtic twilight’; Mitrinović’s saintly 
gleam was that of a visionary from the Balkan twilight who ‘moved among the stars.’273  
MacDonald was said to be of ‘unfathomable depth,’ as was Mitrinović.274  When 
MacDonald’s was in his prime, his ‘nervous electric energy’ was palpable; the same 
was true of Mitrinović, who was nicknamed ‘Mita Dinamika’ (‘Dynamic Mita’) in his 
youth.275 
When Davies recalled his first experience in ‘a packed drawing-room’ at Gower 
Street, he focused on Mitrinović’s mesmeric oratory and its revitalising effect: 
 
It proved to be the most extraordinary meeting I had ever attended in my 
life.  It shattered ‘the even tenour of my ways’.  It flung me into a 
maelstrom compared to which my past conflicts were as a gentle shower 
to a tornado. 
…  What [Mitrinović] said gripped me.  I felt something fall 
away from me.  I cannot recall now the theme of his speech, but I had 
never heard English like it.  Its grammar was English, but that was all. 
…  It sounded marvellous to me. 
I was so tremendously moved and excited, painfully so, that I got 
on my feet and let myself go…  Some deep, suppressed hunger and 
awareness welled up in my heart and tore through my words: now I was 
alive again.276 
 
                                                
272 Brendon, Dark Valley, p. 177; and Mairet, Autobiographical, p. 108.  MacDonald tarnished his 
reputation by securing a baronetcy for McVitie and Price’s chairman, who had supplemented the prime 
minister’s income.  Wits quipped ‘Every man has his price, but not every man has his McVitie and 
Price!’ (Pugh, We Danced, p. 357). 
273 Brendan, Dark Valley, p. 177; and Davies, In Search, p. 124.  Spiritualism, broadly understood as the 
practices of persons ‘prepared to go beyond conventional materialism or theology,’ was one of the 
‘unmodern’ impulses triggered by ‘the most “modern” of wars,’ Jay Winter has explained; see Sites of 
Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge, 1995), p. 54.  In 
1932 Britain there were 500 spiritualist societies and 100,000 séance circles (Pugh, We Danced, p. 11). 
274 Iconoclast [Mary Agnes Hamilton], J. Ramsay MacDonald: The Man of To-morrow (New York, 
1924), p. 268. 
275 Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, p. 69.  Ivo Andrić, who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1961, 
bestowed the nickname on Mitrinović, who was instrumental in the publication of Andrić’s first literary 
work (Jevtic, ‘Dimitrije Mitrinovic’, p. 19). 
276 Davies, In Search, pp. 114–5. 
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Soon after, ‘the apathy and depression of the recent past’ receded, and Davies once 
again ‘walked with [his] head high.’277  Many other demoralised individuals were 
rejuvenated by Mitrinović’s ‘magic medicine,’ as Thomson called it.278  One reminisced 
that he ‘felt a fitter man’ ever since coming into contact with Mitrinović’s ‘radiating 
holiness.’279  Hobson wrote that in the years preceding his association with Mitrinović’s 
group, he was ‘the victim of spiritual and mental fatigue and utterly tired of life’ – but 
then the ‘pervading friendliness’ of Fraser, Slade and Cooper, ‘coupled with a complete 
absence of dogma,’ made him ‘almost wish [he] were young again.’280 
Generally, Mitrinović’s followers considered traditional sources of authority, 
such as the Church (reduced to an instrument of the state in 1914–18), to be 
discredited.281  As Pugh has noted, post-war disillusionment manifested itself in the 
reluctance of citizens to follow self-appointed leaders of their communities.282  To his 
followers, Mitrinović embodied what we might call ‘alternative authority’ – he (or his 
mystique) appeared unsullied, and it seemed to them that such a figure above the fray 
could help make sense of their lives.  Mitrinović gave the impression that he was a 
conduit for ‘secret’ knowledge; those who felt part of the select group privy to these 
truths experienced the thrill of exclusivity.283 
Affiliation with Mitrinović made his followers feel distinguished: to be ‘thought 
capable or worthy of cooperation with Mitrinović in his sublime enterprise was a deep 
                                                
277 Ibid., p. 119. 
278 Thomson Fonds, Box 1, File 7, Thomson to R. G. Wrugh [Rex Campbell], Bowen Island, 23 February 
1946, TS. 
279 NAFDMA, 1/8/7/125, Rodocanachi to Fraser, Athens, 3 September 1953, MS. 
280 Hobson, Pilgrim, pp. 263–4 and p. 267. 
281 In the 1930s the Church’s influence declined and attendance fell, except among Roman Catholics 
(Gardiner, Thirties, p. 487 and p. 490).  The claims to authority of other bodies linked to the state 
weakened, too.  Many individuals became sceptical when it was revealed that much official information 
about the Great War – which they had accepted as gospel – was deceitful (Brendon, Dark Valley, p. xvii). 
282 Pugh, We Danced, p. 8. 
283 Mitrinović ‘belongs to another plane,’ Mairet wrote.  He ‘had angelic knowledge, and could 
communicate it to many’ (NAFDMA, 1/8/7/123, Mairet, Lewes, 3 September 1953, MS). 
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gratification,’ Mairet recalled.284  ‘The Master’ was adroit at making individuals feel 
special, sometimes through acts of generosity; on at least one occasion he arranged for a 
follower to be chauffeured home in a limousine.285 
Next we must consider how Mitrinović’s followers benefited from their 
involvement in the NEG/NBM.  The prospect of empowerment and the opportunity for 
personal transformation were major draws.  Mitrinović was adept at spotting talents that 
were going to waste.  Fraser worked in a bookshop before Mitrinović made her his 
secretary and factotum.286  Similarly underemployed, Thomson toiled as a remedial 
teacher of unemployed youths before committing to the NEG, and Lohan worked at a 
Dockland Settlement (where Thomson had worked alongside him for a short while).287 
Mitrinović was a consummate ‘network specialist’ or ‘knowledge broker,’ to 
use today’s terms of art for those skilled at facilitating fruitful interpersonal 
relationships.288  He ‘never missed an opportunity’ to meet public figures who ‘might 
be of help to him in one of the “three scopes,” the British, the European and world 
affairs,’ recalled Campbell.289  The chance to benefit from these connections was 
another draw for Mitrinović’s followers, most of whom would not have had occasion to 
rub shoulders with such personages outside the NEG/NBM.  At Gower Street, former 
Private Thomson could converse with General J. F. C. Fuller, the father of modern 
armoured warfare.  Though deference and notions of ‘natural’ hierarchy had eroded in 
Britain in the aftermath of the Great War, social apartheid still prevailed in some 
                                                
284 Mairet, Autobiographical, p. 106. 
285 Watts, Own Way, pp. 110–11. 
286 Rigby, Initiation, p. 108. 
287 Thomson, untitled draft of autobiographical section of Turning into Tomorrow, p. 7; and Thomson, 
early untitled draft of autobiographical section of Turning into Tomorrow, p. 111. 
288 If the intellectual preoccupations of the denizens of 1930s Bloomsbury were to be Venn diagrammed, 
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289 Wrugh [Campbell], ‘Notes’, p. 20.  Mitrinović was never able to exert a level of influence over a 
powerful political decision-maker equal to that of Nicholas Roerich over US vice president Henry A. 
Wallace; see John C. Culver and John Hyde, American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. 
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quarters.290  But the NBM warmly welcomed individuals of all classes, and a person’s 
social background mattered little in respect to his or her status in the movement. 
For the followers closest to Mitrinović, comradeship and fellow-feeling were 
major attractors.  These followers were ‘among the very few people I have met who are 
conscious of the glorious thing true friendship can be,’ Peacock wrote.291  He 
continued: ‘An irrevocable bond of friendship exists between them all.  Seldom in life 
have I come across a body of people so sincere and earnest.’292  Thomson had ‘never 
known that human fellowship’ could be ‘so rich and warm as to seem palpable in the 
very air.’293  Each of the closest followers revelled in the camaraderie at Gower Street, 
and cherished the sense of belonging in an accepting community of kindred spirits. 
Involvement in the NEG/NBM gave these conscientious individuals a deep 
sense of social purpose, filling their lives with meaning.  They aspired to do important 
things, and ‘The Master’ made them think they were: ‘Blue prints would be drawn up 
and he hurried forward their completion as if the end of the world was at hand, and 
these blue prints alone would save it,’ Peacock wrote.294  Investing their hopes in the 
movement, the followers felt in the thick of things, and at the centre of a rarefied world.  
Davies recalled: 
 
There were meetings inspired by him at Gower Street and elsewhere all 
day and night, and every day and night, I was getting acquainted with all 
sorts of people, famous and obscure…  My anonymity vanished.  I had 
the grand feeling that I had my hands on the levers of history.  Was I not 
helping to initiate a new order of civilization for Britain and Europe?295 
 
Feeling ennobled by activism, they took pride in championing the causes of the 
movement, to which we shall now turn our attention. 
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294 Peacock, Yours Fraternally, p. 88. 
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The Birth of the New Europe Group 
 
Mitrinović founded the NEG in 1931.  Launching a political initiative in Britain under 
no one’s auspices but his own, Mitrinović came up against a problem: he was not a 
British subject.  So after appointing Fraser secretary of the NEG in October 1931 (at the 
latest), Mitrinović tasked her with recruiting an eminent Briton to serve as a 
figurehead.296  Fraser persuaded Patrick Geddes, a pioneering urban planner who would 
be knighted the following year, to accept nomination as president of the NEG.297  At a 
stroke, Mitrinović became the éminence grise of a group whose credibility was 
enhanced by the British luminary who lent his name to the letterhead. 
On 7 December Mitrinović delivered the inaugural lecture (‘A United Europe in 
a World Order’), in which he warned of ‘a tremendous historical descent to the nadir of 
civilisation.’298  By this time the NEG had prepared a pamphlet, The New Europe 
Group: Disarmament – Federation – Communal Credit, of which only one copy is 
extant in the NAFDMA.299  The text announced the existence of a group ‘conscious of 
the imperative need for a European Renaissance.’300  I believe that this copy was one of 
a tiny batch of proofs, and that the NEG never published it.301  The tenor of the text was 
                                                
296 In the early 1930s it was not uncommon for the principal(s) of a new business venture to recruit a 
grandee as an ‘ornamental’ director: the notable’s ‘name’ and reputation were supposed to lend 
respectability to an unproven undertaking, reassuring its backers (Cannadine, Decline, p. 419).  In a 
similar vein, Mitrinović understood the value of gracing the NEG with an ‘ornamental’ president. 
297 Rigby, Initiation, p. 108. 
298
 Violet MacDermot, ed., Dimitrije Mitrinović: Lectures 1926–1950 (Bradford, 1995), pp. 279–80. 
299 NAFDMA, 5/5/1, The New Europe Group: Disarmament – Federation – Communal Credit [hereafter 
Disarmament], no date (but almost certainly no later than mid-November 1931).  The work is unsigned, 
but Fletcher drafted the text, as can be deduced by cross-referencing the content with articles that 
subsequently appeared in NEG/NBM periodicals under his name.  Fletcher’s biographer has pointed out 
that he ‘redoubled his activity’ on behalf of the NEG in late 1931 (Johnson, Fierce Solitude, p. 191). 
300 Disarmament, p. 1.  Unpriced, the pamphlet was likely intended as a handout to newcomers at events. 
301 The pamphlet is not explicitly referenced in any source, but it was almost certainly the ‘small 
projected pamphlet’ that Fraser mentioned in a letter to Sir Charles Trevelyan (NAFDMA, 5/1/8 File, 
Fraser to Trevelyan, London, 16 November 1931, TS).  Only this explanation fits the pattern of evidence. 
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elitist: if its purpose was to win hearts and minds, it set the wrong tone.302  The NEG 
prepared a substitute inaugural text, but the ‘false start’ reveals a good deal about the 
NEG’s early thinking. 
The events of the previous few years, the proof pamphlet began, had 
demonstrated ‘the community of the people of Europe’: ‘One people cannot suffer 
without dragging down the others; one nation cannot ultimately profit at another’s 
expense.’303  A ‘New Europe’ could arise only if the ‘precarious balance’ that resulted 
from the ‘mutual accommodation of egoistic claims’ was replaced by ‘an organic unity’ 
in which every part was ‘properly subordinated to the whole.’304  In each European 
country, an ‘intelligent and responsible minority’ had to be prepared to put the idea of a 
‘federated Europe before the narrow objectives of nation, state or race.’305  A vast 
amount of ‘research, co-operation and experiment’ was needed, and for that reason the 
NEG had drawn up ‘detailed and comprehensive plans for study, for political action, 
and, in particular, for vital co-operation with corresponding groups in other European 
countries.’306  The NEG followed through on plans to cooperate with likeminded 
Continental ones, and developed a close relationship with l’Ordre Nouveau.307 
The substitute text, which the NEG definitely published, was titled Integration 
of Europe: The Way to Reconstitute the States of Europe as an Organic Society in a 
New World Order.308  It was informed by ideas generated through intense intellectual 
collaboration among NEG members, though the text was composed by Mairet – he 
                                                
302 Most elitist was the ‘New Aristocracy’ section, in which the ‘majority’ of individuals were said to be 
‘apathetic or ignorant’ and ‘too insecure to challenge the life in which they are involved’ (Disarmament, 
p. 4). 
303 Ibid., p. 2. 
304 Ibid., p. 6. 
305 Ibid., p. 6 and p. 2. 
306 Ibid., p. 6. 
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recalled writing ‘the manifesto we printed to start the group, the first in London, I 
believe, dedicated to the cause of European community.’309  The NEG made a ‘radical’ 
proposal, which ‘no one in England has yet ventured publicly to propose,’ namely that 
Europe needed to federalise and thus ‘become one integrated whole.’  As the peace 
settlement had been reached ‘in the same spirit in which the struggle had begun,’ the 
‘jealous re-division’ of frontiers had ‘healed no wound, pacified no enemies.’  Not a 
single European state had any ‘forward policy’; each had ‘only defensive designs for 
saving itself against its neighbours and from disasters that threaten all alike because of 
their division.’  The role of NEG members was to work, in ‘advance of their age,’ for 
the creation of a federal Europe ‘by a series of stages and of partial reforms,’ and by 
fostering ‘a general psychic change.’  In so doing, they had to avoid being ‘schematic 
Utopians, aspiring to unify by obliterating all differences in the frame of a ready-made 
constitution.’310 
NEG members addressed these issues at lectures and discussions on Gower 
Street; in February 1932, for example, they met every Monday and Thursday 
evening.311  In a pamphlet printed that month, the NEG set out its position on the World 
Disarmament Conference.  Europe was setting a bad example: states in ‘the Far East’ 
would ‘prove apt pupils’ of ‘the villainy Europe teaches,’ and Europe would ‘find 
herself outwitted in her aims by her own methods.’312  Britain’s ‘newspapers and 
politicians,’ who ‘present facts so as to appeal to our lowest passions of fear and 
hatred,’ had ‘poisoned’ public attitudes.  The NEG’s expressions of distaste for 
newspapers that ‘exploit men’s worse feelings for their own profit’ suggest that the 
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group had begun, that winter, to see the need to publish its own periodical (the NEG 
publishing programme remained limited to pamphlets until autumn 1932, though).313 
In 1931, the group had declared: ‘the PRESENT SITUATION can only be 
saved from BECOMING DISASTROUS by the active co-operation of individuals.  
Politics have failed; experts are isolated; the public is apathetic.  We are drifting 
towards violence for want of vision.’314  These issues were explored in greater depth in 
Frank McEachran’s The Unity of Europe, which the NEG published in mid-1932.315  
McEachran explained how the breakdown of the international financial system had 
destroyed confidence and led to a ‘disastrous’ fall in prices.316  He was astute in his 
analysis.  By 1929, 60 percent of the world’s gold stock lay in the United States and 
France, whose central banks had since 1926 sterilised a high proportion of bullion 
inflows rather than use them to expand money supply.  With so much hoarded gold out 
of circulation, Britain and other war debtors had been forced to deflate (until, one by 
one, they abandoned the gold standard), which had increased the real cost of credit.317  
In recognising the true danger to be ongoing deflation, McEachran was clearer eyed 
than the Bank of England, which had substantially raised the interest rate after Britain’s 
abandonment of the gold standard in September 1931 – this major mistake (rectified in 
the first half of 1932) is puzzled over by economic historians to this day, with one 
attributing it to ‘anxiety’ or ‘panic’ over the prospect of imported inflation.318  
McEachran made clear that the economic disaster was unfolding at the same time as 
underlying productivity (production technology, in particular) was improving at an 
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unprecedented rate – indeed, poverty ought not to exist in the ‘age of plenty,’ an idea 
that would become a fixation of the NBM. 
McEachran argued that European prosperity would rise ‘to an extent hardly 
dreamed of’ if customs barriers were to be abolished.319  Autarky never had any place in 
the economic thinking of the NEG/NBM; in contrast, the New Party’s leaders declared: 
‘We stand for Free Trade in times of prosperity and employment.  We stand for 
Protection in depression and times of unemployment.’320  Mosley had failed to see that 
shielding industries would give their stakeholders less cause to boost productivity, and 
that the resulting complacency would deepen the depression (not least because many of 
the workers clustered around uncompetitive facilities could have been more 
productively employed in efficient new industries) – even before factoring in the 
repercussions of the retaliation the protectionism was sure to provoke. 
McEachran had finalised The Unity of Europe mere weeks after the entry into 
force of the protectionist Import Duties Act 1932 – legislation that passed only after 
Cabinet collective responsibility was suspended by a novel ‘agreement to differ.’321  
McEachran and prominent figures in the NEG knew it would prove detrimental to the 
general welfare.322  Early in the summer of 1932, the NEG lamented: ‘the fate of 
England is in the hands of weak, ignorant and incompetent men.’323  By then, the NEG 
had gained enough momentum to expand its activities beyond Bloomsbury. 
 
 
                                                
319 McEachran, Unity of Europe, p. 24. 
320 ‘A Question No Man in Europe Can Answer’, Action, 10 December 1931, p. 2. 
321 Williamson, National Crisis, pp. 511–12. 
322 Adam Smith had made an argument that McEachran and the NEG obviously understood better than 
several Cabinet members: the imposition of duties ‘may be good policy’ only if it is likely that ‘they will 
procure the repeal of [others’] high duties or prohibitions complained of’; see Adam Smith, The Wealth 
of Nations (London, 2007 [1776]), p. 301.  In 1932, desperate, panicking governments were making 
irrational decisions, so instead of a cycle of repeal, there was a tailspin of retaliation. 
323 NAFDMA, 5/1/8 File, New Europe Group [pamphlet announcing the Popular Myths Exploded lecture 
series], May or early June 1932. 
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‘Popular Myths Exploded,’ Unorthodox Views Expounded 
 
In the summer of 1932, the NEG organised ‘Popular Myths Exploded,’ a series of 
eleven lectures held at Caxton Hall in Westminster.324  In the pamphlet announcing the 
series, the NEG stated that it hoped to arouse the public – which was ‘inactive in face of 
the perils’ – ‘to believe that it can and it must think and decide for itself.’  The NEG had 
therefore arranged lectures that would ‘deal directly with certain myths’ that had 
become ‘entrenched in the minds of most people as gospel truths.’  Civilisation was 
‘cracking’ and 
 
ignorance, superstition, fear and prejudice are BRINGING ENGLAND 
AND EUROPE TO A STANDSTILL. 
… The time is come for the public to awake to the fact that A 
STRUGGLE FOR MATERIAL PROSPERITY IS NOT NECESSARY 
– THAT THERE IS NO SHORTAGE OF ANYTHING BUT MONEY 
– that we are not the victims of mysterious economic laws, but of 
unscrupulous, self-interested individuals …325 
 
 
Each lecture attracted an audience of between 200 and 500 members of the public.326 
In the inaugural lecture on 9 June, money supply was among the subjects 
discussed by Arthur Kitson, who had become president of the NEG following the death 
of Geddes in April.327  Kitson ‘exploded’ two ‘myths’: ‘That the Bank of England is 
Essential to Industrial Prosperity,’ and ‘That the gold standard is essential to financial 
stability.’  Money supply had been ‘arbitrarily reduced,’ causing ‘social misery and 
depression.’  ‘Currency Deflation has always produced the same evil disasters,’ Kitson 
argued, though the lesson had apparently ‘had no effect on the minds of our Bankers or 
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74 
 
politicians’ (the chair was Oliver Baldwin, estranged son of the Tory leader).328  Kitson 
condemned the befuddled ‘leaders of all our political parties’ for being ‘densely 
ignorant of monetary science.’329  It must be remembered that Kitson was speaking at a 
time when economics was ‘a festering mass of assumptions,’ as H. G. Wells put it – this 
being several years before John Maynard Keynes firmly established the field of 
macroeconomics with The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.330  
Though Keynes considered Kitson to be one third of the ‘great Trinity of crankdom,’ he 
acknowledged in The General Theory that such ‘heretics’ (including Douglas) were a 
‘brave army’ that had been of service in their assault on orthodox economics.331 
The second lecture was given by Frederick Soddy, who exploded the myth ‘That 
poverty is of God.’  Soddy’s research on radioactivity had won him the Nobel Prize in 
Chemistry in 1921, after which he authored books on economics while continuing his 
scientific career.  In Caxton Hall, he proposed ‘making money plentiful without altering 
its power of purchase,’ which would ‘give people enough money to buy all there was to 
be bought at a fair price.’332  Today this sounds like garden-variety monetarism, but in 
1932 this proposal was radical.  Soddy had distilled his thought to policy prescriptions 
that included abolition (not just suspension) of the gold standard; floating exchange 
rates; use of surpluses and deficit spending (if necessary) to smooth business cycles; 
and the establishment of a consumer price index, produced by a bureau of economic 
statistics.  Each of these prescriptions was generally regarded with suspicion in his day, 
but all of them eventually came to be widely accepted by those responsible for 
                                                
328 Mitrinović (with Campbell in tow) visited Oliver Baldwin and tried to talk him into supporting the 
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macroeconomic management.333  The Popular Myths Exploded lecture was not the only 
platform the NEG offered Soddy; Mitrinović would open the pages of NEG/NBM 
periodicals to the Nobel Laureate, whose prescience extended to imagining a single 
currency that would be ‘an inestimable boon to everyone.’334 
The third lecture in the series, on the ‘myth’ ‘That Science Will see us through,’ 
was delivered by John Macmurray, Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University 
College London.  The chair was Leonard Woolf, another link between the Bloomsbury 
Group and Mitrinović’s group.335  The fourth lecture, chaired by Harold Nicolson, was 
given by C. E. M. Joad, a well-known philosopher who had resigned from the New 
Party eleven months earlier.336  Joad discoursed on a point to which the NEG would 
return over and over again: ‘Our physical and chemical sciences have so outstripped our 
social science that we are unable to distribute the bounty we produce; thus the system 
breaks down through excess of plenty and men starve because of their inability to 
purchase the goods,’ while producers are ‘ruined because of their inability to sell.’337  A 
synopsis of the ninth lecture (by Gerald Heard) is extant, but those for lectures five 
(chaired by Vernon Bartlett), six, seven (chaired by John Strachey), eight, ten and 
eleven are not.338 
These synopses were the last pamphlets the NEG issued before it embarked on a 
far more ambitious venture: the preparation of a large-format periodical for national 
distribution.  As we shall see in chapter two, the publication of New Britain quarterly 
gave the NEG a public profile beyond Bloomsbury – only for the group to be sidelined 
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by the explosive growth of the NBM, which enfolded the NEG as a Europe-focused 
London subset of what swiftly became a nationwide movement. 
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Chapter 2 
The Rise and Demise of the New Britain Movement 
 
The Rise and ‘Inevitable’ Demise of a Politicised Social Movement 
 
The NBM had the potential to grow at a rapid rate because it licenced the public 
articulation of pent-up discontent that individuals had expressed – if at all – only in the 
company of family members, friends or workmates.  Martin Kolinsky and William E. 
Paterson have explained that social movements show ‘potential participants’ that ‘what 
is being talked about and proposed concerns them personally,’ and then try to convince 
them ‘that what they might experience as a private grievance or deprivation is part of a 
general problem affecting the interests of the collectivity.’  Social movements have to 
make it seem not only ‘reasonable, desirable and possible’ for individuals to ‘do 
something’ about the general problem, but necessary, too.339  To mobilise individuals, a 
social movement has to present the solution as something that cannot be left to 
politicians – hence the NEG/NBM’s focus on ‘rousing people to a sense of their 
individual responsibility.’340  Yet, as Gary B. Rush and R. Serge Denisoff have 
explained, once a social movement has emerged, it is subject to ‘inevitable’ demise 
either through failure or through success – if it proves successful it becomes part of the 
status quo, which ends the ‘the viability of the movement as an antithesis.’341 
It was the publication of the first issue of New Britain quarterly that began to 
turn Mitrinović and his followers from the organisers of a vibrant research and lecture 
society into the principals of a politicised social movement – one that ‘the Master’ 
would not allow to become part of the status quo, as we shall see. 
                                                
339 Kolinsky and Paterson, Western Europe, p. 18. 
340 ‘Former “Everyman” Editor Starts “New Britain”’, World’s Press News, 11 May 1933. 
341 Gary B. Rush and R. Serge Denisoff, Social and Political Movements (New York, 1971), p. 367. 
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‘Bring It Right Home’: New Britain Quarterly 
 
Thomson recalled that around August 1932, ‘it seemed to him [Mitrinović] time to 
“bring it right home.”’342  The idea was ‘to start talking not only New Europe, but New 
Britain.’343  Though it ‘was imperative for Britain to take leadership’ in the world, this 
would only ‘be possible through a regenerated Britain.’344  ‘So New Britain was 
projected,’ Thomson recalled, ‘first as a Quarterly, then as a weekly paper and then as a 
“national movement.”’345 
Mitrinović appointed Davies editor of New Britain quarterly.  Davies met with a 
printer to discuss details, and had a dummy copy made up – only for Mitrinović to 
discard it ‘after one withering, contemptuous look.  “You are not going to stab the 
Unconscious of the Englishman with that kind of thing,” he said.’  Mitrinović then 
sketched his own design; when Davies presented that three-column 16- by 14-inch 
design to the printer, the response was ‘ribald laughter.’  But ‘that was to be its format,’ 
and Davies ‘began to learn that to be editor meant being Mitrinović’s office-boy.’346  
Mitrinović controlled the quarterly: he suggested prospective contributors, decided what 
material from Continental writers would be translated, chose the illustrations, and 
selected which books would be reviewed.347  His insistence on an out-of-the-ordinary 
format was vindicated: the first issue of the quarterly sold an impressive 2,000 
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copies.348  One historian has declared the NEG/NBM’s large-format periodicals ‘the 
most handsomely designed journals of the thirties.’349 
In the first issue of New Britain quarterly, Delahaye discussed the crisis and 
explained the need for a ‘revolution of order’: 
 
Leaders continue to tinker with symptoms, whereas it is the disease 
which has to be attacked…  Not planning only is required but planning 
for a new purpose.  That purpose, briefly stated, is to achieve a 
maximum of individuation, i.e. the maximum devolution of power and 
significance and responsibility in the spheres of politics, economics and 
culture, upon the maximum number of individuals. 
Each individual then must see to the change in his own outlook, 
rather than urge others to take the first step.350 
 
Delahaye defined what he saw as the two types of reformers common in Britain: 
‘world-savers’ and ‘soul-savers.’  The former, an ‘extroverted planner and organiser,’ 
believed the world had become ‘an interdependent whole and must be organised 
accordingly.’  In contrast, the introverted soul-saver had a ‘priestly and psychological’ 
attitude; reformers of this type deemed it futile to speak of national cooperation until 
‘individuals themselves have been reformed by a change of heart.’  Delahaye found 
each approach ‘inadequate,’ and deemed ‘exclusive emphasis’ on either a mistake.  
World-savers had pinned their faith to the League of Nations, yet nationalism was as 
intense in 1932 as it had been before the Great War.  Soul-savers had ‘proved equally 
ineffective’ with their exhortations to the individual to become less self-centred and to 
‘extend his loyalties until he embraces all mankind in his interest.’351  
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The NEG’s prominent figures differentiated themselves from world-savers and 
soul-savers through their earnest efforts to marry the two approaches.  Delahaye saw 
that ‘theoretical exhortation in vacuo’ would not result in hearts being ‘permanently 
converted and on a wide scale.’  Reformers would only be successful if appeals to 
individuals were accompanied by ‘action upon the outer world,’ through which 
‘changes in consciousness occur.’  Thus the failure of the reformers could be explained 
by the fact that few of those who prayed for the 
 
emergence of a new individual are at the same time working to establish 
the external conditions which are necessary for his development.  Few of 
those who desire the League of Nations to become a real league are 
making direct efforts to eradicate the spirit of competitive economic 
nationalism within their own nation.352  Those who deny the possibility 
of world peace until there has been a majority change of individual heart 
… do nothing but increase the feeling of despair.353 
 
Deriding as ‘sheer defeatism’ the suggestion that no practical changes could be made 
until everyone had become a better person, Delahaye advocated the NEG view that ‘a 
minority’ needed to act with ‘conscious determination to establish a new national and 
international order’ (the majority could be converted to ‘fully conscious participation’ 
after new conditions arose).  Otherwise, nothing could be expected but ‘eternal 
procrastination’ by governments postponing reform efforts on the grounds that the 
whole world had to move together.354  The establishment of a new order in Britain had 
to begin with the changing of the consciousness of every individual – through ‘action 
upon the outer world’ – over whom the NEG/NBM had influence.  Mitrinović called 
this process ‘Self change for world change.’355 
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‘Self Change for World Change’: Prefigurative Politics in Mitrinović’s Court  
 
Mitrinović offered his followers the opportunity for personal transformation through 
prefigurative politics.  Wini Breines has defined the central task of prefigurative politics 
thus: ‘to create and sustain within the live practice of the movement, relationships and 
political forms that ‘prefigured’ and embodied the desired society.’356  Soon after 
joining Mitrinović’s court, it became ‘clear’ to Thomson that he and his fellows ‘were 
embarked on a double-sided project – the exoteric affairs of starting a paper and 
running lecture-series on the one hand, and on the other, the esoteric business.’357  The 
latter involved what Rigby has called training for cosmopolitan citizenship.358  Under 
the guidance of Mitrinović, his followers underwent a ‘transformative process’ through 
which they learned to ‘live their lives in association with others, in full consciousness of 
their commitments as fellow members of a common humanity.’  This entailed their 
pledging themselves to one another ‘in open and equal alliance.’359  It meant accepting 
‘People’s fears & faults, hopes and ambitions … as if they were one’s own,’ as 
Campbell put it.  It was ‘necessary “to digest” other human beings, including all their 
weaknesses, vanities, and stupidities,’ he added.  Only thus were ‘the barriers of race, 
class, sex and age broken down.’360 
 Thomson discussed an example of Mitrinović’s teaching, which followed 
occasions when Lohan 
 
let us down politically or personally in some way or another.  With each 
succeeding offence our hearts grew harder against him.  Many times we 
were ready to reject him utterly till D.M. reminded us that it was just at 
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such junctures that we were tested as to the reality and depth of our 
contract with each other – and with Sammy [Lohan]. 
‘His badness is the world’s badness.  Each of us carries with us 
so much of the wrongness of things from time immemorial.  We have all 
been offended against by our fathers and our fathers’ fathers from the 
beginning.  That darkness we have to turn into the light.  And how?  
Why, by swallowing it!  By eating up that bit of evil which is in 
Sammy.’ 
 
Thomson added that the group was ‘impressed by the significance and power that lies 
potential in that old-fashioned concept of forgiveness, taken to its logical and most 
earnest extreme.’361 
Rigby has asserted that the ‘various public projects set in motion by 
Mitrinović and his followers’ need to be ‘understood as instruments or vehicles for 
the personal development of the participants.’  Rigby has argued that their ‘real 
purpose’ was ‘the furtherance of the initiation process through which Mitrinović was 
guiding his intimate associates.’362  Mairet was of the view that 
 
every one of the public projects launched by [Mitrinović] came to an 
end, usually chaotic, after a brief life of intense activity and sacrificial 
expenditure.  But this is the way with most, if not all authentic esoteric 
schools; any enterprise or organization they undertake in the outer 
world must be of some public value or interest, but that is not the 
primary purpose.  It is a communal exercise, which the teacher ordains 
for the development of the pupils as individuals: they must not be 
allowed to identify themselves with it, still less must the school or the 
teacher himself become committed to that one exoteric work.  It must 
achieve some success; but then it must be dissolved or abandoned.363 
 
According to Mairet, ‘turning the attention of pupils to some public work is an absolute 
necessity if the group is not to sink into self-regarding inactivities.’364  Mitrinović once 
wrote: ‘what is necessary is not that this weekly paper should survive…  Neither is it 
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necessary that [the NBM] should maintain itself’ – they were ‘incidental.’365  What 
mattered most to him was the movement’s set of ideas (which could be carried forward 
by other groups) and ideals, which would be embodied by the individuals transformed 
through prefigurative politics. 
 
 
New Britain Weekly and the Launch of the NBM 
 
On 9 February 1933, Fraser replied to Ivy Brand’s request that the NEG send a 
representative to speak at a meeting of the British Order of Woodcraft Chivalry: 
 
[S]ince our activities are now divided between the New Europe Group 
and the New Britain Group, it would be more appropriate if the speaker 
should talk on the meaning of the New Britain Group. 
… The New Europe Group represents what should, we believe, 
be the foreign policy of a New Britain.  It is not possible, however, to 
make people who are satisfied with the present system realise how 
unworthy of England and how much against the human interest 
England’s attitude of isolation is.  We must work first for a New Britain 
where individuals will realise that it is impossible for the individual or 
nation to further his own interests at the expense of other individuals or 
nations…366 
 
From Fraser’s comment that the group’s ‘activities are now divided,’ it seems ‘the New 
Britain Group’ (which soon grew to the proportions of a movement) began to identify 
itself as such in January 1933; at this stage its membership was drawn exclusively from 
Mitrinović’s followers and high-profile associates.  Almost all the prominent figures in 
the NEG came to be involved in the NBM, which meant the public profiles of the two 
groups were hardly distinguishable.  Even Mitrinović’s closest followers were uncertain 
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about some of the names and interrelationships of the Gower Street-based initiatives he 
started, confused as they were by his occasional rechristenings.367 
At some point in the spring of 1933, an independently wealthy follower of 
Mitrinović named Gladys MacDermot donated £100,000 to the movement.368  This sum 
was more than six times the amount the Liberal Party would receive in 1935, and was 
greater than the foreign subsidies the BUF would receive in 1933 and 1934 
combined.369  The donation enabled the launch of New Britain weekly in May 1933.370  
Approximately half a million English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish readers would 
prove willing to consider the message of the movement.371 
When planning the weekly, Mitrinović and his followers – who knew little 
about the technical and commercial aspects of running a tuppenny periodical – recruited 
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former Everyman editor Charles Purdom to be managing editor.372  Though the 
initial confusion surrounding the venture reminded Purdom of ‘a comic opera,’ the 
ideas to be expressed in New Britain weekly ‘were not different’ from his own.373  
Advertised by an eye-catching poster (Fig. 7), the first issue appeared on 24 May, 
Empire Day, as Mitrinović believed that any appeal to the British public had to be 
couched in patriotic terms.374 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Stanley Herbert, ‘Read New Britain’ poster advertising the launch issue of New 
Britain weekly, NAFDMA, 6/4/3, no date (but almost certainly May 1933). 
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Vendors ‘arrayed with two posters each, suspended from cords about [their] 
necks,’ were ‘sent out in the highways and byeways.’375  At the bookstalls, the weekly’s 
‘noticeable design in green’ ensured that it ‘stands out among the periodicals,’ one 
Londoner wrote.376 
New Britain weekly featured articles on wide-ranging subject matter, which 
differentiated it from the many ‘separate sphere’ periodicals that appealed to either male 
or female readerships.  It included radio, theatre and book reviews; illustrated guides to 
physical exercise (authored by Cooper); and writings on cinema by John Grierson (the 
father of modern British documentary filmmaking).  Peacock recalled that many editors 
were ‘envious’ of the stable of contributors, and stated that New Britain was ‘the best 
twopenny political review produced by the journalism of the period.’377 
The first issue announced that ‘the event of this week is in all truth the 
appearance of this paper,’ whose ‘endeavour’ would be ‘to live and work for the 
renaissance and self-fulfilment of the British nation.’  The moment had come for British 
men and women ‘to take charge of their national destiny.’378  Appearing at a time when 
pessimism was, in the words of Overy, ‘highly contagious’ and ‘increasingly 
institutionalized,’ New Britain weekly moved one unemployed youth to write to the 
editor to say that he ‘felt better’ after reading it.379 
Davies was convinced that the NBM had grown ‘at a fabulous pace’ because it 
enabled young people ‘to feel they were capable of mastering the forces of dark, 
mechanical necessity that were engulfing society.’380  Peacock attributed the pace of 
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growth to widespread disillusionment with ‘the growing spirit of materialism’ in left-
wing organisations when ‘Labour was sick at heart.’381  New Britain weekly drew ‘a 
splendid company of men and women’ who deemed ‘economics and ethics’ two sides 
‘of the same coin.’382  One young reader, Francis Clarke of Norwood, wrote to the 
editor: 
 
NEW BRITAIN is more than a paper, it is a ‘movement.’  I have 
been waiting for it for more than ten years.  I’ve read every number from 
cover to cover.  Every idea I have read in it finds a response in me. 
There are no doubt thousands waiting for Action and a Lead, but 
to overcome the inertia in the hundreds of thousands is the great 
problem before you.  That will not be possible by mere rationalization.  
They must be drawn within the sphere of the movement by directly 
enlisting the enthusiasms and directing the energies of those who are 
with you from the beginning.383 
 
The mention of the decade-long wait suggests that New Britain tapped into pent-up 
demand among Clarke’s generation for a programme of radical reform of the British 
state. 
Beyond Bloomsbury, most of the NBM’s supporters were introduced to the 
movement through its periodicals.  One recalled why and how he was mobilised: 
 
[B]y the time I got to Oxford I had it quite clearly in my mind that the 
two world problems to be dealt with were war and poverty… 
My problem was that my sympathies were basically with the 
‘left,’ but I could not go the whole way with them.  I did not … see the 
struggle or the solution as a class one…  The world seemed to me to be 
more divided between those who saw and wanted to do something about 
the social problem and those who did not, than between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie…  I saw no reason to believe that a mass movement of the 
working class would produce a world much better than the existing one. 
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382 Peacock, Yours Fraternally, pp. 84–5. 
383 Francis Clarke, ‘We Agree’, New Britain weekly, 21 June 1933, p. 153. 
88 
 
Consequently I was in a difficult situation.  I felt very strongly 
the need to be active doing something about the social problem, but I 
found no body of people with whom I could unconditionally ally myself, 
because they all seemed to be grinding a partial and divisive axe.  [O]ne 
afternoon I picked up the first number of the New Britain [quarterly] in 
the Junior Common Room.  I was really thrilled by … a journal which 
really stood for social justice and had a serious and radical programme, 
and at the same time maintained the best values of human culture... 
I did not at that time … get in touch with anyone in London.  I 
bought the next two numbers of the Quarterly and when the New Britain 
Weekly came out in May 1933 I bought it first thing every Wednesday 
morning and did nothing else until I had read it almost from cover to 
cover…  [W]hen I saw [an Oxford group] was started I got in touch.384 
 
This supporter, then, waited for others to take the initiative and start a local group 
before he began to actualise his political commitment to the movement. 
The most animating idea in the NBM’s ideology – and the one that gave the 
greatest cause for hope – was that the world was entering an ‘age of plenty.’  For 
Mitrinović the crisis was, among other things, a challenge to individuals to ally with 
each other (rather than cluster in the large collectivities of nation, race or class) to 
complete the transition to the age of plenty.385  Millions of Britons felt beleaguered by 
‘scarcity,’ yet scientific and technological advancements had made possible material 
abundance from which all could benefit.  The Bromley New Britain Group’s organiser 
stated that ‘dissatisfaction with the National Government’ arose from its apparent belief 
that ‘we have got no further than the age-old problem of keeping mouths fed and bodies 
warm – when there is enough food and clothing to keep everyone well supplied.’386  An 
NBM member representing the West Bromwich groups asked ‘Why is it that, while 
boot and textile factories are standing idle, numberless people are ill-shod and ill-
clothed; while brickyards and builders are short of work, men and women are less well 
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housed than beasts?’387  The reason, one NBM supporter ventured, was that none of the 
political parties are ‘plenty conscious’: party politics remained ‘an ignoble struggle 
between opposing groups which reflects all the motives of fear, hate, revenge and class 
struggle appropriate to an age of scarcity and coercion.’  Until Britons came to be 
 
conscious of and to accept all that a new age of abundance must imply, 
so long will all this talk of plenty remain a bitter jest to our millions of 
half-starving unemployed, so long will our cabinet ministers make bad 
jokes in worse taste at the expense of those defenceless millions. 
 
The supporter pointed out that although it seemed ‘ridiculous at first glance that anyone 
should resist plenty,’ society had been ‘dominated’ by scarcity: ‘our traditions, our 
social customs, our institutions, our morals, our religious precepts, have all been 
moulded by this factor.’388 
Among the National Government’s key figures, no one was more moulded by 
scarcity than the NBM’s bête noire: Prime Minister MacDonald.  The prime 
representative of what the NBM deemed ‘Old Britain’ had, in his early days in London, 
survived on only water and oatmeal; during his first occupancy of 10 Downing Street he 
ate in its heated banqueting rooms, being too poor to heat his private apartment.389  To 
Mitrinović’s mind, Britons had to grow conscious of plenty before a New Britain of 
material abundance could replace an Old Britain corrupted by an (unnecessary) sense of 
scarcity, and presided over by old men who did not know any different. 
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Strategic Ambiguity and Its Uses 
 
Mitrinović’s contributions to New Britain weekly ranged over wide terrain.  From May 
to July 1933, he published a series of articles titled ‘World Affairs.’390  Purdom 
received letters of complaint, such as one from J. B. Thorburn of Essex, who argued 
that the individual responsible for the ‘atrocious’ English ‘should be kept away from 
pens and paper.’391  Mitrinović knew what changes he wanted to see in Britain and 
Europe, so why were his writings and some of the movement’s terminology so 
perplexing?  The answer is that Mitrinović favoured the use of ‘strategic ambiguity,’ 
which Eric M. Eisenberg has defined as a communication strategy whereby ‘individuals 
use ambiguity purposefully to accomplish their goals.’392  Eisenberg has posited several 
reasons why leaders may find it preferable to ‘allow for multiple interpretations’ by 
receivers of ideas.393  The two reasons why Mitrinović made use of strategic ambiguity 
were that it preserves leaders’ ‘privileged positions,’ and promotes ‘unified 
diversity.’394 
Leaders seeking to preserve their ‘formal or informal standing’ can use strategic 
ambiguity to take out ‘character insurance,’ as Eisenberg has explained.  For leaders 
who are highly credible, ‘clarity is always risky’ because it provides the receiver with 
new information that can result ‘in a potentially negative reevaluation of character.’  A 
source ‘deemed credible who speaks ambiguously may be called a prophet, but a low-
credible source speaking identically may be dubbed a fool,’ Eisenberg has stated.395  
Many called Mitrinović a prophet, but few records point to his having been treated as a 
                                                
390 Mitrinović’s writings appeared under the byline ‘M. M. Cosmoi,’ which was used exclusively by him. 
391 J. B. Thorburn, ‘“World Affairs”’, New Britain weekly, 21 June 1933, p. 153. 
392 Eric M. Eisenberg, ‘Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication’, Communication 
Monographs 51 (1984), p. 230. 
393 Ibid., p. 231. 
394 Ibid., p. 227. 
395 Ibid., p. 235. 
91 
 
fool.396  Peacock once tried to draw out Mitrinović on the question of why he seldom 
expressed himself on paper with the clarity that he was able to demonstrate in person.  
Believing that ‘most people’ passed over ‘baffling’ articles, Peacock was frustrated that 
Mitrinović made ‘no attempt to make himself clear in [written] English.’  Peacock 
advised Mitrinović that he ‘had better give as much time to the study of Cobbett and 
Selden as he had done to Blake,’ so that his audiences ‘might grasp the more speedily 
the ideas he was ventilating.’  Mitrinović’s only recorded response was a smile.397 
Faced with Mitrinović’s magniloquent writings, some readers’ eyes glazed over 
– but his style made other readers, such as F. G. A. Hartley of Hendon, sit up and take 
notice.  Hartley ‘spent an hour or so’ figuring out that Mitrinović had ‘something fine 
and significant to say,’ yet felt the need to ask: ‘Why this tortuous and involved, not to 
say obscure, literary style?  Why all these strange new words?’398  Purdom responded 
that the style of ‘World Affairs,’ ‘as it is in poetry,’ was the means by which ‘the 
capacity of sharing experience is awakened in others.’399  Eisenberg has stated that 
leaders need to use ‘abstract, evangelical, and even poetic’ language in order to ‘make 
meaning for followers’ because values have to be expressed ‘at a level of abstraction at 
which agreement can occur.’  Effective leaders thus use ambiguity strategically to 
‘encourage creativity and guard against the acceptance of one standard way of viewing 
organizational reality.’400  This ‘unified diversity’ was precisely what Mitrinović was 
determined to forge. 
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Worley has shown that the New Party gathered in ‘restless souls’ who had 
drifted from one political organisation to another in search of ‘a congenial home to 
express their ill-fitting views.’401  Similarly, the NBM united some ‘who found 
themselves at odds with the causes they had earlier supported, or who had seen those 
causes come crashing down around them,’ as James Webb has put it.402  Prominent 
figures in the NBM never saw the movement’s main role as being that of an ‘Adoption 
Society’ for all ‘Political Orphans’ who ‘nosed around.’403  But Mitrinović’s strategic 
ambiguity meant that the NBM, in the early days, was like a Rorschach test in that 
prospective supporters could see in it what they wanted to see.  Many young persons, 
including some not previously politicised, looked up to the NBM as a city on the hill; 
others saw it as a big tent offering shelter when they wandered in lost on a murky 
political landscape.  There were also handfuls of malcontents who flocked to the latest 
flag waved, rather like the protesters in Modern Times who follow the Chaplin character 
after he picks up a hazard warning flag that fell off a passing truck.  Whatever their 
affiliations, they were welcomed under the New Britain banner.  Peacock recalled that 
‘Extreme Marxists and Christian Socialists, Guild Socialists, and Liberals, die-hard 
Tories and enthusiastic Money Reformers all participated’ in NBM activities; 
Mitrinović was ‘striving always to find some point of contact.’404 
Campbell wrote that the ‘tremendous crowd’ ‘thronging’ a typical NEG/NBM 
event in Bloomsbury was ‘the strangest collection of people you ever could imagine’: 
 
Doctors, teachers, students, budding Freudian, Jungian & other 
psychologists, pseudo-philosophers ...; Communists, Marxists & fascists 
... food reformers at any time, dress reformers, neurotics, hoboes, titled 
people from Mayfair, artists & would-be artists from Chelsea, 
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‘intellectuals’ all the time, bright young ‘upper class’ girls out for 
adventure, theosophists & anthroposophists & ‘seekers for truth.’  
Everybody expectant, everybody confused & most of them very much 
dug into the grave of their own partial viewpoint.405 
 
Hobson explained that Mitrinović’s aim was ‘not to induce people who agree to co-
operate, but to prove that the reconciliation of opposites in persons of deeply rooted and 
differing convictions was possible’ – at that Mitrinović was a ‘master, combining 
knowledge, spiritual power, persuasiveness and humour.’406 
By building bridges across ideological divides, Mitrinović and the NBM helped 
to defuse anger and diffuse tension among competing groups.  Campbell recalled that at 
Friends House, after a ‘packed’ meeting at which General Francis Younghusband ‘gave 
his blessing & support’ to the NBM, Mitrinović 
 
sent a message asking us to invite anyone back to our headquarters in 
Gower Street. 
Communists came; Fascists came – some dozen to twenty.  
Before discussion had begun they were quarrelling.  Soon it was a 
sustained hostility.  Mitrinovic spoke.  ‘Everyone here,’ he said is 
against the old order.  Everyone here is for the necessary economic 
changes, abolition of unemployment and the coming of the age of 
plenty…  So that you all agree with the New Britain programme.  
Everyone did.  Mosley’s fascist movement was destroyed in minutes!407 
 
Campbell’s conclusion was, of course, mistaken: those induced to murmur agreement in 
public likely scratched their heads later in private, only to resume their hostility to 
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opponents with whom they had been crammed in a drawing-room.  This case of 
reconciling (however temporarily) groups that could hardly have been any more 
adversarial is an extreme case of Mitrinović’s ‘Above and Between’ principle put into 
practice, and evidence of the NBM’s dampening effect on passions that often 
overheated.  Mitrinović typically attempted to forge points of contact among socialists, 
liberals and conservatives, whose ‘unified diversity’ would have held more promise 
than that of a communist–fascist one.  Mitrinović’s approach was eventually rejected by 
some associates who came to believe it resulted in nothing more than endless arguments 
among a mishmash of persons of clashing political hues.  Fuller, for example, had been 
drawn to the NBM prior to fully committing to the BUF, and Mitrinović convinced him 
to write articles for the NEG/NBM’s periodicals.  But Fuller concluded that the NBM 
was disorganised, and gave up on it in frustration.408 
 
 
Growing Pains 
 
The average weekly net sales figure for the first five issues of New Britain weekly was 
32,119, according to the chartered accountants Mitrinović tasked with certifying its 
circulation.409  This was twice the circulation of the New Statesman and Nation and 
more than five times that of the Week-End Review.410  New Britain weekly’s articles on 
guild socialism attracted support from socialists and trade unionists, and its emphasis on 
devolution drew into the movement Geddes’ followers, along with others who believed 
London was over-mighty in British governance.411  Young people joined ‘in great 
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numbers,’ Davies recalled.412  One disillusioned youth wrote that New Britain ‘fires me 
with enthusiasm,’ and that there had to be 
 
thousands of young men like me, who, bewildered by the state of 
affairs in which they find themselves, search their minds for solutions 
of the various problems facing the world today, and come to the 
conclusion that a new social order is required.  Most of us conclude 
also that none of the established political parties can bring it into being.  
So far we have been powerless individuals; NEW BRITAIN gives 
the leadership required.413 
 
 
Such enthusiasm was felt all over Britain.  Local groups were started in towns and 
villages as small as Diss, Norfolk; Wroxall, the Isle of Wight; Prestatyn, Denbighshire; 
Elland, West Yorkshire; Heswall, Cheshire; Milngavie, Dunbartonshire; and Ongar and 
Thorpe Bay, both in Essex.414  Across London, NBM groups ‘sprang up like 
mushrooms.’415  Even the Tory bastion of Royal Tunbridge Wells had a group.416 
A group was formed in Rugby after Gladys MacDermot (whose son Niall, the 
future government minister, was at Rugby School) and other followers of Mitrinović 
held a public meeting in the town.417  Some locals visited the NBM headquarters at 55 
Gower Street, the base of the NBM’s ‘Central Group’ of prominent figures (including 
Fraser, Slade, Cooper, Thomson, Davies, Delahaye, Campbell and Lohan).  One of the 
visitors from Rugby recalled that Mitrinović ‘had such a presence that you only had to 
look at him to know that you were in the presence of someone great…  I really couldn’t 
take my eyes off him.’418  Back in Rugby, they drew their associates into the local 
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group, which met several evenings a week.  ‘The astonishing thing,’ one recalled, ‘was 
that there was such a release of psychic energy that you could do with a very few hours 
of sleep.  We would read and talk until sometimes 4.00 in the morning, and then the 
men would go to work at 9.00.’419  By the following year, the NBM presence in Rugby 
was prominent – so much so that the town’s branch of the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP) got the ILP conference to rule NBM membership incompatible with ILP 
membership, and to instruct the National Council to enforce prohibition of dual 
membership.420 
Mitrinović and the Central Group were as surprised as anyone by the 
overwhelming response to their calls to action – and as is common in nascent social 
movements, enthusiasm and spontaneity quickly outstripped the founders’ ability to 
coordinate and channel them.421  By August 1933, Purdom fully comprehended that 
New Britain weekly ‘had struck a rich vein of political dissent and yearning for 
change,’ as Rigby has put it.  Seeking to capitalise on the momentum, Purdom began to 
push for the establishment of a national political organisation that would weld all the 
NBM local groups into a unified whole that could exert pressure on decision-makers 
around the land.422  By September, 55 Gower Street was beset by requests for literature, 
while Thomson and Davies travelled to address meetings and burgeoning local groups 
(among the most active were those in Birmingham, Merseyside and Oxford).423  The 
London groups responded enthusiastically to Purdom’s initiative: in October, more than 
50 delegates from the London groups met at Chiswick to draft a constitution and plan 
for the organisation of all the groups in the capital and environs.424 
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By 8 November, there were 47 groups in the provinces and at least 30 in the 
London area.425  The next New Britain weekly noted that ‘the sudden increase in the 
number of people wishing to start groups’ meant that there was no longer enough space 
on the back page for the list of group leaders.426  In that issue Purdom acknowledged 
that the politico-economic proposals in the weekly had been vague, but argued that 
without a national organisation, the movement’s vision could not be translated into a 
specific plan of action.  The ‘crystallization’ of the ideas expressed in New Britain 
weekly, he stated, would ‘require the backing of an organised body’ rather than just ‘co-
ordinated groups with a central committee in London.’427  Purdom was responding not 
only to external critics, but to a piece by Mitrinović that Rigby has compared with a 
papal nuncio.428  Mitrinović had declared that the NBM was ‘not a party.  A party, 
political or otherwise, the New Britain Alliance can never become.  It shall not be a 
party.  All parts and parties of our nation shall be contained in our New Spirit, in our 
New Way.’429  Mitrinović knew that the natural tendency of a political party is to turn 
its membership into a tribe; he realised that if the movement were to become a party, its 
work to reconcile competing groups would have been undone.  Becoming just another 
grid reference on the party political map would have negated the NBM’s efforts to 
connect the citizenry to politics by a route other than a party. 
Purdom suspected that Mitrinović and the Central Group did not want to cede 
control over the direction of the movement they had birthed.  To Purdom, it seemed that 
the NBM had reached the phase of growing up that necessitated leaving home; the 
members of the Central Group, though, were acting like overly protective parents on 
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discovering that their progeny wanted to follow a different course to the one they had in 
mind.430 
The conflict centred on the movement’s ‘nature and form,’ as Rigby has stated.  
The founding members around Mitrinović (the Central Group based at Gower Street) 
wished for the NBM to remain a predominantly ‘spiritual movement,’ concerned with 
propagating ideas for the individuals who would build a New Britain.  But certain 
activists in the London, Leeds and Sheffield groups wanted the NBM to become an 
organisation directly engaged in efforts to implement its proposals through conventional 
political processes.431  The two sides met in Rugby on 19 November, but failed to agree 
a formal statement on the NBM’s aims and organisational form.  On a return visit four 
weeks later, they again failed to reach agreement.  At a meeting in Birmingham in 
January 1934, the two sides failed once more to resolve their differences, and then yet 
again when they met in London on 25 February.  The Central Group refused to 
countenance voting to decide issues in the NBM, fearing that it would result in the loss 
of the founders’ ‘guardian’ role.432  Following the London meeting, representatives 
from some of the provincial groups lambasted the ‘dictatorial’ founders for their 
unwillingness to ‘allow an elected Committee to decide the principles of Aims and 
Policy,’ nor even to ‘permit any authority to pass to a National Council elected by the 
Groups.’  The Central Group was further criticised for ‘consistently’ failing to explain 
‘in specific terms’ its position on, or its claim to, ‘authority’ in the movement.433  In 
March, representatives of the London groups met to devise a new strategy to reduce the 
power of the Central Group.  They agreed a draft constitution for a federated 
movement, whose coordinating body would be a National Council made up of four 
representatives from each provincial region, 12 from the London area groups, and just 
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two from the Central Group (when unanimity proved elusive, a 75-percent 
supermajority would be able to decide an issue in its favour).  It was clear to all 
involved that adoption of this proposed constitution would have emasculated the 
Central Group.434 
 
 
The First National Conference (Leamington Spa) and the Struggle for Control of the 
NBM 
 
The struggle for control of the NBM came to a head at its first national conference, held 
at Eastertide 1934.  More than 300 representatives from around the country travelled to 
Leamington Spa to take part.  Purdom chaired most of the sessions, which began on 
Friday, 30 March; Mitrinović kept a low profile.  Purdom believed he saw ‘every sign 
of the initiation of a strong movement,’ but difficulties arose on Friday evening, when 
labour organiser J. T. Murphy made his first appearance on an NBM platform.435  
Davies claimed that Mitrinović enlisted Murphy with a view to ‘injecting an upsetting 
element and bringing the conference to nought.’  The movement was ‘becoming too 
vigorous for Mitrinović and his inner circle to control,’ Davies explained, and members 
of the Central Group ‘were always desperately anxious not to allow anything to get out 
of their hands.’436  Murphy thundered on about the need to forge a classless society by 
abolishing private property and the profit motive, which antagonised Purdom and 
members of the London area groups, who had strived to broaden the NBM’s appeal and 
bring businessmen into the movement.437 
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On Saturday morning the representatives were addressed by a London group 
leader who was among the strongest advocates of an organisational overhaul.  When he 
declared that the NBM could attract 10,000 new members if it toned down its attacks on 
the capitalist class, Murphy retorted: ‘If you went a little further and turned it into a 
capitalist party, I could bring you in 50,000 new members!’438 
Saturday evening was devoted to Soddy’s address on monetary reform.  A 
discussion of the proposed NBM constitution was scheduled for the following 
morning, but late on Saturday evening Slade stood up and proposed that the conference 
solve, on the spot, ‘the problems of leadership which must arise in the early stages of a 
movement’ by appointing seven co-leaders: Soddy, Delahaye, Fraser, Davies, Murphy, 
Reverend A. D. Belden and the well-known criminologist H. F. T. Rhodes.  Slade was 
‘inspired,’ ‘almost on fire,’ according to one attendee, and her proposal was carried by 
acclamation.  Rigby has concluded that although the cheers were ‘undoubtedly 
genuine,’ the representatives had witnessed an orchestrated ‘coup’ by the Central 
Group.  On Friday night members of the Central Group had met with Mitrinović to 
plan a pre-emptive move against the constitution proposed by the London area groups.  
The Central Group dismissed formal voting procedures as belonging to Old Britain, but 
its members ‘could rival the most devious of the old-world politicians when the 
occasion and their own interests demanded it,’ as Rigby has commented.439 
On Sunday morning, in the cold light of day, representatives argued about the 
legitimacy of the previous night’s appointment of co-leaders by acclamation.  In the 
afternoon Purdom expressed his dissatisfaction with proceedings.  This sentiment was 
shared by a number of representatives, some of whom walked out in disgust.  They 
were dismayed by the machinations of the Central Group, which preached devolution 
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yet did not practise it, and whose members seemed to ape the behaviour of the 
roughshod-riding National Government they all decried. 
Put to the vote, the appointment of the co-leaders was upheld with 125 in 
favour, two opposed.440  Fewer than half the members who had travelled to 
Leamington gave their blessing to the coup, but it was enough (given the walk-outs) to 
crush the attempt to turn the NBM into a federated political organisation. 
To Davies’ mind, this was one of the ‘missed opportunities,’ in ‘long 
procession,’ that doomed the movement.441  Peacock, too, lamented that ‘a glorious 
opportunity was missed by those at the helm’ of the NBM, which ‘possessed much 
initiative and enterprise’ and had ‘an abundance of talent in its ranks.’442  Before 
examining why exactly the Central Group was so determined to prevent the movement 
becoming a national political organisation, it must be noted that Mitrinović occasionally 
doubted the wisdom of this resistance.  Davies wrote that ‘to the best of my belief, 
Mitrinović did not intend the movement to be organized, most certainly not as a popular 
party,’ yet as late as August 1934 
 
he did not seem to have made up his mind whether New Britain 
was to be a political movement or a spiritual fraternity.  After a 
year and a half of chaotic, frustrated attempts at political 
organization, I was flabbergasted at Mitrinović’s uncertainty, 
which he communicated to me during a taxi-ride to a meeting.  It 
was this confusion that was the source of the chaos and conflict 
behind the movement.443 
 
 
Lacking British subject status, Mitrinović knew full well that he was in no position to 
lead a national political organisation in Britain, even if he had been so inclined.  
Thomson wrote of ‘the difficult fact that the centre of [the] central group consisted of a 
single dominant person who, for a variety of reasons (of which the most easily sayable 
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was that he was not British) could not function openly.’444  As mentioned above, 
Scotland Yard kept an eye on Mitrinović, who did not want to be singled out as a 
troublemaker, or even a nuisance.445  In 1921, Mitrinović noted that Oscar Levy, a 
colleague at The New Age, was deported in the wake of the passing of the Aliens 
Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919.446  Section 3 of the Act made ‘any alien’ who 
‘attempts or does any act calculated or likely to cause sedition or disaffection’ liable on 
conviction ‘to penal servitude for a term not exceeding ten years.’  Given the 
NEG/NBM’s political perfectionism, the publication of most of its periodicals could 
have been seen as ‘calculated’ to cause ‘disaffection.’447  It is no wonder, then, that 
Mitrinović sought to avoid official scrutiny, while cultivating influential associates who 
could have been relied on to vouch for him in a time of need.448 
If the NBM had been transformed into a national political organisation, 
Mitrinović would have been obliged to retire to the attic of the house of ideas for which 
he had laid the foundations.  Mitrinović would have controlled the NBM only for as 
long as he could sway (using the force of his personality and oratory) those who were 
running it.  If persons outside his orbit were to have been permitted to become 
prominent figures in the movement, Mitrinović would no longer have been able to reign 
over it from Gower Street. 
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For their part, Mitrinović’s followers in the Central Group did not think such a 
beatified soul could descend to the grubby confines of the corridors of power.  They 
believed their proximity to Mitrinović imbued them with the values of New Britain, 
which NBM supporters beyond Bloomsbury could not embody to the same extent (in 
their view).  Members of the Central Group worried that the NBM would be hijacked if 
they did not safeguard the ideological and spiritual purity of the movement.  They 
fretted that entryism would undermine or vitiate a federalised organisation more easily 
than it would a centralised movement that they steered.  Unwilling to ‘deabsolutise’ 
their power over the NBM, its founders squandered the opportunity to attract resources 
from others who were committed to furthering the movement’s aims. 
The members of the Central Group were unwilling to allow ‘their’ politicised 
social movement to turn into a national political organisation; such a transformation 
would have put the NBM one step away from becoming a political party.  The founders 
had ‘a suspicion of, indeed a repugnance to, machine politics,’ Hobson noted.449  
Political parties need financial backers, who seek favours in return for their largess; the 
Central Group certainly did not want to be beholden to the vested interests of Old 
Britain.  As soon as a social movement institutionalises itself, it comes into competition 
with longer-established organisations and parties: the NBM would have had to compete 
with other formations for supporters, in a zero-sum game that it was not equipped to 
play.  The Central Group had witnessed the New Party’s mauling at the polls – if the 
NBM were to have fielded candidates for Parliament, retaining deposits would have 
been hard, and breaking the mould of party politics would have proved impossible.  The 
Week-End Review and the New Statesman and Nation had suggested that the New 
Party’s programme was too much of a mismatch to offer a viable alternative to that of 
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the National Government.450  It is very likely that the NBM would not have been spared 
a similar verdict. 
A social movement could just about get by without professionals in key posts, 
but a national political organisation could not be helmed by amateurs such as the 
members of the Central Group.  Bill Duff complained to Mitrinović that the movement 
was ‘full of fine people dithering about.’451  Patrick Maitland (later 17th Earl of 
Lauderdale) described the NBM as ‘a show already congested with muddlers.’452  
Kolinsky and Paterson have stated that a social movement’s ‘political significance’ 
depends on the way it manages ‘colder’ aspects such as ‘discipline,’ the ‘transformation 
of ideology into politically relevant policies,’ and ‘the management of relations with 
established groups and authorities.’453  Managing these ‘colder’ tasks would have been 
too onerous for the founders, who were working extremely hard just to keep things 
running.  In any case, in their view reducing the movement to a political instrument – 
merely one among many in 1930s Britain – would have entailed a (self-defeating) 
lessening of the human warmth of the NBM. 
 
 
Practical Problems and the Rift over Rearmament 
 
Purdom had warned that ‘the new leadership was nonsense,’ and so it proved: ‘the 
leaders never once met or functioned in any way whatever,’ Davies recalled.  While 
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Mitrinović had got away with a ‘brilliant stroke’ at the national conference, he had, in 
the eyes of Purdom, ‘robbed the paper of serious purpose.’454  Within a fortnight 
Purdom resigned the editorship of New Britain weekly.455  According to Davies, 
Purdom’s departure spelled ‘virtually the end of the growth of the movement on a 
national basis.’  Mitrinović appointed a new editor: Davies.  ‘I sat in the editorial chair,’ 
Davies recalled, but ‘To sit was all I did.  I was editor only in name.  The real editor 
was Mitrinović.’456 
In the weeks following the conference Davies, Thomson, Lohan and others 
toured the country addressing NBM groups and other audiences, trying to raise morale 
and the funds needed to continue publishing New Britain weekly.  By June 1934 it 
looked like the movement had survived the divisions exposed during the national 
conference.  To rally support, the Central Group scheduled a second national 
conference for the August bank holiday weekend.457  Then, in the 4 July issue of New 
Britain weekly, Mitrinović called for Britain to rearm, on the grounds that even ‘a 
possible victory’ of Germany over the rest of Europe would ‘disfigure the human 
universe.’458  Mitrinović realised that Britain would face ‘the paradoxical prospect’ (in 
Overy’s words) of having to use war as a means of restoring a peaceable international 
order.459  Mitrinović’s call upset absolute pacifists – who renounced violence of any 
kind, in any circumstances, out of the conviction that it was morally wrong – in local 
groups around the land.  Later that month the Southend group severed connections with 
Gower Street; other groups followed suit.  The secretary of the Coventry group pleaded 
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with the Central Group to ‘avoid mentioning rearmament or any other term likely to 
antagonise the left wing and pacifist elements in the movement.’460 
Meanwhile, the circulation of New Britain weekly fell ‘catastrophically,’ Davies 
recalled.  The periodical had used up its initial funds, creating ‘increasingly enormous 
difficulty in keeping [it] alive’: 
 
We literally did not know from week to week whether the next number 
would appear or not.  I was not initiated into the mystery of the paper’s 
finance; but on occasions I was asked to accompany a few people to 
interview some wealthy or influential person…  There would be weeks 
when salaries were delayed. Towards the end, the money for printing 
had to be found for each issue before the printer would put it on the 
machine.  Many a time I was informed at luncheon hour on the Monday 
when we went to press that there was no money to print. 
 
 
‘Miraculously it turned up’ – until the miracles ceased.461  The 8 August 1934 issue, 
which appeared during the second national conference, was the final one. 
 
 
The Second National Conference (Glastonbury) and the Demise of the NBM 
 
The coffers were low but spirits were high as the second national conference got 
underway at Glastonbury on 4 August.  Nearly 200 representatives were prepared for 
in-depth discussions on a constitution and statement of aims, which had been promised 
at the first national conference.  The Central Group presented a document that reiterated 
the NBM programme: the twin principles of devolution and federalisation were 
features, as was the call for the socialisation of industry via the guild system.  The 
document also argued for a ‘universal citizen’s allowance’ (what is, today, referred to 
variously as an unconditional basic income, a universal demogrant, or a citizen’s 
income) to end poverty, as was fitting in the age of plenty.  Following discussion on the 
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organisation of the movement, 160 representatives voted in favour of control remaining 
with the Central Group, which the founders had stipulated was open to all who accepted 
that New Britain was not merely a political programme, but ‘a way of life.’  The 
representatives acknowledged that the basic unit of organisation was the local group, 
which would to be ‘autonomous and self-moving’ within the guidelines established by 
the Central Group.  Only four representatives dissented.  The formal conference ended 
on 6 August, and was followed by a week-long summer school.  The communal 
experience consisted of lectures, cricket, and physical exercise demonstrations and 
classes.462  In this way, the conference turned into what Davies called ‘a domestic 
conclave.’463  It became clear to all that the NBM – with neither a weekly nor means of 
replenishing funds – would retreat from public view, and in short order cease to be a 
movement with a national profile. 
By winter, Thomson summed up the feeling of the Central Group: ‘the next 
phase should be one of interior concentration, personal equipment and research rather 
than of enlarged publicity.’464  In effect, the Central Group was scaling back its political 
activities to the 1931 level (e.g. research, lectures and discussion groups), the better to 
focus on prefigurative politics.  The NEG would remain in existence.465  But at the 
NBM’s third national conference on 15–17 December, the decision was made to 
devolve the NBM into four separate but related bodies.466  Some of Mitrinović’s 
younger followers, including Harry Rutherford and Watts, kept The Eleventh Hour New 
Series (hereafter Eleventh Hour) going until July 1935 – so the NBM had a six-month 
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afterlife in the sense that several of the issues addressed by the movement continued to 
be discussed on a weekly basis by a single periodical.467  But the four successor bodies 
each focused on only one issue – thus the NBM ended not with a bang, but with four 
whimpers: the House of Industry League, the League for the National Dividend, the 
League for the Threefold State, and the British League for European Federation.468  The 
fourth of these mainly reiterated (alongside the NEG) the Eurofederalist ideas 
developed in the NEG/NBM, and it is to those – the movement’s greatest intellectual 
legacy – that we now turn.    
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Chapter 3 
The NEG/NBM as Britain’s First Genuine European Federalist Group 
 
 
Situating the Eurofederalist Thought of the NEG/NBM 
 
The aim of chapters three and four, which focus on the NEG/NBM as a pioneering 
Eurofederalist group, is to position the movement in its rightful place in the 
historiography of Europeanism in Britain.  Having identified, in the introduction, many 
of the reasons why the literature on the NEG/NBM is so small, it is worth mentioning 
that scholars’ neglect of the movement’s Eurofederalist proposals has additional causes.  
While it is true that the pre-1939 British discourse on European unity has ‘faded’ in the 
British consciousness (as Mark Garnett has observed), European academia has for 25 
years been heavily invested in a bull market for studies on the ‘pre-history’ of 
integration – so here I need to explain the three reasons why the NEG/NBM’s stock has 
hardly risen among intellectual historians of the European project.469 
The first reason why the NEG/NBM’s Eurofederalism has received so little 
attention is that the authors of seminal studies on the origins of European integration 
published before 2003–4 did not have access to the movement’s archive.  For example, 
Walter Lipgens states in A History of European Integration that the archive ‘was not 
available to me as the group is planning to publish its own history.’470  Consequently, 
Lipgens afforded the NEG/NBM a mere six sentences – rather than the fuller 
assessment it warranted – in an otherwise detailed history that is still widely cited. 
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The second reason is that although the NEG/NBM was the first British group to 
advocate genuine Eurofederalism, the NBM was relatively short-lived; in contrast, 
Federal Union (FU), the second British Eurofederalist group, has been continuously 
active since 1938.471  FU’s longevity is one of the reasons why it has almost 
monopolised the attention of the few historians who have researched pre-1945 
Europeanist groups in Britain; their scholarship has created the impression that FU was 
the first British group to champion Eurofederalism.  As early as 1950, Purdom sensed it 
was necessary to explain to journalists that the NEG was established ‘to put forward the 
ideas of European federation and devolution long before Federal Union or before any of 
the existing proposals for European federation were in the least considered.’472  The 
official history of FU, Federal Union: The Pioneers, incorrectly dates the NEG and 
steals its thunder; the work begrudges Mitrinović’s movement a single sentence, even 
though one of the first FU vice presidents was NEG member Niall MacDermot, whose 
mother had been by far the largest donor to the NBM.473  A source in the NAFDMA 
states that an NEG luncheon in 1938 ‘was devoted to helping to launch Federal Union, 
a more conventional movement which came to be more widely known.’474  The 
NEG/NBM was the real pioneer of Eurofederalism in Britain – FU followed in its 
footsteps. 
The third reason why the NEG/NBM has been a lacuna in surveys of the 
intellectual history of Europeanism stems from the NEG’s post-1945 relationship to the 
wider Eurofederalist movement in western Europe.  In 1946, Alexandre Marc – who 
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had been the leading figure in l’Ordre nouveau and a contributor to the NEG/NBM’s 
periodicals – founded the Union of European Federalists (UEF) to coordinate the 
activities of ‘second-wave’ groups (e.g. those founded or refounded during or after the 
Second World War).  In November 1948, the NEG sent delegates – including Soddy, 
Purdom, Niall MacDermot and David Shillan – to Rome for the UEF’s Second Annual 
Congress (FU also sent representatives).475  There, Shillan was elected to the Central 
Committee of the UEF, after MacDermot stood down.476  But Shillan thought the 
congress, which ‘suffered badly from excess of mechanism over meaning and of letter 
over spirit,’ seemed to ‘lead further into the jungle of “organization” and intrigue.’477  
By 1949, Shillan wrote to Marc that the NEG was ‘wrestling with great difficulties of 
material resources and organisation, complicated just now by much illness.’478  By 1950 
the NEG no longer wanted   
 
to be drawn into the present confusion of political Federalist movements 
and organisations.  These preach the principles of Federation while 
ignoring the equally important principle of Devolution, whereas we 
would not only devolve within geographical regions, but would devolve 
social life altogether into its true functions, economic, civic, and 
cultural.479 
 
When the NEG declined further opportunities to collaborate with Continental groups 
that, in its view, were not wholly federalist, it lost influence in the lead-up to the signing 
of the Treaty of Rome (1957).  In these years, second-wave groups gained strength (in 
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the wake of total war and genocide) at a rate that had never been possible for any first-
wave group.480  Thus scholars tracing the intellectual history of Europeanism were 
liable to dismiss the NEG as an unimportant second-wave group that faded from the 
scene, rather than to appreciate that the NEG was (with the NBM) a very important 
first-wave group – and one that maintained sufficient strength (under relatively benign 
wartime conditions in Britain) to be active at the start of the second wave.  Lacking 
access to the NEG/NBM’s archive, scholars knew little or nothing about the NEG’s role 
in the first wave.  That the NEG continued to publicise Eurofederalism into the mid-
1930s – and thereby served as something approximating a missing link to second-wave 
thought – was not appreciated until late in the twentieth century. 
What follows in this chapter is scrutiny of the meaning(s) of ‘federalism’ and an 
explanation of why the issue of sovereignty has been the crucial one in any plan for 
European integration.  Next, I provide an overview of the tradition of thought on 
European integration from German unification through to the 1930s.  The chapter ends 
with an explanation of how the NEG/NBM’s prominent figures understood the Great 
War as a ‘European civil war,’ and an examination of what they perceived to be the 
characteristics of the interwar ‘crisis.’ 
 
 
The Meaning(s) of ‘Federalism’ and the Issue of Sovereignty 
 
Since the mid-seventeenth century, when the first stage of the process of state-
formation in Europe was complete, political thinkers have considered how states might 
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be organised in a system.481  Although the development of nationalisms and the forging 
of nation-states led to particularisms that left little room for the mass expression of 
support for European political unity, intellectuals did, over the centuries, draw up plans 
‘in almost forgotten profusion.’482  In order to differentiate among them, a few terms 
need to be examined.  Stirk has argued that the ‘elasticity’ of ‘the idea of Europe’ has 
allowed it to be ‘appropriated by individuals of diverse ideological inclinations.’483  The 
idea of a united Europe has almost the same degree of elasticity, so any scholar 
discussing a specific invocation of the idea needs to carefully examine its particular 
ideological freight.  The ‘United States of Europe’ label, for example, has been applied 
to plans for a loose association of states, a fully fledged federation, and every type of 
entity in between.  Mitrinović was worried that some individuals pondering the 
movement’s proposal for the federalisation of Europe might have difficulties 
distinguishing it from other proposals it superficially resembled.  In Integration of 
Europe the NEG insisted that its scheme 
 
should not be confused with any other appearing under a similar name.  
It is conceived, not in the interest of any single State, but in the interest 
of Europe as the most ripe and responsible estate of mankind.  It is of a 
radical nature, requiring conscious changes in social habits and 
organisation throughout the Continent.484 
 
Mitrinović’s concern, well founded in the first half of the 1930s, has been further 
justified by posterity: in the historiography on interwar Europeanism, discussion of the 
many schemes that appeared ‘under a similar name’ has almost crowded out analysis of 
the NEG/NBM’s proposal. 
                                                
481 Wim Roobol, ‘Aristide Briand’s Plan: The Seed of European Unification’, in Spiering and Wintle 
(eds), Ideas of Europe, p. 32.  The genealogy of the ‘European idea’ begins before the first stage of state-
formation, but the ‘pre-history’ of European integration did not start before there were states to integrate. 
482 Lipgens, European Integration, p. 35.  Rolf Hellmut Foerster has identified 182 proposals made 
between 1306 and 1945; see Foerster, Europa: Geschichte einer politischen Idee (Munich, 1967). 
483 Stirk, ‘Introduction’, in Stirk (ed.), European Unity, p. 11. 
484 Integration of Europe, p. 1. 
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Even when scholars narrow their focus to the idea of a federal Europe, the need 
for cautious use of terminology is no less acute.  This is due to the word ‘federalism’ 
and its cognates’ multiplicity of meanings across nations and time; indeed, there has 
been a tendency to use words such as ‘federation’ without defining their meanings.485  
This nomenclature was in flux between the wars, when it was not unusual for the label 
‘federal’ to be applied to a proposal for a mere loose association of European states.486  
The meanings of ‘federal’ and ‘confederal’ were nebulous, and the terms were often 
used interchangeably; it was only in the second half of the twentieth century that their 
respective meanings narrowed, mainly due to the influence of epistemic communities 
(networks of professionals with recognised expertise in the field).487  Most scholars 
analysing interwar schemes for a united Europe take pains to avoid implying that a plan 
labelled ‘federal’ at the time it was publicised would necessarily be recognised as such 
from a more recent vantage point.  The most insightful among them have paid greater 
attention to the proposed substantive changes to inter-state relations than to the rhetoric 
in which the plans were couched. 
A feature of the European Studies boom and the rise of the ‘history of the idea 
of Europe’ scholarly industry since the 1990s has been the ‘hunt’ for the provenance of 
the European Union (EU).488  Given the semantic shifts over time, a pitfall on this hunt 
has been the elision of differences among first-wave proposals put forward by interwar 
visionaries, some of whom deliberately used ambiguous language (often for tactical 
reasons).  Briand, for example, referred to his proposed entity as ‘the European Union,’ 
                                                
485 N. J. Crowson, Britain and Europe: A Political History since 1918 (London, 2011), p. 4. 
486 Crowson has pointed out that when Churchill used the word ‘federalism’ in the 1940s, it invoked 
merely ‘conceptions of trust and equality between partners’ (Britain, p. 4). 
487 The refinement of this vocabulary was driven by the disciplinisation of political science, and by the 
development of international relations and European Studies as intelligible fields of study. 
488 This trend is not unconnected to the disbursal of humanities research funds by the EU and other bodies 
anxious about the EU’s legitimacy deficit. 
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the ‘European association’ and ‘the Federal Union.’489  Confusion was compounded at 
the time by interpreters and haste-prone commentators (including journalists facing 
tight deadlines), and has been deepened over the decades by translators insufficiently 
alert to how definitions have been refined in the academy (by political scientists, in 
particular).  Another pitfall on the ‘hunt’ has been the teleological one: first-wave 
schemes are sometimes lumped together in the course of attempts to make post-1945 
European integration ‘appear as an inevitable historical evolution,’ to borrow Michael 
Heffernan’s phrase.490  In fact, nearly all the interwar proposals labelled ‘federal’ were 
just schemes to formalise intergovernmental cooperation.  For its part, the NEG 
believed that ‘setting together the State Machineries … and [founding] a Central Office 
which may be entrusted to work out the common interest of the twenty-six’ would be of 
‘no use for the Nations.’491  Rather, the political integration that the NEG/NBM 
envisioned was nothing short of federalism as understood today. 
Political integration, as defined by Ernst B. Haas, is ‘the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct national settings’ shift their ‘loyalties, expectations 
and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.’  The result is ‘a new political 
community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.’492  When categorising any 
historical plan for European unity, it is important to note that envisaged political 
integration is necessary but not sufficient for a proposal to be deemed ‘federal’ (after 
                                                
489 Briand explained that he had avoided a single, inflexible formula for fear of dividing opinion and 
frightening certain governments; see Derek Heater, The Idea of European Unity (New York, 1992), 
p. 143.  One British diplomat complained to FO colleagues that the French Government’s Memorandum 
on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union (1930) was ‘so overloaded with verbiage 
that it is clear that the author has been at great pains either to conceal his meaning or to screen his 
complete lack of ideas’ (Crowson, Britain, p. 30). 
490 Michael Heffernan, The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics (London, 1998), p. 3.  André 
Gerolymatos has defined a ‘semi-official’ history (or parahistory) as one that ‘work backwards’ in an 
attempt to ‘justify’ the present circumstances of a particular polity by ‘subtly redrawing the past to suit 
the present’; see Gerolymatos, The Balkan Wars: Myth, Reality, and the Eternal Conflict (Toronto, 
2001), p. x.  Many such parahistories of European integration have been published in recent decades. 
491 NAFDMA, 5/4/2 File, Victor M. Bauer, Europe: A Living Organism [part 3], 1933, p. 53. 
492 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, 1958), p. 16. 
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all, political integration can be proposed with a view to the creation of a confederation 
or supranational organisation, too).  
Any jurisdictional shift away from a state means that its national sovereignty is 
no longer absolute, so a state that refuses to relinquish ‘final and absolute authority’ 
(F. H. Hinsley’s definition of sovereignty) cannot be said, today, to be integrating with 
other states, let alone federalising.493  Thus any scheme to unite Europe that did not 
envisage the creation of a new European polity invested with a measure of pooled 
sovereignty cannot be considered federal by today’s standards.   Focusing on this 
criterion enables a clear distinction to be drawn between two types of proposal: those 
that would have left intact national sovereignty (i.e. the ability of states to act 
autonomously, with any proposed European institutions powerless to interfere), and 
those that would have necessitated some degree of ‘de-sovereignization.’494  In the 
historiography, the clutter of proposals of the first type has obscured the smaller number 
of proposals of the second type, including the one made by the NEG/NBM. 
The NEG/NBM was in fact one of the very few groups in interwar Europe to 
formulate a proposal for European political integration congruent with today’s 
understanding of federalism.  In the very first issue of New Britain quarterly, one 
contributor rued that Britons wanted to be able ‘to snap our fingers at foreigners and 
their interference with us,’ and were prone ‘to think in terms of national glory, national 
success, national ambition and national sovereignty.’  But that pattern of thought was 
‘incompatible’ with the solution to inter-state strife.  Britons could ‘hardly say that we 
really want to solve our international problem’ if the retention of absolute sovereignty 
                                                
493 For the full definition, see F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1986), p. 1. 
494 For a discussion of ‘de-sovereignization,’ see Francesco M. Bongiovanni, The Decline and Fall of 
Europe (Basingstoke, 2012), p. 30. 
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continued to be favoured over the creation of a ‘sovereign government for Europe as a 
whole,’ which would ‘reduce’ the states to a ‘subordinate’ position ‘in a federation.’495 
Repeatedly and consistently, the NEG/NBM argued for the creation of a 
European polity invested with a measure of pooled sovereignty; a body of rules under 
which states would be obliged to operate (entailing the institutionalisation of the 
process of resolving differences among them); and a set of mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with the rules in the case of any recalcitrance.496  Before proceeding to 
examine these arguments, though, the NEG/NBM’s ideas need to be contextualised in 
the pre-1939 tradition of thought on European integration. 
 
 
An Overview of the Pre-1939 Tradition of Thought on European Integration 
 
By insisting on the necessity of pooling sovereignty, the NEG/NBM renewed a 60-year-
old British tradition of thought on European integration, albeit one that before 1931 was 
exclusively comprised of proposals published on behalf of private citizens.  The NEG – 
‘the first group in [Britain] to be essentially concerned with the unification of Europe,’ 
as it put it – did generate ideas similar to some that had been set out by Victorian 
                                                
495 Professor J. MacMurray, ‘Can Science See Us Through?’, New Britain quarterly vol. 1, no. 1 (October 
1932), p. 10. 
496 Harold Laski was one of the few figures outside the NEG/NBM to argue to the effect that ‘sovereign 
states cannot, by reason of their sovereignty, successfully organise their relationships upon any basis 
which can reasonably assume that peace is permanent’; see Laski, ‘The Economic Foundations of Peace’, 
in Leonard Woolf (ed.), The Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War (London, 1933), pp. 532–3.  Another 
was Sir Arthur Salter , who wrote that a United States of Europe would need  a ‘common political 
authority’ able to ‘reduce’ national governments to ‘the status of municipal authorities’; see The United 
States of Europe and Other Papers (London, 1933), pp. 91–2.  Salter stated that the United States of 
Europe would need to be a ‘political reality’ to ‘be an economic one,’ though that was not ‘conceivable’ 
(p. 92).  The New Britain weekly book reviewer regretted that the ‘practicability of such political unity’ 
seemed ‘beyond’ Salter’s imagination; see ‘The Reader’s Guide’ [review], ‘Sir Arthur Salter, The United 
States of Europe (London, 1933)’, New Britain weekly, 12 July 1933, p. 243. 
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thinkers, though Mitrinović and the other prominent figures drew on many and varied 
sources, as well as their own imaginations.497 
The first Briton to propose a federal Europe was Cambridge professor John 
Seeley, who wrote on the subject in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War.  In an 1871 
lecture to the Peace Society, Seeley proposed a European legislature and executive, an 
armed force, and a form of direct link between the individual and the federal 
institutions.  He stated that ‘We must cease to be mere Englishmen, Frenchmen, 
Germans, and must begin to take as much pride in calling ourselves Europeans.’498  
Macmillan’s Magazine published Seeley’s ideas, but no group advocated them. 
In 1899, W. T. Stead proposed that ‘an impartial Court’ be constituted as ‘a 
permanent part of the apparatus provided by the nations for adjusting [their] 
differences.’499  As states were, presumably, to defer to the court’s rulings and be 
subject to decisions made by personnel in other parts of the apparatus, it is clear that 
Stead envisaged the impairment of national sovereignty.  But Stead’s ideas, like 
Seeley’s a generation earlier, were not espoused by any group. 
The Quakers began to support the idea of a United States of Europe in 1910, and 
the British National Peace League followed suit in 1911.500  But it was not until Max 
Waechter founded the European Unity League in 1913 that a British organisation came 
into being specifically to advocate European unity (though not federalism).501  Twenty-
thousand joined – likely because of, rather than despite, the vagueness of its ideas – but 
the outbreak of war put a stop to its work.502 
                                                
497 NAFDMA, 5/2/2/138, Memorandum on the New Europe Group, no date (but no earlier than the mid-
1950s), p. 1. 
498 Passerini, Europe in Love, p. 52. 
499 W. T. Stead, The United States of Europe on the Eve of the Parliament of Peace (London, 1899), 
p. 202. 
500 Heater, Idea of European Unity, p. 123. 
501 Le Dréau, ‘L’Europe’, p. 325. 
502 Max Waecher, ‘The United States of Europe’, Advocate of Peace through Justice 86 (1924), p. 608.  
In the first half of 1914, the Review of Reviews and the Daily Citizen put forward the idea of a United 
States of Europe as the only way to guarantee peace and stability (Passerini, Europe in Love, p. 53). 
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During the war, certain sections of the Continental intelligentsia called for 
European political unity.503  The Berlin-based association Neus Vaterland was founded 
in November 1914 to promote ‘supranational unification.’  Shortly after, the Dutch 
committee De Europeesche Staatenbond called for Europe to become ‘a closely united 
league of states or a federal state’; a Spanish committee echoed that call.  In France, J. 
Barthélemy and A. Thierry developed sophisticated arguments in favour of integrating 
Europe.  In 1918 Walther Rathenau called on German youth to ‘replace international 
anarchy by a voluntarily accepted higher authority.’504 
It was Italy, though, that was the breeding ground for the purest federal 
proposals of the war years.  In 1918 the economist Luigi Einaudi argued that national 
sovereignty was the root cause of war, and that the solution to Europe’s political and 
economic problems was a federal European state with its own army and administration.  
Einaudi proposed that the federation collect taxes and exercise its powers in direct 
relation with its citizens, as in the United States.505 
At the same time, Einaudi’s associate Attilo Cabiati was writing the book 
European Federation or League of Nations? with Giovanni Agnelli, the founder of Fiat.  
Cabiati and Agnelli proposed European institutions including a federal congress, 
executive, and court to ensure the rule of law.  Foreign policy, defence, finance and 
trade would be federal competencies; national sovereignty would be retained in all other 
areas.506  On comparing the Articles of Confederation with its replacement, the 
Constitution for the United States of America, Cabiati and Agnelli realised the former 
had failed because it affirmed ‘the sovereign independence of the individual states,’ 
whereas the latter ‘created a Republic’ that ‘all admire.’  This showed that ‘one 
community, for its very survival,’ had ‘to change from a league of sovereign and 
                                                
503 Lipgens, European Integration, p. 38. 
504 Ibid., pp. 36–7. 
505 Pinder, ‘Federalism’, in Stirk (ed.), Unity in Context, p. 201. 
506 Ibid. 
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independent states to a more complex form of a union of states ruled by a central 
power.’  For Cabiati and Agnelli, this meant that a ‘milder’ prospect than ‘a federation 
of European states’ was ‘but a delusion.’507 
After Mussolini came to power in 1922, the proposals of Einaudi, Cabiati and 
Agnelli ‘disappeared from view’ in Italy.508  Their ideas influenced a generation of 
Continental politicians, but had an ‘unclear’ impact in Britain, according to N. J. 
Crowson.509  Wells’ analysis of the Articles of Confederation certainly echoed that of 
Cabiati and Agnelli.  Wells stated that the Articles had ‘made a Union so lax and feeble 
that it could neither keep order at home nor maintain respect abroad.’  Europeans, then, 
needed to ‘do a parallel thing’ to what the Americans accomplished in the 1780s, 
namely ‘repeat, on a much greater scale and against profounder prejudices, the feat of 
understanding and readjustment’ that resulted in a federation.  Wells argued that war 
would ‘destroy the social fabric of Europe’ unless boundaries were ‘got rid of’ and 
Europeans stopped ‘thinking in terms of the people of France, the people of England … 
and so forth.’510 
Wells’ appeal had no effect on British Government policy.  Britain’s approach 
to Continental affairs throughout the early 1920s has been characterised as one of 
‘limited liability.’  In the interwar years, successive British governments weighed 
potential commitments against domestic and imperial politico-economic considerations; 
usually, a prospective commitment that had little relation to British interests would be 
                                                
507 Giovanni Agnelli and Attilo Cabiati, ‘European Federation or League of Nations?, 1918’ in Peter 
M. R. Stirk and David Weigall (eds), The Origins and Development of European Integration: A Reader 
and Commentary (London, 1999), p. 14. 
508 Pinder, ‘Federalism’, in Stirk (ed.), Unity in Context, pp. 201–3. 
509 Crowson, Britain, p. 19.  John Pinder has pointed out that the work of Cabiati and Agnelli 
‘foreshadowed’ many of the ideas that would be developed in Britain’s Eurofederalist literature.  This is 
unsurprising, given that their work was inspired by British political culture and was steeped in ideas from 
the English liberal tradition; see Pinder, ‘Federalism’, in Stirk (ed.), Unity in Context, pp. 201–3. 
510 H. G. Wells, The Salvaging of Civilization: The Probable Future of Mankind (New York, 1922), 
pp. 64–5. 
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deemed not worth the risk of embroilment.511  The NEG/NBM disdained this hesitancy 
and drift, and rejected the naive hope-for-the-best attitude. 
Britons who had any faith in the prospect of normalising conciliatory behaviour 
among states tended to invest their hopes in the League of Nations.512  Many thought 
Britain’s position as the foremost imperial power ruled out its direct participation in 
schemes for European integration, though figures debated whether Britain should at 
least sponsor such schemes.513  Proposals for customs unions were taken seriously by 
political and bureaucratic elites on the Continent, and the Ouchy Convention (1932) 
came close to ratification.514  In Britain, though, the separation of economics from 
foreign policy made it hard for elites to see the potential of economic cooperation; it 
was not until 1931 that the Foreign Office (FO) created an economic intelligence unit, 
and even then it was staffed by only a single desk officer.515 
Passerini has argued that beyond Westminster and Whitehall, British attitudes 
toward ‘the idea of Europe’ through the 1920s and into the 1930s were much more 
varied than previously assumed, though ‘Europeanism seems to have been mainly an 
urban, even metropolitan, affair.’516  In 1929, Gaston Riou wrote that 
 
the Conservative English press, for one reason or another, hardly breathe 
a word on this question of the United States of Europe.  But from private 
information I can say that it is passionately discussed in London, even 
more so than in Paris, even if the papers do not dare to write of it.517 
 
 
                                                
511 Crowson, Britain, pp. 26–7. 
512 Heater, Idea of European Unity, p. 119. 
513 Crowson, Britain, p. 116. 
514 Stirk, ‘Introduction’, in Stirk (ed.), Unity in Context, p. 15. 
515 Crowson, Britain, p. 22. 
516 Passerini, Europe in Love, p. 54.  In 1927 for example, the Trades Union Congress passed a resolution 
calling for the creation of a United States of Europe; see Andrew Boyd and Frances Boyd, Western 
Union: A Study of the Trend Toward European Unity (Washington, 1949), p. 35. 
517 Riou, quoted in ‘New Europe Speaks to New Britain’, New Britain: Quarterly Organ for National 
Renaissance vol. 1, no. 3 (April–June 1933) [hereafter New Britain quarterly vol. 1, no. 3 (April–June 
1933)], p. 86.  Riou would later call the NEG ‘the most cultured milieu in London’ (Shillan, ‘from D. S.: 
Rome – Paris’). 
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The papers did not dare to – but a few years later Mitrinović changed that situation 
when he launched New Britain weekly.  A periodical that stood ‘for The Federated 
States of Europe’ was ‘an event,’ Campbell recalled, ‘for at that time not a single 
journal or newspaper in Britain stood for European Federation; no responsible editor 
would dare to.’518  The national press almost completely ignored the Eurofederalist part 
of the NEG/NBM’s platform.519  Campbell remembered Daily Express editor Arthur 
Christiansen ‘looking around Mitrinovic’s basement room in Gower Street, browsing 
over his books & doubtless, after his talk with him, he would report the conversation 
fully to Lord Beaverbrook … whose pro-Empire policy was hostile to Europe & 
Mitrinovic’s impulse & proposal.’520  There is no record of Mitrinović’s view on the 
Beaverbrook boycott, but he referred to British newspapers in general as the ‘daily 
dirge.’521 
Reflecting on the NEG/NBM’s efforts to ‘pioneer the way to European 
Federation,’ Campbell recalled that to publicly advocate it in Britain ‘was to invite 
ridicule or hostility, as this writer received on many occasions.’522  Another contributor 
noted that to speak of European federation ‘may well appear laughable.’523  Indeed, the 
NEG/NBM’s calls for the federalisation of Europe would have seemed quixotic to 
many readers.  Yet the movement’s prominent figures believed that advocating 
                                                
518 Wrugh [Campbell], ‘Notes’, p. 18. 
519 At no stage did coverage of the NEG/NBM by the News Chronicle make the movement too 
newsworthy for other dailies to ignore.  The News Chronicle covered NEG events as late as 1938; see, for 
example, ‘China’s Great Fight’, News Chronicle, 14 May 1938. 
520 Wrugh [Campbell], ‘Notes’, p. 8.  Lord Morley described the Daily Express as a ‘huge engine for 
keeping discussion at a low level’ (Graves, Long Weekend, p. 161).  Seaman’s verdict was that the 
newspaper ‘took nothing seriously (unless it was unimportant)’; see Life in Britain, p. 126. 
521 Wrugh [Campbell], ‘Notes’, p. 8.  Mitrinović was ‘prodigious’ in his ‘reading of daily newspapers & 
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522 Ibid., p. 8. 
523 W. Horsfall Carter, ‘Exploring the Approaches to a Federated Europe’, New Europe vol. 1, no. 1 
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p. 22. 
123 
 
Eurofederalism was not tilting at windmills; what led them to this belief was their 
perception that the annihilation of Europe was increasingly likely. 
 
 
The ‘European Civil War’ 
 
For the NEG/NBM’s prominent figures, the roots of the European ‘crisis’ lay in the 
blood-soaked trenches of the Great War – which they viewed as a terrible ‘European 
Civil War,’ in Mitrinović’s words.524  Fuller called it ‘the great European Civil War of 
1914–18,’ a conflict among nations ‘belonging to a common civilization and culture.’525  
Another contributor deemed it ‘a civil war of Europe, of mass madness, when each 
belligerent nation blasphemed the Almighty in their prayers for victory.’526  Tom 
Lawson has dated the emergence of the ‘conceptual device’ of the ‘European Civil 
War’ to the 1930s, and has suggested that its use was part of the effort to ‘define the 
crisis.’527  But the term had been used as early as November 1914 by Mitrinović’s 
former associate Franz Marc, who wrote from the Western Front that the conflict was ‘a 
European civil war, a war against the inner invisible enemy of the European spirit.’528 
Donald Cameron Watt has written that those who ‘spoke of a European civil 
war’ in the 1930s felt the existence of ‘a common European political society, a civitas 
Europae,’ and ‘identified those elements in it which were in conflict with each 
other.’529  Such sentiment was rarely expressed in Britain, where the notion of Anglo-
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Saxon fraternity was more venerable.530  Prominent figures in the NEG/NBM were not 
shy in asserting their belief in a civitas Europae, though.  They boldly argued that ‘So 
united has Europe always been in history, culture, and political origins – and so much 
more now, by constant interchange of life – that its wars are in the nature of civil 
war.’531  Strictly speaking, a civil war cannot, by definition, be fought by two or more 
states.  Yet a writer with a continental (or larger still) perspective could put forward the 
concept of an international civil war in the confidence that open-minded readers would 
not dismiss it as oxymoronic.  After all, awareness of the shredding of the common 
fabric of European civilisation in 1914–18 had created ‘a sensation akin to civil war’ 
among some individuals.532  In 1915, Jules Romains had referred to a ‘civil disorder’ at 
‘the heart of a homogenous civilization.’  The authors of some books published during 
the war years even treated the ‘European civil war’ as ‘the war of European 
unification,’ because they believed the conflict would force Europeans to learn their 
lesson.533  This was the provenance of the NEG’s notion that if Europe federalised, the 
‘crime’ of the war would be ‘expiated’ because history would then ‘bestow upon that 
War the new meaning of having been the pangs of the re-birth of Europe.’534 
To some Europeans the Great War seemed like a civil war in another respect: 
the closer the conflict came to being a total war, ‘the more it resembled a civil war,’ as 
Dan Diner has noted.  In civil wars, each of the sides has to aim for the total defeat of 
the other because only one of them can end up with ultimate political authority and a 
monopoly on violence.  In most cases of pre-1914 interstate violence in Europe, the 
sides had not strived for the destruction of the enemy power but were, instead, ‘satisfied 
                                                
530 Two examples from 1896 will suffice: Arthur Balfour ventured that ‘the idea of war with the United 
States carries with it some of the unnatural horror of a civil war,’ while Joseph Chamberlain agreed that 
such a conflict would constitute ‘fratricidal strife.’  See Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become 
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with a complaisance’ that preserved its existence.  In contrast, compromise was 
impossible in a civil war because victory implied the destruction or total submission of 
the vanquished.  For this reason, ‘civil wars are the most brutal wars possible,’ Diner 
has explained.535 
The Great War had brought the standards of colonial warfare home, where 
Europeans butchered others so like themselves.536  The fear that the ‘European civil 
war’ to come would be even more brutal underpinned the conviction – held by 
Mitrinović and other prominent figures in the NEG/NBM – that European culture itself 
would be ‘in danger of perishing.’537  In 1935, the poet Herbert Palmer wrote in 
Eleventh Hour that the conflict would have ‘all the appearance of Civil War,’ and 
would be ‘self-murder, suicide, a horrible activity of negations.’538 
 
 
The Movement’s Perception of the European and World ‘Crisis’ 
 
In a September 1933 issue of New Britain weekly, Lavrin wrote of a grave ‘world-
crisis’ that could no longer be ignored by those who tried to bury their heads ‘ostrich-
like’ in the sand, which had become ‘much too thinned and scattered by the continuous 
storms sweeping over the present day world.’539  The NEG saw the European ‘crisis’ as 
a ‘painful time’ of ‘deepening debts and of social disintegration,’ in which ‘crime, 
suicide and insanity’ were on the rise among a ‘more insecure’ people.540  McEachran 
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540 Integration of Europe, p. 1 and p. 4.  In Britain, the Means Test was a force for social disintegration. 
Community cohesion was weakened when neighbours informed the authorities about one another’s 
material circumstances (Blythe, Age of Illusion, p. 161).  But ‘all over England,’ Orwell wrote, the ‘most 
cruel and evil effect of the Means Test is the way in which it breaks up families’; see Orwell, The Road to 
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summarised the economic dimension of the global crisis thus: ‘the world grows more 
impoverished, unemployment increases in numbers, and in the midst of plenty we 
starve.’  Austerity measures and beggar-thy-neighbour policies presented the ‘absurd 
spectacle of each nation cutting its own throat and that of its neighbours, in a desperate 
attempt to economise and balance its budget.’541  One New Britain weekly contributor 
stated that Europe’s economic crisis was the fault of the makers of the ‘arbitrary’ 
treaties of Versailles and Trianon, whose redrawing of borders had resulted in 
‘dislocated, disjointed, and hopeless’ economies, with ‘tragic sociological 
consequences.’542  In August 1933, Purdom proclaimed that Europe was a ‘mad and 
dangerous’ armed camp, in which nations were ‘preoccupied with preparations for war’ 
and ‘actively fighting with economic weapons.’543   
In the Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin, Lester Hutchinson wrote that armed 
competition for colonial monopolies and foreign markets could result in ‘the complete 
destruction of civilisation.’  War would be ‘brought to every civilian’s doorstep,’ 
making the Great War ‘almost seem like a skirmish.’  Hutchinson argued that the 
peoples of Europe had to ‘swiftly join together to introduce a new order into a mad and 
weary world’ if they were to prevent their being ‘blown to bits from the air, gassed in 
the streets, or artificially infected with terrible diseases.’544 
Such presentiments of disaster were not uncommon in what Allen Hutt called an 
‘eve-of-war age.’545  The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures did not think of war and 
                                                                                                                                         
Wigan Pier (London, 1998 [1937]), pp. 70–1.  Inspectors assessed total household income: it was thus 
common for youths to be driven from their childhood homes, and for employed persons to come to resent 
out-of-work kinsfolk they had to support (reducing the fruits of their labour to subsistence level).  The 
inquisitorial ‘test’ was a humiliating violation of domestic privacy, too (Gardiner, Thirties, pp. 47–51). 
541 McEachran, Unity of Europe, p. 25.  McEachran was not the only commentator to equate trade policy 
with violence.  In 1926, Elémer Hantos had noted the ‘comprehensive armaments’ of post-war trade 
policy; the ‘new weapons’ included barriers that ‘exceed the highest customs dues in their effectiveness.’  
See Elémer Hantos, ‘The European Customs Union’, in Stirk and Weigall (eds), Origins, p. 15. 
542 ‘Sentinel’, ‘The Shape of a New Europe’, New Britain weekly, 29 November 1933, p. 41. 
543 C. B. Purdom, ‘Britain’s Destiny’, New Britain weekly, 16 August 1933, p. 400. 
544 Lester Hutchinson, ‘Europe on the Brink of War’, Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin, 29 August 
1934, p. 6. 
545 Allen Hutt, This Final Crisis (London, 1935), p. 161. 
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peace in binary terms, so did not equate the absence of war with peace.  Instead, they 
saw points on a continuum, which included what Delahaye called ‘Permanent Peace’ 
(also referred to as ‘active peace’); ‘so-called peace’; and war.  In August 1934, so-
called peace reigned: it was no more than ‘the suspension of imminent military 
hostilities during a period of continuous financial and economic struggle.’546 
Palmer wrote that if war broke out, the result would be ‘horror and tyranny.’547  
The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures thought that a war in Europe would be ‘impossible 
to localise’; if no war on the Continent could be contained, it followed that any war 
would necessarily become a Great one.  New Europe: A monthly Journal for Federation 
and Disarmament (hereafter New Europe) stated that armed conflict was ‘possible 
between many states on the Continent at any time,’ which was consistent with the 
prominent figures’ view of Europe as closer to a state of war than it was to active 
peace.548  Civilisation was a hairsbreadth from barbarism and the ‘negation of all that 
humanity has risen to,’ New Britain weekly wrote.549 
Prominent figures in the NEG/NBM recognised that a second Great War would 
be more horrific by an order of magnitude than the first, in which the use of armaments 
had for the most part been limited to relatively narrow strips of Europe.  They were, of 
course, far from alone in thinking this way and in sensing the danger so acutely.  As 
Susan R. Grayzel has noted, civilian memoirists and commentators during this period 
were ‘consistent’ in asserting that air raids had ‘changed the nature of warfare.’550  
Stanley Baldwin’s 1932 prophecy that ‘the bomber will always get through’ became 
common currency.551  Britain was thought to be especially vulnerable to aerial attack 
                                                
546 New Britain Constitution and Statement of Aims (London, August 1934), p. 7. 
547 Palmer, ‘British Initiative’, p. 254. 
548 New Europe, September 1934, inside back cover. 
549 ‘The Eleventh Hour for Europe’, New Britain weekly, 2 August 1933, p. 325. 
550 Susan R. Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to 
the Blitz (Cambridge, 2011), p. 103. 
551 Overy, Morbid Age, p. 176.  The Air Ministry stoked fears of a ‘knock-out blow’ by enemy bombers 
in order to scare the Treasury into funding expansion of the Royal Air Force (Crowson, Britain, p. 38). 
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because its population and industry were concentrated in relatively small areas.552  As 
G. E. G. Catlin noted, aircraft had ‘reduced the Channel, militarily speaking, to a 
ditch.’553  Washing ‘our hands of all these blankety-blank foreigners’ and letting them 
‘go to the devil in their own way’ was no longer an option, Wickham Steed wrote in 
New Britain quarterly.554 
Fears were fuelled by works of popular fiction.  For example, the rumour of a 
raid by thousands of planes ‘all carrying bombs filled with suffocating gas, or explosive 
that would blow entire streets into atoms with one bang’ was the turning point in the 
plot of Cicely Hamilton’s 1933 novel Little Arthur’s History of the Twentieth Century 
(reviewed in the 22 November issue of New Britain weekly), which had been serialised 
in the mass-circulation Time and Tide.555  That same year, Wells’ The Shape of Things 
to Come featured the ‘bombing, gas-diffusing aeroplane,’ which made ‘the entire 
surface of a belligerent country a war area.’556  For the NEG/NBM’s prominent figures, 
Europe risked ending ‘her glorious history in indignity and mutual slaughter, a 
spectacle for the world’ – but they believed the continent could still ‘pull up and show 
the world that Western civilisation has not yet exhausted its meaning and purpose.’557  
As we shall see, what distinguished them from others who thought similarly was that 
the movement formulated far-reaching, detailed plans that promised to reverse the 
                                                
552 Pugh, We Danced, p. 323. 
553 G. E. G. Catlin, ‘Is It Peace?’, New Britain: For British Revolution and the Social State New Series 
(Autumn 1934) [hereafter New Britain quarterly New Series (Autumn 1934) – because only this one 
issue was published], p. 26. 
554 Wickham Steed, ‘Alarm in Europe – Where Do We Stand’, New Britain quarterly vol. 1, no. 3 (April–
June 1933, p. 79. 
555 Dennis Kennedy, ‘Cicely Hamilton’s Twentieth Century’ (paper delivered to the Belfast Literary 
Society, 3 April 2000), p. 5; and Lis Whitelaw, The Life and Rebellious Times of Cicely Hamilton: Actor, 
Writer, Suffragist (Columbus, 1991), p. 234.  These rumours of a raid begin a chain of events that leads to 
the creation of a ‘Federated Europe’ when states become provinces with ‘no fighting machines and men 
for outside wars,’ only police forces ‘to keep order at home’ (Kennedy, Ibid., p. 7, p. 12 and p. 2). 
556 H. G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come (London, 1933), p. 40. 
557 ‘Another Week Goes By’, Eleventh Hour, 2 January 1935, p. 114. 
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generalisation of insecurity (or ‘socialized danger,’ to use the term employed by the 
political scientist Harold Lasswell in 1941).558 
In response to a Daily Mirror article that urged the government to develop ‘the 
retaliatory power of air attack,’ the Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin lamented that 
civilisation would become ‘a competitive slaughter of infants.’559  Prominent figures in 
the NEG/NBM saw that there would be no distinction between combatants and civilians 
in a war extending far beyond battlefields.  With fear of retaliation the only thing that 
might hold back an enemy, pity would be taken for weakness: civilians en masse would 
be ‘legitimate’ targets – and defenceless victims (Fig. 8).  The prominent figures feared 
that adversaries in the next war would aim not for the mere capitulation of states, but 
for the annihilation of nations.560  Geoffrey West likened the prospect of war to ‘men 
quarrelling together in a small room and threatening each other with sticks of 
dynamite.’  The conflict would be ‘war without victory, war to the death – the death of 
European civilisation.’561 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Arthur Wragg, ‘1940?’, Eleventh Hour 
Emergency Bulletin, 29 August 1934, p. 3. 
                                                
558 Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Garrison State’, American Journal of Sociology 46.4 (1941), p. 455. 
559 ‘Crisis?  Issues?  Emergency?’, Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin, Mid-April 1934, p. 1. 
560 ‘New Albion’ [Special Supplement], Supplement (p. 4). 
561 Geoffrey West, ‘War the Spectre’, New Albion, April 1934, p. 33. 
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Mitrinović’s vision of civilisation-engulfing catastrophe was ‘the hell of 
bacterial and gas suicide of Christendom.’  Britain would be desolated by ‘the 
bacteriological east wind,’ he prophesied.562  Mitrinović expressed disdain for the ‘ugly 
and ignorant spirits, ignoble and animal minds’ who had brought Europe to this pass.  
He questioned whether these so-called statesmen really cared if civilisation met ‘its 
shipwreck and cosmic earthquake in the European self-extirpating war.’  They were 
guilty of ‘power-delusion,’ but ‘Press-lords, great and world-ruling powers that be, 
infinite merchants and galactic financiers’ too were to blame for the calamity to come 
(Fig. 9).  Mitrinović noted their combined ability to ‘destroy, dwarf, humiliate the 
kingdom of Culture and Civilisation,’ Christendom and Europe, ‘Western Man and the 
God in him.’  The everlasting ‘chronicle of the Truth of Things’ would judge them all 
‘misleaders of the people,’ and would remember them and their own children as having 
been ‘killed off like the rest of us that are to be killed in our rat and mice millions.’563 
                                                
562 ‘New: New Disaster’, p. 177.  A week later he moderated his prognosis: Britain would merely ‘not 
survive as a world power’ if another war broke out (‘United States of Europe instead of the Atlantic 
Catastrophe?  Albion and Columbia to lead Europe into World Federation.  Stop on the Brink of the 
Abyss and Turn Back, Upwards, Towards Survival!’, New Britain weekly, 11 July 1934, p. 209). 
563 ‘Sermon to the Deaf, and to the Criminal Idiots, and to those who shall kill and shall be killed, unless 
they wake up to hear’, Eleventh Hour, 8 May 1935, pp. 461–2.  Mitrinović, here, also called them 
‘infernal souls and maleducated upstarts and highwaymen,’ ‘bloody and killing souls,’ and ‘blind and 
insensate leaders.’  Examples of demonisation were extremely rare in the NEG/NBM’s periodicals. 
131 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Stanley Herbert, ‘The International Lunatic Asylum’, New Britain weekly, 12 
July 1933, p. 241. 
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NEG/NBM periodicals told their readers what they could do – as part of the 
movement or in sympathy with it – to end their ‘waking nightmare,’ in which ‘strain, 
fear … and utter helplessness are [the] chief emotions.’564  Prominent figures in the 
movement saw the way to resolve the crisis, but it would take nothing less than ‘radical 
measures of reform.’565  One of these measures would be the creation of a European 
federation, such as had never been proposed by any group in Britain.  The NEG/NBM’s 
proposal was genuinely Eurofederalist, as shall be made clear in chapter four through 
analysis of both the movement’s reasoning and its vision for the creation of European 
institutions. 
  
                                                
564 ‘The Eleventh Hour for Europe’, p. 325. 
565 Disarmament, p. 2. 
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Chapter 4 
To Create a ‘New Europe’: the NEG/NBM’s Reasoning and Vision, in Context 
 
 
Three Visions of a United Europe: a Comparative Analysis of the Proposals of 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand and Mitrinović 
 
From 1923 into the early 1930s, at least two dozen books on European unity were 
published every year.566  By far the most important of these books was Pan-Europe 
(1923) by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, an aristocratic geopolitician who was the second 
most prominent advocate of European integration (after Briand) between the wars.567  
Pan-Europe was the manifesto of the Paneuropean Union, the organisation 
Coudenhove-Kalergi established to propagate the idea of European integration, to 
convert individuals to its cause, and to exert influence on governments via its 23 
national branches.568  In 1925 Coudenhove-Kalergi visited London, where he convinced 
some personages to endorse his vision of Pan-Europe.569  The British official attitude, 
though, was chilly.570 
Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that Europe’s states had to be ‘supplemented or 
completed’ by a union because the post-war proliferation of ‘a dozen Alsace-Lorraines’ 
had multiplied the risk of war.571  Like Mitrinović, then, Coudenhove-Kalergi thought 
political union was the only means by which Europe’s troubles could be overcome.  But 
                                                
566 Lipgens, European Integration, p. 21. 
567 Roobol, ‘Briand’s Plan’, in Spiering and Wintle (eds), Ideas of Europe, p. 37.  Seven years later, 
Churchill publicly recognised that Coudenhove-Kalergi ‘revived the ideal of European unity’ (‘The 
United States of Europe’, The Saturday Evening Post, 15 February 1930). 
568 Lipgens, European Integration, pp. 39–40. 
569 Passerini, Europe in Love, p. 55.  After the Nazis seized power, Coudenhove-Kalergi repeatedly went 
to Britain to set up a Paneuropean Union branch, which Salter and Nicolson joined; see Luisa Passerini, 
Love and the Idea of Europe, trans. Juliet Haydock with Allan Cameron (New York, 2009), p. 74. 
570 In 1926, a mandarin at the FO called Coudenhove-Kalergi an ‘impractical theorist.’  Prior to 1930, the 
FO library did not include any books on Pan-Europe.  See Ralph White, ‘The Europeanism of 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’, in Stirk (ed.), Unity in Context, p. 39; and Crowson, Britain, p. 32. 
571 R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (New York, 1926), p. 11 and p. 55; and R. N. Coudenhove-
Kalergi, ‘War Danger in Europe’, Advocate of Peace through Justice 88 (1926), p. 549. 
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unlike the NEG/NBM, Coudenhove-Kalergi deemed the Soviet threat a major reason 
for the states to ‘overcome all national hostilities and consolidate’; if they failed to 
commit to mutual defence in Pan-Europe, they would eventually ‘succumb to a Russian 
conquest.’572  Like the NEG/NBM, the Paneuropean Union argued that intra-European 
disputes needed to be resolved through obligatory arbitration, but Coudenhove-Kalergi 
focused on arbitration as a way to prevent meddling by the Soviet Union, the adversary 
that posed the greatest threat to Europe, as he saw it.573  Whereas Coudenhove-Kalergi 
feared a newly industrialised Russia extending its borders to the Rhine, Mitrinović 
never fixated on the possibility of Soviet aggression – rather, he feared ‘a new Great 
War’ in which ‘Europe as a whole would suffer the cataclysm of her history and her 
being.’574  The NEG wanted European states to avoid antagonising the Soviet Union: 
while federalising, they ought to ‘have no desire to interfere with Russia, and must 
create our own conditions, so that Russia shall not desire to interfere with us.’575 
While acknowledging the injustices of the post-war settlement, Coudenhove-
Kalergi thought borders needed to be respected, not redrawn.576  In contrast, Mitrinović 
expressed openness to borders being ‘revised’ as part of a ‘Covenant of the 
Federation.’577  Coudenhove-Kalergi was in favour of a ‘Magna Carta of Tolerance’ to 
protect minorities, though in his view the need for special protection would fade away 
as political and economic integration made borders ever less important.578  In contrast to 
                                                
572 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, p. 55. 
573 White, ‘Coudenhove-Kalergi’, in Stirk (ed.), Unity in Context, p. 33.  Arnold J. Zurcher, an associate 
of Coudenhove-Kalergi, later explained that the main reason for the focus on ‘the ideals of free Europe’ 
was to give Communism ‘more effective competition’ in the ‘struggle for men’s minds’; the ‘military and 
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with intercontinental issues.  See White, ‘Coudenhove-Kalergi’, in Stirk (ed.), Unity in Context, p. 34. 
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1934, inside back cover. 
575 Disarmament, p. 3. 
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577 New Europe, September 1934, p. 11. 
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the enshrining of mere tolerance, the NEG was open to the idea of ‘European 
citizenship and the right of any member of such Minority to unprejudiced European 
jurisdiction,’ as proposed by Victor M. Bauer, a Viennese thinker who gave a series of 
lectures to the NEG in 1933.579 
The Paneuropean Union’s view on the place of Britain differed from that of the 
NEG/NBM.  Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that Pan-Europe had to ‘constitute itself 
without England, but not against England.’580  He excluded Britain because he believed 
it had grown out of Europe to form, with its empire, a political continent in its own 
right.581  The NEG/NBM, in contrast, called for a ‘straight and powerful British 
initiative for the Federation of the Continent.’582  To Mitrinović, the launch of such an 
initiative by Britain would have mattered more than ‘whether Britain herself wants to 
join that Federation or whether she does not join it.’583  Indeed, Britain’s ‘prime duty’ 
was to help ‘the European nations to draw together,’ one issue of New Britain weekly 
declared on its front cover (Fig. 10).584  Mitrinović’s preference was for Britain ‘joining 
[the] European Federation as an integral member.’585   
 
                                                
579 Bauer, Europe [part 3], p. 56. 
580 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, p. 41. 
581 Bugge, ‘Nation Supreme’, in Wilson and van der Dussen (eds), History, p. 97.  Coudenhove-Kalergi 
added, though, that as soon as Britain felt ‘drawn to Europe’ more strongly than to its possessions, the 
way to Pan-Europe had to ‘lie open’ (Pan-Europe, p. 42).  Yet the more pertinent question was how 
strongly the dominions felt drawn to Britain – this matter would be settled in 1931, when the Statute of 
Westminster made the dominions fully self-governing.  Their people’s aspirations for looser ties with 
Britain ended any hopes for imperial federation that had lingered after the Edwardian era (Pugh, We 
Danced, pp. 406–7).  NEG/NBM periodicals rarely featured in-depth discussions of the idea of imperial 
federation; Mitrinović saw the prospect of the federalisation of Europe as more realistic and important. 
582 ‘New Britain’, ‘An Open Letter to the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M.P.’, New Britain weekly, 18 
October 1933, p. 677. 
583 ‘Versailles Peace, Versailles Armament, Versailles Disarmament – everything except New Order for 
Great Britain, first and immediately, and Federation for Europe first and immediately for the sake of New 
Adam and the World Federation!’, New Britain weekly, 8 August 1934, p. 339. 
584 New Britain weekly, 18 April 1934, front cover.  The weekly’s striking front cover depicted the 
British Isles as a solid black landmass, an umbra befitting what the NBM’s prominent figures saw as dark 
days – but the shadowlands brighten as ‘New Britain’ (including an apparently united Ireland) moves 
closer to the Continent.  When the movement’s financial position became perilous, the weekly’s 
production values declined; the front cover of the last eleven issues was printed in green ink only. 
585 ‘Editorial’, New Atlantis vol. 1, no. 1 (October 1933), p. 2. 
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Fig. 10.  Front cover of New Britain weekly, 18 April 
1934; artwork by ‘CWB’ [C. W. Bacon]. 
 
Delahaye, for his part, believed Britain and the other large states would either 
enter the European federation ‘direct as units’ or after joining ‘small scale federations’; 
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he suggested that Britain could join ‘on her own or with Scandinavia.’586  Another 
contributor to the NEG/NBM’s periodicals took the view that 
 
Britain can neither accept plans for a United States of Europe, from 
which she is excluded, nor can she shut herself up within the wide 
borders of the Empire.  Britain is as necessary to Europe as Europe is to 
her.  Her destiny and that of Europe as a whole are one.587 
In the same vein, Mairet argued that ‘The culture of Britain is European, and the natural 
and true orientation of British politics is therefore towards European unity, to be 
expressed ultimately in a federation of all the European States.’588 
In marked contrast to the NEG/NBM, Coudenhove-Kalergi paid little attention 
to how Europe would be united.  He offered outlines rather than detailed plans; for 
example, his proposal for a Pan-Europe constitution was vague.589  Coudenhove-
Kalergi ignored or skirted some issues in his writings, in which questionable assertions 
commingle with prescient insights.590  Many took the Paneuropean Union’s proposals to 
be ‘naïve’ and ‘overly optimistic,’ as Ralph White has surmised – yet while 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ‘Europeanism was idealistic and, in some respects, impractical,’ 
as ‘a radical critique of existing European order, it had to be.’591  The same goes for the 
proposals of the NBM, whose weekly declared that ‘The impossible is the only possible 
course of action today’: ‘the federation of nations, the creation of institutions for a 
European society, political, economic, and cultural.’592 
There is evidence only of indirect contact between the NEG and Coudenhove-
Kalergi: Vandeleur Robinson wrote to the NEG, in advance of his attendance at a 1938 
meeting, to say that he had ‘recently’ had ‘a long talk’ with the leader of the 
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Paneuropean Union.593  The NEG/NBM’s publications mentioned Coudenhove-Kalergi 
or the Paneuropean Union only twice (in passing) in three years.  Mitrinović evidently 
deemed Coudenhove-Kalergi’s proposals undeserving of serious consideration, but 
given that there were some similarities between the blueprints of the NEG/NBM and 
Paneuropean Union, it is worth considering why this was so.  Mitrinović did not believe 
in half measures (unless they were way stations): unlike the Paneuropean Union, 
prominent figures in the NEG/NBM were clear-eyed on the issue of national 
sovereignty and uncompromising in their belief that it had to be drastically curtailed.  In 
stark contrast, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas on sovereignty were equivocal.  Favouring 
‘an ad hoc politico-economic federation,’ he was sure that all the Continental states 
would relinquish some of their sovereign powers after the pioneers among them 
showcased the advantages of doing so.594  Initially, Coudenhove-Kalergi seemed to 
think that small concessions of sovereignty would be sufficient to ensure lasting peace 
and prosperity.595  But he had changed his mind by February 1930, when he argued that 
unity could be achieved without impairing national sovereignty.596  It seems, then, that 
Coudenhove-Kalergi came to believe that his proposed permanent bureau, House of 
Peoples and House of States needed only negligible powers.  In contrast, Mitrinović 
comprehended that European institutions could not possibly prove effective unless they 
pooled a large measure of sovereignty. 
Ignoring a mass of evidence to the contrary, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that a 
wide constituency for his ideas was waiting to be inspired.597  Like Mitrinović, he 
overestimated the extent to which the Great War had blunted the emotional appeal of 
nationalism.  Both visionaries also overestimated the extent to which the non-
                                                
593 NAFDMA, 5/2/2/125, Vandeleur Robinson to Mayne, London, 13 July 1938, TS.  Robinson was a 
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intelligentsia would be swayed by invocations of a common European heritage – in 
each case, this owed something to a class-specific misrecognition of the relation of 
politics to values, as enshrined in high culture, in the new age of mass suffrage. 
The Paneuropean Union never gained broad-based support.598  Although its first 
congress attracted over 2,000 delegates from across Europe, Arnold J. Zurcher admitted 
that its branches were rarely more than ‘study and discussion groups,’ and conceded 
that there was little effort to forge a mass organisation strong enough to pressure 
governments.599  Instead, Coudenhove-Kalergi concentrated on winning over political 
leaders and officials in the hope that they might 
 
use their influence and power to establish appropriate public organs of 
European cooperation and mold favourable opinion.  It was a strategy 
that … could not go far to popularize the movement for integration.  
Hence, during the interbellum period, although European union 
became an ideal to be reckoned with among intellectual circles and in 
the salons where social and political leaders foregathered, it made little 
headway in capturing the imagination of the common man. 
 
Zurcher considered Coudenhove-Kalergi’s greatest interwar achievement to be the 
Briand initiative, on the grounds that the Paneuropean Union made the French 
statesman sufficiently enthusiastic about ‘the European cause’ to ‘try to make it the 
policy of the major European power’ for the first time.600  Scholars have debated how 
much influence Coudenhove-Kalergi had on Briand, but it is known that the two met in 
1926, and that Briand accepted the honorary presidency of the Central Council of the 
Paneuropean Union in 1927.601 
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At that time Briand’s personal standing was extremely high: he had shared the 
1926 Nobel Peace Prize for the Locarno Treaties, which reintegrated Germany into the 
comity of European states.602  Following Locarno he failed to get the United States to 
guarantee French security; all that could be salvaged from the negotiations was the 
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which lacked credibility.603  Briand then sought to weave a 
European web to enmesh Germany, whose underlying economic strength was greater 
than that of France.604  The following winter Briand privately stated: 
 
A European confederation would be the true way of assuring peace.  
The League of Nations is too vast and feeble.  The Locarno treaties are 
too restricted and directly linked to the bad peace treaties of 1919.  But 
Europe!  The 27 European States united in the economic, customs and 
military spheres, that is where there would be safety. 
 
 
In a September 1929 address to the League of Nations Assembly, Briand proposed ‘une 
sorte de lien fédéral’ (a kind of federal link) among the states – but one that would 
somehow avoid infringing their sovereignty.  Having identified economics as the ‘most 
pressing’ issue, Briand argued that the prospective organisation should ‘act chiefly’ in 
that sphere: economic union needed to take precedence over political union.605  The 
following May the French Government circulated the Memorandum on the 
Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union.  The proposals were modest: the 
régime would have had hardly any competencies.  The Memorandum set out a plan for 
the principle of a European ‘moral union’ being affirmed in a treaty that would oblige 
the states to meet regularly as a European Conference.606  A permanent Political 
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Committee and its secretariat would provide continuity and act as an executive body.607  
The Conference and the Committee would shape further cooperation.608 
Reversing Briand’s stance, the Memorandum stipulated that political union had 
to precede the establishment of a common market because the ‘useless’ contrary order 
would scare the smaller nations, which feared that larger states would leverage their 
economic might for political domination.609  The change in priority between September 
1929 and May 1930 was encapsulated by the phrase ‘the necessary subordination of the 
economic to the political.’610  The phrase bred suspicions that Briand’s proposals had 
been twisted to further the ends of French security policy, and that the purported 
concern for the smaller nations was a mask for self-interest.611 
In the Memorandum, Briand envisaged the creation of a political union 
 
built not upon the idea of unity but of union; that is to say, sufficiently 
flexible to respect the independence and national sovereignty of each 
of the States, while assuring them all the benefits of collective 
solidarity for the settlement of political questions involving the fate of 
the European community or that of one of its Members.612 
 
 
This was a vision of an intergovernmental Europe; given that national sovereignty 
would be respected, it is hard to gauge what degree of unity could possibly have been 
forged.  It is also unclear what Briand had in mind when he stated that ‘benefits’ would 
be assured for each state.613  These were just two of the vagaries in the 
Memorandum.614  Derek Heater has noted how Briand ‘piled’ up adverbial phrases to 
emphasise the integrity of national sovereignty, an example being: ‘in no case and in no 
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degree may the formation of the Federal Union desired by the European Governments 
affect in any way any of the sovereign rights of the States which are members of such 
an association’ (emphasis added by Heater).  The Dutch Government’s reply recognised 
that ‘the co-ordination of the economic and moral forces of Europe’ would fail unless 
states were ‘ready to limit the exercise of their sovereign rights to some extent.’615  But 
as Heater has noted, ‘Briand did not square this circle; he danced around it…  [By] 
giving so many assurances about the rights of states, Briand was contriving to give the 
impression that he was proposing to make a federal omelette without breaking 
sovereign eggs.’616  The Memorandum, phrased in such a way as ‘to be all things to all 
men,’ ‘ended up being nothing to anyone,’ Heater has concluded. 617  There was 
opposition to the Briand initiative from (and within) states including Britain and Italy 
(Fig. 11).  Ultimately the states decided on a ‘first-class burial’ for the initiative (which 
the German Cabinet had sought): it was interred in a League of Nations commission, 
which did little more than gather economic statistics.618  After Briand’s death in March 
1932, the commission met one last time to dissolve itself.619 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Briand, holding the reins, spurs on a mongrel ‘united Europe’ to 
meet the American challenge.  This Italian cartoon was reproduced by the 
Review of Reviews in October 1929 (Passerini, Europe in Love, p. 60). 
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Whatever its flaws, the Memorandum was the first plan for European unity to be 
more than a paper project.  The Briand initiative set a precedent; a generation later, 
officialdom would prove well disposed to similar proposals.620 
One scholar’s suggestion that Briand’s ‘eloquent Pan-European call’ was ‘not 
even remembered two or three years after its utterance’ does not hold true for prominent 
figures in the NEG/NBM.621  The NEG’s recommended reading list included L’Union 
Européenne, a book by B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch and Georges Scelle containing the 
complete documentation of the Briand Memorandum and the debate on it.622 
Some critics had dismissed Briand’s vision as castles in the air (see Fig. 12).623  
Yet ‘building castles in the air,’ Watts argued in Eleventh Hour, was decidedly different 
from exercising ‘imagination,’ the latter being ‘the forerunner of creation, the 
possession of vision for the future.’  Any fair assessment of the NEG/NBM has to 
acknowledge that the movement’s Eurofederalist advocacy was characterised by the 
‘immediacy of thought and action’ that Watts deemed essential to the expression of 
political imagination.624 
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Fig. 12.  Briand dreams of a United States of Europe, depicted as 
castles in the air.  This Dutch cartoon was reproduced by the Review 
of Reviews in August 1929 (Passerini, Europe in Love, p. 59). 
 
 
Three weeks prior to Watts’ article, Eleventh Hour had lamented that a 
European federation had long been regarded as ‘a utopian dream.’625  To New Britain 
weekly, though, it was the editors of The Economist who ‘breathe and move in 
dreamland,’ given their ‘faith’ in the League Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  
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Prominent figures in the NEG/NBM continued: ‘We rubbed our eyes’ on reading the 
assertion by a ‘respected contemporary’ that the United States of Europe would be ‘no 
substitute for the world-wide collective system of security.’626  Addressing those who 
dismissed the ‘Utopia’ of a ‘New Europe’ as ‘an idle dream,’ ‘Sentinel’ wrote that the 
NEG/NBM would ‘create a policy which will be the instrument to achieve our 
purpose.’627  A week earlier, ‘Sentinel’ had called for Briand’s ‘great and real’ vision to 
be ‘translated into practical politics.’628  Given that ‘more heterogeneous’ peoples 
‘could live together’ in other parts of the world, ‘the federation of Europe ought to be 
child’s play.’629 
Unlike Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi, who avowed that little or no ceding of 
sovereignty would be necessary for a successful union, the NEG/NBM was unequivocal 
in its position that there could be 
 
no reconciliation of differences, political or economic, while the 
nations stand firmly on their sovereign rights.  Unless those rights are 
surrendered in part and the nations come together to make a common 
European polity, conflicts, threats of war, and insecurity will disturb 
them, and the reconstruction of Europe will be out of the question.630 
 
 
Prominent figures in the movement took the uncompromising position from which 
Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi had shied away.  The states had rejected the Briand 
initiative because it went too far, but for the NEG/NBM it had not gone far enough.   
The NEG argued that war would be inevitable if states continued to act as laws unto 
themselves, ‘clinging’ to their ‘powers of separate sovereignty.’631  Neither armed 
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neutrality nor, in the aviation age, island status guaranteed protection, so no state could 
unilaterally exempt itself from conflict. 
The ‘war to end war’ had resulted in what Archibald Wavell called the ‘Peace to 
end Peace.’632  In the view of the NEG/NBM, another continent-wide conflict could be 
prevented only if states pooled at least as much sovereignty as had allowed them to 
wage war in the past.  Ultimately, a federal body with a monopoly on the use of force 
(except that needed by each constituent state to uphold domestic order) would ensure 
peace among the states over which it held jurisdiction.  The NEG stipulated that the 
pooling of sovereignty ‘would not involve the renunciation by any nation of its 
legitimate autonomy, much less its territory, culture, language or customs’; each of the 
states only needed to renounce sovereignty over the competencies that allowed them to 
act with ‘aggression, both military and economic.’633 
In New Britain weekly, ‘X. Y. Z.’ took issue with G. D. H. Cole and Margaret 
Cole’s criticism of Briand’s vision.  They argued, in The Intelligent Man’s Review of 
Europe Today, that Briand had ‘attempted to bring about a political union of the 
European States without giving it any firm basis of economic service.’  ‘X. Y. Z.’ 
understood that to mean the Coles thought economic union had to precede political 
unity, as many states had argued in their replies to the Memorandum.  But ‘X. Y. Z.’ 
believed attempts at economic integration needed to be postponed until Europe had 
overcome its political problems, which were the greatest danger facing the continent.634 
Mitrinović’s personal view was that it needed to be ‘recognised in fairness and 
historic decency’ that Briand, and France, had made a ‘fine and innocent attempt’ to 
bring about a united Europe.  The Briand initiative had ‘failed’ not because 
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it was only a mere diplomatic and superficial attempt of officials; for 
economically it was enlightened enough, and politically it was not 
based on a secret motive of French dominance.  Historically, that 
attempt shattered on the unconscious and profound British resistance; 
but it metaphysically shattered because it did not come out of Spirit. 
 
 
Mitrinović did not elaborate on the metaphysical shattering, but he may have been 
alluding to the failure of politicians and civil servants to rise above a pattern of power 
politics ingrained over centuries.  Nor did Mitrinović explain his concluding judgement 
that the Briand initiative ‘was sociologically and psychologically a seedless fruit,’ 
though here he may have been referring to the absence, among the relevant parties, of 
what is now called European consciousness.635 
‘British resistance’ to the Briand initiative had indeed been ‘profound,’ not least 
because the FO had feared it could ‘endanger the cohesion’ of the Empire.636  But 
Germany, as well as Britain, had worried about antagonising the United States and 
lowering the chances of reviving global economic cooperation.637  Even France came to 
reject the initiative after the fervent nationalist André Tardieu succeeded Briand as 
prime minister.638  Other reasons for the failure included opposition from the League of 
Nations bureaucracy, which resisted the development of a potential rival; the death of 
German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann; the abrupt change in the economic 
climate after the Wall Street Crash; the National Socialist electoral breakthrough in 
1930; and Briand’s fading from the international scene.639  Mitrinović was thus 
mistaken when he singled out Britain’s attitude as the cause of failure.  Coudenhove-
Kalergi came to take a similar view a decade later, though: he stated that Britain’s reply 
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to the Memorandum was ‘the most disastrous’ and ‘spelt the complete ruin of Briand’s 
initiative.’640 
Across the NEG/NBM’s periodicals, the contributor who most closely 
scrutinised the implications of national sovereignty was W. Horsfall Carter, editor of 
the journal of the New Commonwealth Society for the Promotion of International Law 
and Order.  For Carter, the enemy of peace was not ‘evil hearts’ but rather ‘inter-State 
anarchy.’  He believed that there had to be 
 
a recognised law which can be enforced in inter-State relations just as 
there is a law that can be enforced in civic relationships. 
The remedy is not to be found in anti-nationalism or 
internationalism but Federation, each country making its contribution 
to the community of nations without imposing its own interests at the 
expense of the others.641 
 
 
Carter focused on the issue in ‘A New Foreign Policy for Britain,’ first published in 
New Britain weekly.642  Arguing that European states needed to ‘sacrifice a measure of 
“sovereignty” to a Federal authority,’ Carter thought that disarmament would be 
possible only if such an authority assumed responsibility for defence.  He explained that 
there had never been a community in 
 
which the members enjoyed security where the principle of each 
defending himself obtained.  Even in a primitive savage tribe the 
defence of the individual being is not an individual function but a 
function of the community.  Yet in our inter-State relationships this 
idea of self-protection, bolstered by alliances, is maintained.643 
 
 
Carter saw ‘all the difference in the world’ between ‘competing and policing 
armaments’; he argued that Europe should not seek to ‘abolish armed force,’ but rather 
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to ‘make armed force police power.’  ‘International defence’ would make it 
unnecessary for each European state to maintain a ‘huge margin’ of armaments ‘over 
and above what is required for preserving domestic law and order.’  Carter stated that 
 
a policy of federalism and disarmament through security – i.e., co-
operative defence – for Europe is both practicable and essential.  A 
metropolitan police force for the metropolitan continent is the first 
step.  And, since the coming of the aeroplane, the British Isles are 
bound to Europe ‘by links as strong as steel and as light as air.’ 
 
 
Aviation was both a curse and a blessing: ‘effective defence against aerial attack’ was 
‘impossible,’ but ‘Air Transport’ was ‘the heaven-sent federative link of our 
generation,’ given that ‘physical bonds of unity’ had to ‘precede and condition the 
coming of [a] “European state of mind.”’644  Carter proposed that ‘European air police 
power’ be vested in a federal authority, and ‘national air forces’ abolished.  Doing 
likewise with armies and navies, though, would ‘obviously be a gradual and lengthy 
process.’  Carter believed these changes would allow Europe to ‘cross the Rubicon to 
an era of federal government and peace.’645 
Some readers of the NEG/NBM’s periodicals were entirely convinced by these 
arguments.  A. Griffiths of Barking, for example, wrote to the editor of New Britain 
weekly following the publication of Carter’s article.  Griffiths stated his agreement that 
‘a collective system of security for Europe’ could ‘only eventuate by a surrender by 
National Governments of their sovereignty.’  For Griffiths, national sovereignty meant 
 
the right of any nation to defend itself by any means whatsoever: from 
pop-guns to bacteriological and chemical and super-physical weapons.  
With these weapons past and present imperia have been established.  
The psychology that has accompanied the foundation and the 
preservation of these empires cannot ‘keep company’ with the 
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psychological background of federation as it must be understood even 
by those who have but a passing acquaintance with European politics. 
 
 
Griffiths put the onus on ‘individuals in all lands’: they had to make the ‘bold gesture’ 
of ‘declaring their intention to make a personal resistance to War.’  Once the individual 
had surrendered ‘his sovereign right, i.e., his right to use arms, with others, to assert his 
will,’ the ‘goodwill’ of Europe could ‘be established by patience in conference, without 
the “threat” of armed national forces to fortify weak argument, unjust claims, and 
impatient militarism.’646  Clearly, the movement’s periodicals not only provoked 
readers to reflect on the issue of sovereignty, but prompted some to develop their own 
nuanced views and to share them with others in the NBM’s networked audience. 
 
 
Four Lines of Reasoning: the NEG/NBM’s Case for Eurofederalism 
 
The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures, along with some other contributors to the 
movement’s periodicals, consistently advocated the creation of a European federation – 
but on what grounds, exactly?  I have discerned four lines of reasoning that entwined to 
form the tightest and strongest argument for Eurofederalism woven by any group in 
Britain before the Second World War. 
The NEG/NBM’s first line of reasoning was that, given the inefficacy of the 
League of Nations, ‘only Federation’ could stop the crisis turning into a disaster.647  The 
second was that the nations that pooled sovereignty had much more to gain than 
security; economic and other benefits would accrue to all.  The third line of reasoning 
was that federalisation would reinforce Europe’s geopolitical position, which had been 
weakened by the Great War.  The movement’s fourth line of reasoning was that Europe 
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was one community and as such ought to be one polity (this was, in part, a 
rationalisation of the prominent figures’ deep emotional investment in the idea of 
European unity).  These four lines of reasoning will be discussed in turn. 
 
i) Federalisation as the only means of preventing disaster 
 
The line of reasoning that the NEG/NBM articulated with the greatest sense of 
urgency was that disaster could be prevented only by federalisation.  ‘Without doubt,’ 
the NBM declared, the ‘dominant fact’ in Europe was the ‘struggle (against ever-
shortening time) for constructive integration before disintegration works irrevocable 
havoc.’648 
In September 1934 the journalist C. F. Melville argued that ‘Nationalism and 
Expansionism threaten to destroy Europe as an entity,’ making it ‘more clear that the 
only alternative to European chaos is European Federation.’  He conceded that ‘fear’ 
was ‘not the highest of motives,’ but thought the prospect of ‘European disintegration’ 
might drive the nations of Europe to ‘find a lasting solution by means of the Federative 
idea.’649  That same month, Carter wrote that Europe had to federate in order to ‘survive 
at all’: it was ‘just a simple case of self-preservation’ given ‘the appalling prospect of 
aero-chemical warfare.’650 
Five months later, Palmer argued that if the ‘gigantic reform’ of ‘Federation’ did 
not ‘occur peaceably during the next fifteen years,’ it would be ‘forced upon Europe by 
war.’651  The League of Nations ‘functioned too idealistically and illogically,’ so it was 
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649 C. F. Melville, ‘Federation or Chaos’, Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin, 26 September 1934, p. 3. 
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the responsibility of ‘good Europeans’ to ‘make clean the house of Europe’ before the 
‘Wrath of God’ did it for them.652 
Prominent figures in the NEG realised that the League was ‘in actuality’ a 
‘League of dominant and self-seeking States.’653  Carter supposed there was a need for 
‘a loose universal cadre, such as we have in the League,’ but wanted ‘continental 
operation of federal machinery’ within it.654  ‘The Reader’s Guide,’ however, fretted 
that if European cooperation were to be institutionalised within the League, Europe’s 
reconstruction would be ‘stultified by precedent.’655  The NBM noted that the League 
had not welcomed the prospect of a ‘move towards a Federation of Europe’ because it 
saw in it ‘a challenge to itself.’  Ultimately, the League was ‘futile’ and ‘a farce’ 
because ‘no nation takes it seriously.’656  Only ‘the welding of Europe into unity’ would 
‘make arms unnecessary.’  The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures asked: 
 
Why does not Manchester fight London?  Because the two cities, with 
others, form a political unity.  Germany and France will cease to look 
upon each other as enemies when they have common political interests 
in the Federation of Europe.  That Federation is the one way to 
disarmament and world salvation.657 
 
But any ‘federative attempt’ stemming merely ‘from fear of disaster’ would not 
succeed: only ‘a positive vision’ for the continent could ‘disarm Europe and organise 
her for peace and survival.’658 
 
ii) Federalisation (particularly the pooling of sovereignty) as a means of mutually 
reaping benefits beyond those in the sphere of security 
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The NEG/NBM made a strong case that a European federation would ensure 
permanent/active continent-wide peace – but what other benefits would accrue to 
nations that pooled sovereignty, in the view of the movement’s prominent figures?  
Drawing into focus a ‘positive vision’ of Europe that would promote ‘Dignity, Freedom 
and Happiness,’ the NEG/NBM argued that Europeans would enjoy ‘greater physical 
and spiritual comfort’ and other benefits under a Kantian, rules-based order than under 
the established disorder.659  While adamant that federalisation was not to be attempted 
‘just for the sake of … bourgeois comfort,’ the movement’s prominent figures 
recognised that ‘material advantage lies in unity rather than disunity,’ as McEachran put 
it.660  He prophesied that ‘enormous’ advantages would result from the creation of a 
floating (‘freed from gold’) single European currency ‘managed by experts from each 
nation in the interests of the whole.’661  McEachran favoured free trade in Europe 
because ‘every argument in favour of a Zollverein for one nation holds equally well for 
any group of nations.’662  Bauer, for his part, saw that Europe would face ‘much harder 
competition in the world, which forces us to … larger collectives into which we are 
growing together.’663 
But in contrast to the Paneuropean Union, which emphasised the economic 
rationale for European unity, the NEG/NBM devoted few column inches to the 
matter.664  This was mainly because the movement’s prominent figures thought that 
nations could ensure their prosperity only by making cooperation, rather than 
competition, the basis of their national economies.  They believed that if financial and 
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economic reconstitution did not precede or accompany federalisation, states in a federal 
Europe would still need to transform their financial systems, and modes of production 
and distribution. 
The ‘private control of credit’ was, in the NEG’s view, ‘largely, if not wholly, 
responsible for our present inability to consume more than a fraction of the abundant 
wealth which is available,’ so the ‘concentration of financial powers controlling a larger 
area [all of Europe] by the same methods would be quite likely to make matters 
worse.’665  In Mairet’s view, the ‘plans and intrigues’ of a ‘super-government’ of 
‘banking and financial interests’ had already impaired the ability of politicians to 
determine their nations’ vital interests.666  The politicians were controlled by financial 
‘advisors’ who were, in turn, controlled by stock-market reports as ‘fantastically 
uncontrollable as the weather.’667  Believing that the economic sovereignty of nations 
had been weathered and eroded, the NEG/NBM’s prominent figures anchored their 
radical ideas for financial and economic reform at the national level, knowing that 
changes would be hard enough to effect in their own country. 
Other than permanent peace, a single European currency and free trade in 
Europe, what else did states that pooled sovereignty stand to gain?  Four more benefits 
had been identified by C. F. Heerfordt, a Danish doctor and author of A New Europe 
(1925), whose ideas were publicised by the NBM.  The first additional benefit would be 
the ending of what Heerfordt saw as ‘national duplication of shipping and transport.’  
The second benefit would be ‘immense’ savings in the defence expenditures of states, 
given that those pooling sovereignty would need merely ‘to contribute towards the 
support of one international armament instead of maintaining many competing armies.’  
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The third benefit would be the ability to ‘combine in the execution of vast schemes of 
development of mutual benefit unhindered by national jealousies.’ 
The fourth benefit that Heerfordt had identified, namely the ‘great sense of 
freedom and power’ that comes ‘when a longstanding fear of neighbours gives way to 
trust in them,’ is worth examining in detail.  For centuries, ‘evil dreams of illegitimate 
power [had] cankered every cultural flowering,’ but federalisation would end the 
‘nightmare,’ freeing up energies for ‘cultural expansion.’  Far from imagining that the 
national lives of small nations (such as his own) might be drowned in a pool of 
sovereignty, Heerfordt thought that all their talent ‘crippled by the dread of national 
extinction’ would gain ‘the freedom to take cultural forms which has come only to great 
nations hitherto.’  The Great Powers, for their part, would lose ‘nothing but a reputation 
for bullying rapacity.’  The ‘sacrifice of a portion of their autonomy’ would leave ‘still 
secure the advantages which their abilities as peoples have won for them,’ and would in 
fact free those abilities for ‘beneficent enterprise.’  In short, a federal Europe’s ‘powers 
and possibilities would be immense.’668  The NEG expressed similar sentiment: 
federalisation would allow European states to ‘gain the larger life’ and attain ‘their full 
significance in history.’669  The movement’s prominent figures were very much in 
sympathy with Heerfordt’s ideas, which they discussed not only in New Atlantis: For 
Western Renaissance and World Socialism (hereafter New Atlantis), but in New Britain 
weekly and Eleventh Hour, too. 
 
iii) Federalisation as a means of reinforcing Europe’s position in the world 
 
The NEG/NBM’s third line of reasoning was that if Europe federalised, it would 
strengthen its geopolitical position, which had been weakened by the Great War.  For 
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the movement’s prominent figures, Europe was ‘universal’ and ‘the world’s heart of 
culture’; its canon of virtue consisted of ‘Personality, Individuation, Human 
Freedom.’670  Europe had ‘proclaimed to the World that reason is the guide to human 
action,’ yet was ‘betraying its principles,’ Delahaye wrote.  The depths to which Europe 
was sinking were only to be apprehended through ‘consciousness of the high destiny 
she should fulfil.’671 
Delahaye’s concerns were features of the European intellectual landscape 
between the wars, when elites were troubled by the continent’s diminution and loss of 
prestige.  The United States (the sole anti-colonial Great Power) had ‘temporarily 
suspended’ its pre-eminence when it shunned the League of Nations and politically 
retreated to hemispheric isolation.672  This did not, however, temper Europeans’ fears of 
the economic eclipse of their continent, which was another preoccupation of elite 
discourse. 
In 1920 Albert Demangeon had proved, in Le déclin de l’Europe, that the 
continent’s share of world trade had fallen, which he took to be one symptom of the de-
Europeanisation of the world.673  Trade recovery in the 1920s did not stop Somerset de 
Chair fretting in 1931 – a year after the publication of Ludwell Danny’s America 
Conquers Britain: a Record of Economic War – about the prospect of European 
‘vassaldom.’  Americans were exercising an ‘astonishing’ degree of ‘industrial control,’ 
de Chair argued, and Continental Europe was being ‘bought up’ via ‘a mortgage’ on 
‘indebtedness.’674  What was less clear, though, was the extent to which the Great War 
had undermined Europe’s claim to global political leadership.675 
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In the long nineteenth century, European hegemony had seemed to be 
underwritten by history itself.  Fear of the loss of this hegemony increased during the 
Great War, but debate on the vexed issue intensified in 1919, when Paul Valéry asked: 
 
can Europe hold its pre-eminence in all fields? 
Will Europe become what it is in reality – that is, a little 
promontory on the continent of Asia? 
Or will it remain what it seems – that is, the elect portion of the 
terrestrial globe, the pearl of the sphere, the brain of a vast body?676 
 
By 1926, Toynbee was discussing ‘the dwarfing of Europe’: with the world adopting 
Western practices, Europe risked being overwhelmed and outpaced by industrialisation 
elsewhere.  Two years later, Herman von Keyserling wrote that Europe had ‘become 
weak and very small in relation to the new world,’ but that if the continent allowed ‘the 
supranational to overcome the national’ it might be able to hold at bay the forces of 
homogenisation and mechanisation.677 
In 1934 the NEG/NBM published an article by Alexandre Marc on ‘the 
weakening of the importance of Europe.’  Previously ‘the centre of the world,’ Europe 
had become ‘a mere peninsula of Asia,’ the leader of l’Ordre Nouveau wrote.678  A year 
earlier, Spengler had taken an even more pessimistic view: the European powers – 
having lost ‘the respect of the coloured races’ – had ‘abdicated from their former rank,’ 
shifting ‘the political centre of gravity.’679  Woolf, a neighbour of the NEG in 
Bloomsbury, had argued as early as 1928 that ‘The revolt against the European’s 
                                                
676 Valéry imagined Britain and India on a set of scales, tilted in Britain’s favour – but he foresaw ‘a 
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political domination and economic exploitation, which we have already seen in Asia, 
will inevitably be repeated in Africa.’680 
The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures acknowledged that the Europe-centred 
world order was in a state of disrepair, but did not regard European enfeeblement as 
inevitable.  The NEG stated that ‘the potential power and splendour’ of the continent 
was ‘not less than before the War.’681  Bauer argued that a federal Europe would 
‘regain’ the continent’s ‘lost supremacy amongst the Peoples of Earth – not by 
violence, but with prudence and wisdom.’682 
Stirk has noted that advocates of European unity in the interwar years ‘tended to 
reassure’ their audiences that all was not yet lost for Europe’s cultural heritage.683  This 
tendency was strongly in evidence among the NEG/NBM’s prominent figures, but they 
made clear that the revival of Europe depended on federalisation.  They argued that 
failure to federate would make it ‘most unlikely’ that western Europe could ‘live for 
long as a chief world-power,’ and ‘doubtful’ that the British Empire could ‘long 
survive’ – for failure would lead to the world being ‘divided between two dynamic 
forces of the Soviet States and of America.’684 
As prominent figures in the NEG/NBM saw it, Europe had a responsibility to set 
an example: federalisation would assure Europe’s future as the ‘internation,’ the 
‘country of the world,’ as McEachran put it.685  In Mitrinović’s view, Europe rightfully 
stewarded much of the world, though he couched this in terms of service to humankind.  
                                                
680 Leonard Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization (New York, 1928), p. 122.  During the Great War, the 
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Among the NBM’s aims was that ‘less industrialised countries’ receive ‘assistance,’ 
ultimately ‘leading to a World Federation of free peoples.’686  For the movement’s 
prominent figures, then, European centrality was a matter of custodianship, not 
hegemony.  The Soviet Union and the United States were not ready to be ‘left alone in 
charge’ because they needed ‘European and British Guidance if the necessary world-
planning of our age’ were to proceed ‘in the human interest,’ Mitrinović wrote.687 
Mitrinović’s statements about American and Russian unfitness to take up the 
mantle of global leadership echoed those of José Ortega y Gasset.688  The Spanish 
philosopher had argued that it would not matter if Europe ‘ceased to command’ if its 
place could be taken by another entity – but there was not ‘the faintest sign of one.’689  
Ortega y Gasset’s ideas, though, had a greater influence on the NEG/NBM’s fourth line 
of reasoning for Eurofederalism, as we shall now see. 
 
iv) Federalisation as the means of actualising the community of Europe in a polity 
 
The movement’s fourth line of reasoning was that Europe needed to become a 
federal polity because it was one community with a ‘common history and cultural 
development.’690  This was the sincere belief of the movement’s prominent figures, who 
wrote of ‘the great European brotherhood,’ divided by ‘unreal barriers.’691  One of 
Ortega y Gasset’s ideas that resonated with them was that Europeans were ‘checked’ in 
their economic, political and cultural projects: their ‘vital possibilities’ were ‘out of 
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proportion’ to the ‘puny’ states that hemmed them in.692  Ortega y Gasset thought that 
the greater part of Europeans’ ‘opinions, standards, desires [and] assumptions’ came to 
them from ‘the common European stock,’ which led him to conclude that the 
continent’s nation-states were obsolete and needed to be led to a ‘higher evolution.’693 
Princeton professor Christian Gauss, an occasional contributor to the 
NEG/NBM’s periodicals, explored these ideas in an article for New Atlantis.  
Nationalism had ‘fulfilled its cultural mission,’ and was ‘as defunct as paganism or 
feudalism,’ he declared.  ‘Henceforth it can beget only sterile destructive conflicts and 
final catastrophe,’ so ‘to realise the richest life open to the modern man, we can no 
longer be merely Englishman or Germans or Frenchman,’ he argued.694 
The current of thought channelled by Ortega y Gasset and Gauss was part of a 
wider investigation into the ‘unity’ of European civilisation undertaken by intellectuals 
in the interwar years.  Some of these intellectuals, Lipgens has noted, took the 
‘conscious rediscovery’ and ‘passionately renewed awareness’ of what they saw as 
common European values to be an ‘indispensable preliminary’ to political unification.  
They realised that in the aftermath of the Great War, victors and vanquished alike were 
less secure.695  Jay Winter has written of the ‘wrenching experience of loss,’ the 
‘universality of grief and mourning’ and the ‘bond of bereavement’ as features of the 
‘commonality of European cultural life’ at this time.696 
In a way, the universality of suffering brought Europe back together, as the 
NEG recognised in 1931: 
 
[S]uffering for their millions slain, diminished altogether as a group of 
world powers, the nations of Europe have one thing which they have not 
had for centuries.  And that is the dawning consciousness of a common 
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predicament.  They begin to know, in the ruins of their bloodiest rivalry, 
that the hour has come when, if they cannot live together they must go 
together to a worse downfall. 
 
The NEG stated that Europe was mainly ‘one in culture’: there was a ‘natural unity to 
which our whole history, geography and anthropology bear witness, and which would 
save our situation if we recognised and took control of it.’697  Europeans’ mere 
recognition of a deeply rooted shared tradition would not be enough – the natural unity 
had to resonate with them, so they would become cognisant of their ‘community of 
interest.’698  The NEG/NBM promoted awareness of this unity through its publications 
and events, and encouraged the NBM local groups to engage with the idea at their 
meetings.699 
McEachran was the member who explored the European ‘life lived in common’ 
in greatest depth.700  The peoples of the continent would grow intellectually and 
culturally ‘more aware of its unity’ if there were a ‘general pooling’ of nations’ 
contributions to ‘the course of European life,’ he wrote.  That would ‘clear the way for 
economic and political union’ by creating ‘more common feeling.’701  Bauer, for his 
part, thought it necessary to ‘transform’ sometimes ‘exaggerated nationalisms into 
enthusiastic European patriotism.’702  McEachran stated that, after all, an individual 
could love ‘the whole as well as the part, Europe as well as his nation.’703  With the 
‘growth of Europeanism,’ the continent would begin ‘to feel itself one country.’  
McEachran recognised that a ‘critic may object’ that he had 
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advanced a European nationalism quite as deadly, if it came into being, 
as the national examples we have condemned.  Europe, if created as a 
single country, would feel itself in opposition not only to Russia, but 
also to America, and would enter into the same conflicts that we now see 
operating within its borders.  There is some truth in this, and it cannot be 
denied that some Europeans, fearing Russia or hating America, might 
envisage a European country in that spirit.704 
 
But if a federal Europe were to be founded on the principles of ‘unity, diversity and 
mutual tolerance,’ it would entirely ‘contradict’ Euro-chauvinism.705  At this juncture 
we must turn our attention to the NEG/NBM’s proposals for federal European 
institutions predicated on these principles.  
 
 
The NEG/NBM’s Proposals for European Governance and Institutions 
 
The NEG/NBM’s proposals for European governance and institutions – including a 
General Economic Council of the Federation, a General Parliament of the Federation, 
and a federal-level Cultural Assembly – were not detailed in a single publication.  
Rather, the main ideas were set out in several pamphlets, supplemented by scores of 
articles.  The movement’s prominent figures were confident that all ‘wounds would be 
healed, and all the insoluble problems of butchered European minorities solved, in 
Federation’ – but how, exactly, did they envisage this happening?706 
The NEG first published ideas for reforms in the spheres of economics, politics 
and culture in Integration of Europe.  The movement’s prominent figures ‘strongly 
supported’ the creation of an ‘economic federation’ of European states, but they 
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believed its disposition would be ‘vitally dependent’ on simultaneous developments in 
politics and culture, without which ‘economic federation might become little more than 
the control of the finances of the whole continent by the present financial houses, only 
acting in closer concert and in an even greater independence of political control.’  
Having the ‘gravest objections’ to this prospect, the NEG sought to make finance 
‘strictly instrumental.’  Believing the true basis of an economy to be production and 
consumption, the NEG wanted the financial sector to be reduced to merely ‘the 
balancing and distributive mechanism.’  It was workers – ‘from the most mechanical to 
the most cultured’ – who were the ‘source of wealth’; the NEG thus argued that each 
group (e.g. miners) needed to be granted the ‘freedom and incentive to develop in self-
governing order.’  To this end, the NEG envisaged the creation of industry-specific 
national associations, each of which would include all workers in its particular field.  
These associations would delegate members to the General Economic Council of the 
Federation, which would be responsible for ‘regulating the co-operation of the different 
industries.’  In the Council the European banking sector would be powerless to prevent 
the repurposing of money, which would become a means of balancing production with 
consumption so as to ensure the distribution of all goods manufactured (e.g. money 
supply would be increased in line with the productive capacity of each national 
economy, so there would never be too little money chasing output).707 
The political organisation of the European federation would be ‘necessarily 
more complicated’ than the reorganisation of any of the prospective constituent states, 
but its 
 
principles and its scope will be much simplified by the presence of a 
well-integrated economic life.  The present political parliaments are 
harassed and absurdly overburdened by work which is not in their true 
province, especially by economic and financial forces which they must 
endeavour to control, but which in fact control them. 
                                                
707 Integration of Europe, pp. 6–7. 
164 
 
 
The NEG proposed that each national parliament ‘adequately’ reform itself by 
transferring some powers to the General Economic Council and by devolving some 
other powers to ‘smaller councils of more local authority.’  The parliaments would then 
elect the General Parliament of the Federation, ensuring its ‘full respect’ for 
‘autonomies’ while it exercised authority solely over ‘relations between the different 
states and language areas.’  European governance would thus be based on the principle 
of subsidiarity.708 
In Integration of Europe the NEG argued that another ‘necessary feature of 
Federated Europe’ would be a Cultural Assembly.  This ‘ought to be founded upon 
[prospective] similar assemblies’ in the constituent states.  The NEG envisioned each 
national cultural assembly comprising appointees from ‘each and all’ of the bodies 
responsible for education, health, recreation, science, philosophy and art in the 
respective state.709  ‘No great fantasy’ would be needed to envisage the creation of a 
federal-level Cultural Assembly, given that international organisations such as scientific 
congresses already existed.  The Cultural Assembly’s principal function would be ‘the 
co-ordination of work in its own sphere of action.’  Its other crucial role would be to 
‘advise’ the General Economic Council and the General Parliament of the Federation on 
many issues (including ‘genetics’ and ‘the waste or misuse of natural and human 
resources’) that ‘demand the highest expert knowledge.’  The three bodies would never 
sit together, but would confer ‘in the persons of specially elected delegates.’  If ‘cultural 
workers’ cooperated to an ‘as yet unheard of’ degree at the European level, the Council 
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165 
 
and Parliament would be provided with expert advice in every field, enabling Europe to 
‘take more intelligent control’ of its destiny.710 
In a 1933 lecture to the NEG, Bauer proposed the creation of a Central 
Scientific Institution, which would ‘carry on the necessary scientific work for all 
political and economic Conferences … to build up’ the federation.711  Personnel from 
‘all [European] nations’ would study controversial questions ‘independent of any 
political influence whatsoever.’  The findings of these disinterested experts would 
inform the decisions of the federal bodies.712 
Bauer argued that Vienna would be the best choice for the capital of a federal 
Europe.  First, though, Vienna would have to become ‘extraterritorial and self-
governed, according to general European interests’; that way, it would be insulated 
from ‘any political trouble.’713  Bauer believed that this ‘European supernational 
Metropolis’ would have a civilising effect, for in Vienna the most intricate 
 
political questions would lose their acuteness.  Any one coming under 
the influence of the very mild and spiritual genius of this locality, seems 
to be elevated upon a higher level of thought and feeling – and begins to 
get a more general view of European things, as one who stands on a high 
mountain and looks down into the valleys below.714 
 
Carter, too, proposed Vienna, which still had ‘the trappings of a capital.’  He also 
suggested that it first be made a Free City, ‘segregated’ from the rest of Austria.715 
New Europe stated that if Vienna became ‘the Capital of the Federation,’ ‘the 
historic mission of Central Europe’ would be accomplished.716  The same periodical 
stated that Tomáš Masaryk deserved ‘more than anyone else’ the European federation’s 
                                                
710 Ibid., p. 8. 
711 Bauer, Europe [part 3], p. 58. 
712 NAFDMA, 5/4/1 File, Victor M. Bauer, Europe: A Living Organism [part 2], 1933, p. 8. 
713 Bauer, Europe [part 3], p. 56. 
714 Bauer, Europe [part 2], p. 7. 
715 Carter, ‘Exploring the Approaches’, p. 24. 
716 New Europe, September 1934, p. 12. 
166 
 
presidency, but suggested neither a set of competencies, nor source of legitimacy.717  
The ‘plea and advice’ offered – ‘Briand having failed, Man Masaryk, should you not try 
again?’ – indicates that Mitrinović was attempting to enlist the widely revered 
statesman as a founding president.718 
New Britain weekly stated that it was ‘natural’ that a ‘beginning should be 
made’ in central Europe because ‘regionalism’ was ‘the only salvation for those 
distraught countries.’719  Lavrin wrote that the increasing speed of communications was 
ending the ‘parochial isolation’ of small nations, making it possible for a European 
federation to be ‘instigated’ by small states that had ‘nothing to lose and everything to 
gain from such a policy.’  A ‘powerful Danubian Group,’ for example, could grow out 
of ‘mutual co-operation’ rooted in the ‘very instinct of political and national self-
preservation.’  This idea, Lavrin argued, would ‘mature’ into the idea of ‘a wide self-
protective federation on the part of the small States of Europe.’720  In August 1933, 
New Britain weekly expressed ‘satisfaction’ over official consideration of the 
‘economic Danubian confederation’ proposed by Czechoslovak foreign minister Edvard 
Beneš.  The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures took this to be evidence that, ‘in the realm 
of practical politics and economics,’ the federative idea was ‘taking shape as the only 
workable solution’ to this ‘regional problem.’  For them, the ‘wider inference’ was 
‘obvious,’ as it likely was for many readers, too.721 
Delahaye, like Lavrin, believed a federal Europe could be ‘built up gradually 
from small scale federations’ of Danubian, Balkan, Baltic or Scandinavian states; there 
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was no need, he argued, to ‘wait until all countries were simultaneously ready to unite.’  
Delahaye proposed ‘co-operative pacts embracing both political and economic 
intercourse’ as the first step toward a European federation.  He did not detail his 
thoughts on the ‘reconstruction of the League and the treaties to be concluded and re-
written,’ but the ‘essential basis’ of the federation would be the application, by each 
constituent state, of the principles of federalism and 
 
devolution internally. There must be the greatest possible devolution of 
autonomy upon racial groups within states, e.g. upon minorities in 
Poland, Italy and Yugo-Slavia.  Linguistic and cultural self-government 
and indeed a considerable measure of political and economic autonomy 
must be granted to all ethnographic areas, such as Scotland and 
Wales.722 
 
Delahaye called the prospective undertaking ‘desirable, intelligent, and no more than a 
statement of what must come to pass within fifty years,’ before assessing the chances of 
it being started within five years.  As in the case of an individual, 
 
so it may be of the nation that suffering leads to wisdom, that despair 
will render both peoples and their leaders receptive to the idea of 
intelligent co-operation.  Financially, economically, and politically 
Europe is yearly becoming more desperate…  Sanity may yet operate if 
a sufficient number of people here and abroad decide that it shall. 
 
To Delahaye’s mind, it was not ‘wildly optimistic’ to suppose that smaller states would 
take (and larger states allow) steps toward federation, given that the alternative was sure 
to be war.723 
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The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures and other contributors were not the only 
ones whose thoughts on prospective forms of European governance appeared in New 
Britain weekly: readers’ correspondence on the subject was published, too.  Richard de 
Bary (of Wimborne, Dorset), for one, welcomed the ‘allusions to a Federal Europe.’  He 
suggested ‘the idea of calling a European States-General with its terms of reference to 
plan out a scheme for a common equal economic citizenship for every prospective 
citizen.’724  Just as the weekly’s articles on sovereignty prompted readers to share their 
ideas, so did its discussions of possibilities for European governance. 
On the issue of economic citizenship, ‘Sentinel’ proposed that a General 
Economic Council-like body ‘regulate scientifically the industrial and agricultural 
output of the whole of Europe,’ ‘abolish all currencies as commodities,’ and ‘establish 
one currency.’725  Bauer argued that a single currency ‘would remove all restrictions’ in 
intra-European ‘financial intercourse’ and would ‘save an enormous amount of profit 
drawn upon exchange.’  It would have a ‘sufficiently broad basis to withstand any 
attacks’ by speculators, he added.726 
Soddy discussed at length the prospect of an ‘international currency,’ which was 
‘quite easy to imagine’ and ‘well worth while attempting to come to grips with.’  
Initially, some ‘sort of Central or International Mint’ could issue the currency at a rate 
agreed by all the states that would permit its use as a second legal tender (the fair 
distribution of seigniorage revenues would not be difficult).  Once that system was 
‘working successfully,’ the machinery would be ‘competent also to take over the issue 
for each of the several nations of its internal money, and as clearly, without anyone 
being a penny the worse off, of replacing national currencies in their entirety by 
                                                
724 Richard de Bary, ‘A Federal Europe’, New Britain weekly, 10 January 1934, pp. 233–4.  Within two 
decades, a protocol signed in The Hague (in 1953) formalised the free movement of workers as a goal of 
economic union in Europe; see Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens (Lanham, 2007), p. 23. 
725 ‘Sentinel’, ‘The Shape’, p. 41.  With the 1962 introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy, the 
European Economic Community began to regulate the agricultural output of its member states. 
726 Bauer, Europe [part 3], p. 53. 
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international money for internal and external use alike.’  But Soddy thought that present 
circumstances rendered all this ‘impracticable,’ given 
 
violent fluctuations of the exchanges inseparable from the irresponsible 
issue and destruction of money, first in this country then in that, without 
the slightest reference to the welfare of the citizens of the countries in 
question.  These difficulties can only be met by complete suppression of 
private mints and the restoration to the nations of the prerogative over 
the issue of money. 
 
In other words, monetary reform in each European state would be a prerequisite for an 
international currency, in Soddy’s view.  But if ‘restoration’ were effected, the need for 
and advantages of an international currency would ‘largely disappear.’  On the other 
hand, ‘hardly any further change’ would be needed to replace the national currencies 
with a single currency.  Ultimately, Soddy feared that the necessary machinery would 
have the potential for ‘the perpetration of new social slaveries.’727 
The NEG/NBM also discussed the principles that ought to undergird a federal 
European security architecture.  New Europe argued that European states in the process 
of federalising would have the ‘responsibility to prevent a threatened aggression.’728  
T. S. Bazley argued that a mere intergovernmental system of collective security would 
be only one degree better ‘than military alliances and the “Balance of Power.”’  This 
was because ‘it would be subject to the same weakness as are all treaties and alliances,’ 
namely that ‘pacts and conventions are never permanent – at least, not till they have 
been translated into something more.’  Bazley therefore advocated the ‘pooling of 
forces in a European federation.’729 
In New Britain: For British Revolution and the Social State, Catlin argued that 
an ‘international force’ would be the biggest stride toward the establishment of 
                                                
727 Soddy, ‘International Money’, pp. 75–6.  Some would argue that such fears were realised 80 years 
later during the Greek sovereign debt crisis: ‘debt slavery’ has been a trope used by those opposed to 
Greece’s acceptance of the conditions (formulated by the European Central Bank, among others) attached 
to the bailout programme. 
728 New Europe, September 1934, p. 6. 
729 T. S. Bazley, ‘Peace Through Postponement’, Eleventh Hour, 3 July 1935, p. 157. 
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‘international sovereignty,’ but stipulated that it was up to ‘public opinion’ to give 
governments a mandate to create the force.730  Bauer argued in favour of ‘a common 
army, especially a common General Staff.’731  Carter, for his part, focused on plans to 
ensure that a European federation would have a monopoly on the use of aerial force 
across the continent, so that aviation would be ‘a boon,’ not ‘a curse.’  He argued that 
the abolition of national air forces would be made possible only by the ‘creation of a 
European Air Police plus establishment of Civil Aviation on a Continental basis.’732  
Following the founding of the Air Police, if a state threatened to commit an act of 
aggression, the mere 
 
assembly of [the Air Police] force for purposes of warning might be 
enough [to stop it].  The difference between military activity and police 
activity is that the military uses the maximum of force to defeat the 
enemy and the police uses the minimum of force in order to bring the 
enemy to the law.733 
 
Carter thought ‘an Air Disarmament Convention on the principle of pooled security’ 
would be the ‘sine qua non of any federal achievement in Europe.’734 
Eleventh Hour argued that to ‘gain the support of the injured nations’ (i.e. the 
revisionist powers), it would have to be made clear that the objective of ‘a federation of 
military forces’ was not to be merely ‘a negative assurance of immunity from attack,’ 
but rather ‘a step towards political Federation.’735  But even this blueprint for a new 
security architecture would not be sufficient to guarantee permanent peace.  Something 
more was needed, because as Bauer pointed out: ‘If a man would try to set his 
neighbour’s household in the order he deems to be the right one, he would be 
summoned for housebreaking.  International tact demands any nation to respect also a 
                                                
730 Catlin, ‘Is it Peace?’, p. 27. 
731 Bauer, Europe [part 2], p. 12. 
732 Presumably, ‘effective control of the civil machines’ was necessary to prevent their being weaponised. 
733 Carter, ‘Constructive Proposal’, p. 90. 
734 Carter, ‘Exploring the Approaches’, p. 24. 
735 ‘Disarmaments or Federations?’, Eleventh Hour, 27 February 1935, p. 249. 
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smaller one’s individuality.’736  The movement thus saw the need for an 
institutionalised means of arbitration, specifically 
 
a recognised tribunal of European powers to which the nations agree to 
defer…  If security is to be collective and mutual there must also be 
collective and mutual justice.  There must be agreement among the 
nations that force shall be the instrument of the law only, and not of 
aggressors or restrainers. 
 
Acts of aggression would be judged, territorial problems ‘unravelled,’ and past 
grievances resolved by ‘collective European will’ channelled through such a tribunal.737 
Ultimately, prominent figures in the NEG/NBM were committed to the idea of a 
federal Europe setting an example of ‘unity,’ by means of institutions that functioned on 
the principle of subsidiarity; economic governance based on cooperation; permanent 
peace; and international justice.  They imagined that the precedent to be set by Europe 
would not only encourage other continents to ‘follow suit,’ but would ‘invite 
internationalism’ on a global scale.738  The movement’s ‘far off’ goal was nothing less 
than ‘the federation of the world’ – ‘what man is meant for.’739 
  
                                                
736 Bauer, Europe [part 2], p. 9. 
737 ‘Disarmaments or Federations?’, p. 249. 
738 McEachran, Unity of Europe, p. 26. 
739 Purdom, ‘Britain’s Destiny’, p. 400. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
I began this thesis by showing that the group of challengers to the National Government 
and the parliamentary regime was not comprised solely of the usual suspects; the 
NEG/NBM, too, should be recognised as a significant ‘positive’ antisystem formation 
in the first half of the 1930s.  In spite of the movement turning its periodicals’ half-
million-strong readership into a networked audience for its ideas, the NEG/NBM has 
escaped the notice of all but a few historians, and had never before been the subject of 
extensive research.  This neglect I have shown to be an oversight – and not least 
because the NEG/NBM constituted a rare example of a movement dedicated to political 
perfectionism, an under-researched sub-field of political history.  Previously, the 
NEG/NBM’s ideas had not been charted in depth, and its ‘aspidistra antisystemness’ 
was an unmapped feature on the British extra-parliamentary political landscape between 
the wars. 
From 1933 to 1934 the NBM was a major politicised social movement; for 
reasons discussed in the introduction, though, few scholars have given the movement 
the attention it deserves.  By examining the interplay between the NEG/NBM’s 
prefigurative politics and its outside-world activity, we can add to the literature on how 
political commitments are privately embodied and publicly expressed.  In examining 
the rise and demise of the NBM, I have demonstrated how a politicised social 
movement can reframe (for those who comprise the movement’s constituency, at least) 
important politico-economic debates and be a formative influence on individuals; in the 
case of the NEG/NBM, these individuals included Niall MacDermot, who would go on 
to hold high public office. 
More importantly, though, I have explained that the NEG/NBM was Britain’s 
first genuine European federalist group, predating FU by several years.  Too few 
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scholars have come to appreciate that prominent figures in the NEG/NBM traced the 
path that second-wave groups followed.  As discussed in chapter one, the movement’s 
prominent figures ‘resolve[d], in advance of their age, that Europe shall become one 
integrated whole.’740  These first-wave thinkers, and others, may not have fully 
appreciated how technical the process of European integration would have been had 
they managed to make it the policy of states in the 1930s – and they certainly 
underestimated how difficult it would have proved to solve the problems that would 
inevitably have arisen.  The NEG/NBM’s prominent figures tended to argue that all that 
was needed for the process of European integration to commence was the states 
summoning the will to integrate.  This naivety was only to be expected, given how little 
experience they had in (civilian) public service.  But their naivety made possible the 
generation of audacious ideas that truly were ‘in advance of their age.’  Similar ideas 
had percolated up to Briand, whose initiative set the precedent that post-war statesmen 
could refer to – and draw lessons from.  By examining first-wave Eurofederalist groups 
such as the NEG/NBM we not only shed new light on the interwar years, we illuminate 
the ideational foundations of the post-1945 political order in western Europe, too. 
In The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Alan S. Milward has argued that 
the underlying purpose of the second-wave drive for European integration was to 
rehabilitate the nation-state following a second world war that was even more 
catastrophic than the first.  The nation-states needed rescuing from ignominy, and this 
was achieved by taming them: they were embedded in a network of institutions, 
including the European Coal and Steel Community, which were designed to ensure 
peace.  Indeed, the ‘common policies of the European Community came into being in 
the attempt to uphold and stabilize the post-war consensus on which the European 
                                                
740 Integration of Europe, p. 3. 
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nation-state was rebuilt.’741  This was only possible because second-wave visionaries 
and theoreticians intersected with those in power, in contrast to their first-wave 
forbears, who had managed to gain little access to official circles.   
It took a total war (including the mass extermination of millions) that devastated 
Europe, and led to its division, for statesmen to come to the realisations that the 
NEG/NBM had come to after the Great War – but the founding fathers of what we now 
call the EU saw fit to enable second-wave technocrats with visions to achieve what 
first-wave visionaries had not been able to.  New Britain weekly stated ‘by our fruits 
shall we all be known in the end.’742  The NEG/NBM’s greatest legacy is its body of 
thought on European integration: it generated a wealth of prescient ideas that linked 
first- and second-wave thinking on a political union that has had a crucial role in the 
prosperity and security of hundreds of millions of persons on this continent. 
  
                                                
741 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (2nd edn, London, 2000), p. 44. 
742 ‘Reality and Prosperity’, New Britain weekly, 4 April 1934, p. 598. 
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Appendix: a Complete List of Periodicals under Mitrinović’s Direction 
 
 
Below is the first complete listing of periodicals under Mitrinović’s direction, with 
issue dates and page counts.  They are ordered by the stated date of the first issue. 
 
New Britain quarterly (large format) 
Vol. 1, no. 1 (subtitled Quarterly Organ of the XIth Hour Club): October 1932 (32 
pages, with a 2-page insert). 
Vol. 1, no. 2 (subtitled Quarterly Organ for National Renaissance): January–March 
1933 (40 pages, with a 3-page insert). 
Vol. 1, no. 3 (subtitled Quarterly Organ for National Renaissance): April–June 
1933 (40 pages). 
 
New Britain: A Weekly Organ of National Renaissance 
Vol. 1: 26 issues (each of 32 pages), issued as weeklies starting 24 May 1933 and 
ending 15 November 1933. 
Vol. 2: 26 issues (each of 32 pages, except for the 24-page issues of 20 December 
1933, 27 December 1933, 25 April 1934, and 2 May 1934), issued as weeklies 
starting 22 November 1933 and ending 16 May 1934. 
Vol. 3: 12 issues, issued as weeklies starting 23 May 1934 (a 36-page issue) and 
ending 8 August 1934: issues from 30 May to 27 June had 28 pages (30 May 
and 20 June issues each had a 4-page insert, too), and those from 4 July to 8 
August had 32 pages (11 July and 1 August issues each had a 3-page insert, 
too). 
 
New Atlantis: For Western Renaissance and World Socialism (large format) 
Vol. 1, no. 1: October 1933 (48 pages, with a 5-page insert). 
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Vol. 1, no. 2: January 1934 (52 pages, with a 27-page supplement titled ‘A View on 
Planning’). 
 
Eleventh Hour Emergency Bulletin 
16 issues, issued fortnightly starting Easter 1934 (a 2-page issue) and ending 7 
November 1934: issues from Mid-April to August 1934 had 4 pages, and those 
from 15 August to 7 November had 8 pages. 
 
New Albion: For British Renaissance and Western Alliance (large format) 
Vol. 1, no. 1: April 1934 (48 pages). 
 
New Britain: For British Revolution and the Social State (large format) 
‘New Series’: Autumn 1934 (48 pages, with a 4-page insert and an 8-page insert). 
 
New Europe: A monthly Journal for Federation and Disarmament (unique format) 
No. 1: September 1934 (48 pages). 
 
The Eleventh Hour New Series 
Vol. 1: 26 issues, issued weekly starting 21 November 1934 and ending 15 May 
1935: issues from 21 November to 13 February (except for the 32-page issue of 
19 December) had 16 pages (the 6 February issue had a 4-page insert, too); 
issues from 20 February to 10 April (except for the 24-page issue of 20 March) 
had 20 pages; and issues from 17 April to 15 May had 24 pages. 
Vol. 2: 9 issues (each of 24 pages), issued weekly starting 22 May 1935 and ending 
17 July 1935. 
 
At least three issues (29 January, 5 February and 12 February 1936) of another 
periodical, The New Britain, were planned, and a few sources suggest they were 
produced.  They may never have been printed, however; in any case, no copy of any of 
these issues is extant in the NAFDMA.    
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